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Confucius Hackers Spy on Critical Sectors Using AnonDoor

Amber | Attack Report
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Confucius Hackers Spy on Critical Sectors Using AnonDoor

Summary

The Confucius group (G0142), a South Asia-based advanced persistent threat (APT) actor active since 2013, has intensified its cyber-espionage operations targeting government, defense, military, and critical infrastructure sectors in Pakistan. This latest campaign, observed in August 2025, reveals the use of two key malware families — WooperStealer and the new AnonDoor Python-based backdoor.

The Confucius APT has evolved from using lightweight information stealers to deploying modular Python backdoors that ensure long-term surveillance, persistence, and remote access. This strategic shift underscores the group’s objective to establish sustained espionage footholds across sensitive networks while avoiding early detection.


Attack Details

The Confucius group continues its hallmark approach of targeted spear-phishing to infiltrate high-value organizations. These phishing emails leverage authority spoofing and contextually relevant decoys to trick users into executing malicious attachments. Once opened, decoy documents display legitimate-looking content while deploying hidden malware payloads.

Initial stages of the infection chain utilize malicious LNK shortcuts and DLL side-loading to execute downloader Trojans. These loaders exploit legitimate binaries to evade antivirus detection and fetch secondary components, including WooperStealer and AnonDoor.

  • December 2024: WooperStealer was distributed through DLL side-loading lures.

  • March 2025: Follow-up campaigns employed LNK shortcuts to facilitate data exfiltration.

  • August 2025: Confucius transitioned to AnonDoor, a Python-based modular backdoor that supports persistent access, data collection, and host profiling through file enumeration and screenshot capture.

AnonDoor’s modular architecture allows operators to deploy new payloads, update modules, and manage infected endpoints without changing command-and-control infrastructure. This signals a tactical evolution from short-term data theft to long-term intelligence collection.

Overall, the Confucius group’s campaign demonstrates a highly adaptive espionage operation engineered for stealth, persistence, and scalability across Windows environments.


Recommendations

  • Implement Network Segmentation and Zero Trust Architecture: Divide networks to contain lateral movement. Enforce identity verification and device health checks before granting access.

  • Harden File System Permissions: Audit access rights for sensitive directories. Restrict write permissions and disable unnecessary file sharing using ACLs.

  • Enhance Email Security and Awareness: Deploy advanced phishing filters and train employees to identify and report spoofed or urgent email requests.

  • Restrict Privileged Access: Apply the least-privilege principle to minimize exposure of administrative accounts and reduce the impact of compromised credentials.

  • Monitor for Anomalous Behavior: Regularly inspect system logs for PowerShell or DLL side-loading activities associated with AnonDoor or WooperStealer infections.


Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Domains

  • marshmellowflowerscar[.]info

  • greenxeonsr[.]info

  • cornfieldblue[.]info

  • hauntedfishtree[.]info

  • petricgreen[.]info

  • bloomwpp[.]info

  • dropmicis[.]info

  • martkartout[.]info

SHA256 Hashes

  • c91917ff2cc3b843cf9f65e5798cd2e668a93e09802daa50e55a842ba9e505de

  • 5a0dd2451a1661d12ab1e589124ff8ecd2c2ad55c8f35445ba9cf5e3215f977e

  • 4206ab93ac9781c8367d8675292193625573c2aaacf8feeaddd5b0cc9136d2d1

  • 8603b9fa8a6886861571fd8400d96a705eb6258821c6ebc679476d1b92dcd09e

  • 24b06b5caad5b09729ccaffa5a43352afd2da2c29c3675b17cae975b7d2a1e62

  • 13ca36012dd66a7fa2f97d8a9577a7e71d8d41345ef65bf3d24ea5ebbb7c5ce1

  • 06b8f395fc6b4fda8d36482a4301a529c21c60c107cbe936e558aef9f56b84f6

  • 11391799ae242609304ef71b0efb571f11ac412488ba69d6efc54557447d022f

  • abefd29c85d69f35f3cf8f5e6a2be76834416cc43d87d1f6643470b359ed4b1b

URL

  • hxxps[:]//bloomwpp[.]info/hjdfyebvghu[.]pyc


MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

  • TA0001 Initial AccessT1566, T1566.001 (Spearphishing Attachment)

  • TA0002 ExecutionT1059, T1059.001 (PowerShell), T1059.006 (Python)

  • TA0003 PersistenceT1053, T1053.005 (Scheduled Task)

  • TA0005 Defense EvasionT1218, T1218.011 (Rundll32), T1027 (Obfuscated Files)

  • TA0007 DiscoveryT1082 (System Information Discovery), T1083 (File and Directory Discovery), T1087 (Account Discovery)

  • TA0009 CollectionT1113 (Screen Capture), T1005 (Data from Local System)

  • TA0010 ExfiltrationT1041 (Exfiltration Over C2 Channel)

  • TA0011 Command and ControlT1071, T1071.001 (Web Protocols)


References

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