ZynorRAT: Emerging Go-Based RAT Using Telegram as C2
Summary
First detected in July 2025, ZynorRAT is a newly emerging Go-based remote access trojan (RAT) that uses Telegram bots as command-and-control (C2) hubs. Although still in active development and not widely deployed, ZynorRAT already demonstrates a powerful feature set, including remote command execution, file exfiltration, process and system enumeration, screenshot capture, and persistence mechanisms.
Telemetry reveals that the author—likely operating from Turkey—is experimenting on cloud instances, iterating code, and re-uploading samples to bypass detection. This tool could soon appear on underground forums as a customizable RAT-for-hire, posing a rising threat to both enterprise and cloud infrastructure.
Attack Details
ZynorRAT is compiled as a 64-bit ELF Go binary (Linux variant) with symbols preserved, making static analysis easier. The malware’s core behaviors include:
C2 via Telegram: Converts a Telegram bot into a live operator console. Non-matching bot messages are treated as shell input, executed with
bash -c
, granting full remote command execution capability.Persistence: Creates a systemd user service under
~/.config/systemd/user
to maintain persistence across reboots.Functionality: Supports command execution, file theft, system inspection, process enumeration, and screenshot capture.
Testing Behavior: Many observed infected hosts are disposable cloud instances, indicating active testing. Distribution of executables has been linked to Dosya.co file-sharing services.
Attribution Clues: Repeated references to the name “Halil” and Turkish IP telemetry suggest a likely single developer or small operator team.
Recommendations
Block Telegram Bot Traffic: Restrict or block outbound connections to api.telegram.org and known bot endpoints at the firewall or proxy layer.
Monitor for New systemd User Services: Detect and alert on suspicious files within
~/.config/systemd/user
.Apply Least Privilege: Avoid running everyday accounts with administrative rights to limit malware capabilities if compromised.
Control File-Sharing Access: Restrict downloads from public file-sharing services (like Dosya.co) on critical systems and sandbox suspicious files before execution.
Deploy Advanced Endpoint Security: Utilize NGAV/EDR solutions with behavioral and ML-based detections to catch memory-resident RAT activity.
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
SHA256 Hashes
037e5fe028a60604523b840794d06c8f70a9c523a832a97ecaaccd9f419e364a
47338da15a35c49bcd3989125df5b082eef64ba646bb7a2db1565bb413b69323
c890c6e6b7cc6984cd9d9061d285d814841e0b8136286e6fd943013260eb8461
237a40e522f2f1e6c71415997766b4b23f1526e2f141d68ff334de3ff5b0c89f
48c2a8453feea72f8d9bfb9c2731d811e7c300f3e1935bddd7188324aab7d30d
4cd270b49c8d5c31560ef94dc0bee2c7927d6f3e77173f660e2f3106ae7131c3
a6c450f9abff8a22445ba539c21b24508dd326522df525977e14ec17e11f7d65
bceccc566fe3ae3675f7e20100f979eaf2053d9a4f3a3619a550a496a4268ef5
8b09ba6e006718371486b3655588b438ade953beecf221af38160cbe6fedd40a
f9eb2a54e500b3ce42950fb75af30955180360c978c00d081ea561c86e54262d
Domain
api[.]telegram[.]org
MITRE ATT&CK TTPs
Execution: T1059 (Command and Scripting Interpreter)
Persistence: T1543 (Create or Modify System Process), T1543.002 (systemd Service)
Discovery: T1057 (Process Discovery), T1083 (File and Directory Discovery)
Collection: T1113 (Screen Capture)
Exfiltration: T1041 (Exfiltration Over C2 Channel)
Command & Control: T1071 (Application Layer Protocol), T1102 (Web Service), T1102.002 (Bidirectional Communication)
References
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