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SantaStealer is an emerging Malware-as-a-Service information-stealing malware actively advertised across Telegram and Russian-speaking hacker forums, representing a rebranded evolution of the earlier BluelineStealer project discovered in early December 2025. Built with a modular, multi-threaded architecture, SantaStealer malware targets sensitive documents, credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, and data from popular applications such as Telegram, Discord, and Steam, while attempting to operate entirely in memory to evade traditional file-based detection systems. The SantaStealer infostealer is being marketed as “fully undetected” through aggressive promotional campaigns on underground forums, yet current samples analyzed by security researchers remain largely unobfuscated, exposing symbol names and plaintext strings that make malware analysis and detection relatively straightforward. Offered under a subscription-based Malware-as-a-Service model ranging from $175 to $300 per month, SantaStealer clearly reflects commercial ambitions and potential for broader adoption as the malware continues to mature. The SantaStealer MaaS platform targets worldwide victims with explicit exclusion of Commonwealth of Independent States regions, following typical Russian cybercriminal operational patterns. Despite bold claims of advanced stealth capabilities, SantaStealer samples are delivered as DLL files with unusually large export tables containing over 500 clearly named symbols tied to credential theft and anti-analysis logic, making reverse engineering straightforward for security researchers. The malware’s core functionality focuses on stealing browser credentials, cookies, stored passwords, cryptocurrency wallet data, and application tokens from Telegram, Discord, and Steam accounts. Collected data is sent to command-and-control servers over plain HTTP in compressed chunks, representing a surprisingly weak exfiltration design that undercuts its marketing narrative of advanced operational security.
SantaStealer is a newly emerging Malware-as-a-Service infostealer that surfaced in late 2025, previously promoted under the name BluelineStealer across underground cybercriminal marketplaces. The malware is being actively advertised across Telegram channels and Russian-speaking hacker forums with bold claims of advanced stealth capabilities and “fully undetected” operation by endpoint security solutions. In practice, SantaStealer malware focuses on stealing credentials, sensitive documents, and application data while running largely in memory to limit its on-disk forensic footprint. Collected data is sent to command-and-control servers over plain HTTP in compressed chunks, a surprisingly weak design choice that significantly undercuts its marketing narrative of advanced operational security and stealth.
In December 2025, security researchers identified Windows samples closely resembling commodity infostealers from the Raccoon malware family. The 64-bit SantaStealer payload was delivered as a DLL file with an unusually large export table containing more than 500 clearly named symbols tied to credential theft and anti-analysis logic. Alongside numerous unencrypted strings embedded in the malware binary, this implementation made reverse engineering straightforward and allowed security analysts to quickly separate marketing hype from technical reality. The decision to ship SantaStealer as a DLL ultimately worked against its developers, as exporting nearly every function and global variable exposed the malware’s internal architecture, configuration handling, and statically linked third-party libraries such as cJSON, miniz, and sqlite3.
Embedded branding within SantaStealer samples, including a “SANTA STEALER” banner and Telegram contact link, led security researchers directly to a web-based control panel advertising MaaS features and subscription pricing. Despite claims of high-profile targeting capabilities, forum activity and infrastructure analysis strongly point to Russian-speaking operators with weak operational security practices and prematurely leaked malware builds. The SantaStealer developers’ failure to properly obfuscate their malware represents a significant operational security failure that enables straightforward detection and analysis by security teams.
Functionally, SantaStealer employs a modular, multi-threaded design optimized for comprehensive data exfiltration. Its main routine performs basic environment checks, including Commonwealth of Independent States keyboard detection and simple anti-virtual machine techniques common in Russian malware. The core stealer component targets browser credentials, authentication cookies, and stored passwords, using an auxiliary in-memory component to bypass Chromium browser protections. This method closely mirrors the publicly available ChromElevator project, suggesting code reuse rather than original malware development. Additional SantaStealer modules collect screenshots and extract data from popular applications such as Telegram messaging, Discord communications, and Steam gaming platform before bundling everything into a single compressed archive for exfiltration to command-and-control infrastructure.
Overall, SantaStealer is best described as an evolving but technically immature infostealer malware. While its fileless, in-memory operational approach aligns with current malware development trends, its stealth and anti-analysis features remain basic compared to established information stealers. Detection is aided by plaintext configurations and hard-coded command-and-control details present in analyzed samples. Despite being marketed as “production-ready” Malware-as-a-Service, SantaStealer remains more notable for its commercial ambition than its technical execution, making cautious user behavior and basic security hygiene effective defensive measures against this emerging threat.
Organizations must educate users to remain alert to suspicious messages, unexpected emails, malicious links, or attachments, especially those pushing urgency or requesting users to run files or execute commands. SantaStealer infostealer campaigns often rely on simple social engineering tactics, and training users to pause and verify suspicious messages can prevent infections before malware execution begins. Implement security awareness training programs specifically addressing infostealer delivery methods and credential theft techniques.
Organizations should enforce policies prohibiting installation of software from unofficial sources, as cracked software, game cheats, and unknown browser extensions are common hiding places for infostealers like SantaStealer. Only permit application installation from trusted vendors and regularly audit installed tools and browser plugins, removing unrecognized or unnecessary extensions. Implement application whitelisting technologies to prevent execution of unauthorized software including Malware-as-a-Service infostealers.
Organizations must mandate strong, unique passwords across all accounts and enable multi-factor authentication wherever possible, especially for email accounts and browser-linked services. These security controls greatly reduce the damage potential even if credentials are stolen by SantaStealer malware. Implement password manager solutions to facilitate unique credential generation and storage, reducing credential reuse vulnerabilities targeted by information-stealing malware.
Organizations must deploy next-generation antivirus solutions and endpoint detection and response platforms capable of identifying and blocking SantaStealer malware variants. Leverage behavioral analysis and machine learning-based detection capabilities to spot suspicious activities characteristic of information stealers, including memory injection techniques, anti-analysis checks, credential harvesting operations, and unauthorized data exfiltration attempts associated with Malware-as-a-Service platforms.
SHA256 Hashes:
IPv4:Port:
TA0042 – Resource Development
TA0004 – Privilege Escalation
TA0005 – Defense Evasion
TA0006 – Credential Access
TA0007 – Discovery
TA0009 – Collection
TA0010 – Exfiltration
TA0011 – Command and Control
TA0040 – Impact
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