Misconfigured Azure Blob Storage Exploited for Global Data Breaches
Summary
A widespread campaign is actively targeting Microsoft Azure Blob Storage, exploiting misconfigured or publicly exposed Blob accounts, leaked credentials, and insecure automation triggers across Azure Functions and Logic Apps.
Attackers are leveraging Blob Storage vulnerabilities to gain initial access, establish persistence, and perform data discovery, exfiltration, and ransomware deployment. Azure Blob Storage, a core component for storing unstructured data such as backups, analytics datasets, and AI models, has become a prime entry point due to its frequent misconfigurations and high-value contents.
Once compromised, threat actors repurpose Blob Storage for command-and-control (C2) operations, malware distribution, and data staging, resulting in large-scale data theft, corruption, and financial loss. The observed tactics align with both financially motivated and espionage-driven threat actors, affecting organizations globally across cloud-native environments.
Attack Details
The campaign underscores how poorly secured cloud storage can expose enterprises to severe compromise.
Key Attack Stages
- Reconnaissance and Enumeration: Attackers begin by scanning for open storage accounts and containers using AI-assisted enumeration techniques. They also harvest leaked credentials (including Shared Access Signatures – SAS tokens) and predict vulnerable endpoints.
- Initial Access: Exploitation occurs through stolen keys, misconfigured blob-triggered automations, or publicly accessible containers, granting attackers direct access to internal data repositories.
- Persistence and Infrastructure Control:
- Issuing long-lived tokens and modifying access policies.
- Tampering with diagnostic logs and firewall configurations to evade detection.
- Embedding malicious logic within blob-triggered workflows to maintain ongoing access.
- Data Discovery and Lateral Movement: Once inside, attackers enumerate sensitive datasets and move laterally into linked services like Azure Functions and Logic Apps to expand their foothold.
- Exfiltration and Impact:
- Attackers exploit Blob Storage replication and metadata to quietly transfer data or establish C2 channels.
- In some campaigns, the same storage is used to host malware, phishing pages, or poison AI training datasets.
- The final stage often involves data theft, corruption, or ransomware encryption, inflicting operational and reputational damage.
This ongoing wave of cloud-centric intrusions highlights the need for strong identity management, network segmentation, and continuous monitoring across Azure workloads.
Recommendations
- Enable Microsoft Defender for Storage:
Activate Microsoft Defender for Storage across all accounts to detect unusual behaviors like data exfiltration, malware uploads, and unauthorized access patterns using anomaly-based threat detection. - Adopt Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) Authentication:
Configure Blob Storage to rely on Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) for identity-based authorization instead of shared keys or SAS tokens. This enforces least-privilege access controls and mitigates credential exposure risks. - Disable Anonymous and Shared Key Access:
Disallow anonymous reads and shared key authorization—particularly for storage accounts handling sensitive workloads or AI datasets—to prevent public data leaks and key misuse. - Require Secure Transfer and Network Isolation:
Mandate HTTPS-only connections and use private endpoints, service endpoints, or network rules to limit exposure. This ensures encrypted data transfer and prevents public network access. - Enable Immutability and Soft Delete Protection:
Apply immutability policies and soft delete configurations to preserve data integrity, prevent tampering, and enable ransomware recovery in case of malicious modification or deletion.
These proactive configurations drastically reduce the risk of compromise, making Azure Blob Storage more resilient to exploitation attempts.
MITRE ATT&CK TTPs
Tactic | Technique | ID |
---|
Initial Access | Exploit Public-Facing Application | T1190 |
Execution | Command and Scripting Interpreter | T1059 |
Persistence | Valid Accounts, Account Manipulation | T1078, T1098 |
Privilege Escalation | Additional Cloud Credentials | T1098.001 |
Defense Evasion | Spoof Security Alerting, Impair Defenses | T1562.011, T1562 |
Credential Access | Steal Application Access Token, OS Credential Dumping | T1528, T1003 |
Discovery | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery, Network Sniffing | T1580, T1040 |
Lateral Movement | Remote Services – Cloud Services | T1021.007 |
Collection | Data from Cloud Storage | T1530 |
Exfiltration | Exfiltration Over Web Service, Transfer Data to Cloud Account | T1567, T1537 |
Impact | Data Destruction, Data Encrypted for Impact | T1485, T1486 |
Command & Control | Application Layer Protocol (Web Protocols) | T1071.001 |
Reconnaissance | Search Open Websites/Domains, Cloud Service Discovery | T1593, T1526 |
Resource Development | Acquire Infrastructure, Cloud Accounts | T1583, T1078.004 |
References