GhostRedirector: China-Aligned Threat Actor Targeting Windows Servers
Summary
First detected in August 2024, GhostRedirector is a newly discovered China-aligned threat actor that has compromised at least 65 Windows servers globally by mid-2025. Active in Brazil, Peru, Thailand, Vietnam, the United States, Canada, Finland, India, Netherlands, Philippines, and Singapore, the group targets industries including education, healthcare, insurance, transportation, technology, and retail.
The attacks employ a modular toolkit including Rungan (C++ backdoor) and Gamshen (IIS trojan), which allow covert command execution and SEO fraud by injecting backlinks into Google crawler traffic. Supporting tools like Zunput and misused remote utilities ensure resilience and persistence. This financially motivated campaign demonstrates a sophisticated strategy to monetize compromised infrastructure at scale.
Attack Details
Initial Access: Exploitation of SQL injection flaws in public-facing applications. Malicious payloads are pulled using LOLBins like PowerShell and CertUtil.
Privilege Escalation: Public exploits such as EfsPotato and BadPotato, sometimes signed with legitimate Chinese-issued certificates, enable creation of admin accounts and persistent access.
Core Malware Tools:
Rungan: A passive backdoor DLL listening for crafted HTTP requests, enabling command execution.
Gamshen: An IIS trojan manipulating Googlebot traffic to inject backlinks to gambling sites, enabling stealthy SEO poisoning.
Supporting Utilities:
Zunput for deploying webshells into dynamic directories.
Legitimate but misused tools such as GoToHTTP for remote access.
Attribution clues such as Chinese-language strings, code-signing certificates, and embedded credentials strongly indicate Chinese alignment. Despite this, the campaign appears financially motivated, focusing on backdoor persistence, SEO fraud, and monetization.
Recommendations
Prevent Initial Access: Patch web applications and databases to close SQL injection flaws. Deploy WAFs and enforce input validation.
Detect Privilege Escalation: Monitor for abnormal admin account creation, credential changes, and binaries signed with suspicious certificates.
Remove Persistence: Inspect IIS servers for rogue DLLs (e.g., miniscreen.dll) and scan for webshells in dynamic directories. Monitor scheduled tasks and services for anomalies.
Mitigate SEO Fraud: Audit IIS modules and detect discrepancies between crawler and user-served content. Monitor outbound traffic for C2 communication with malicious domains.
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
SHA1 Hashes
EE22BA5453ED577F8664CA390EB311D067E47786
677B3F9D780BE184528DE5967936693584D9769A
5D4D7C96A9E302053BDFAF2449F9A2AB3C806E63
28140A5A29EBA098BC6215DDAC8E56EACBB29B69
371818BDC20669DF3CA44BE758200872D583A3B8
9DD282184DDFA796204C1D90A46CAA117F46C8E1
87F354EAA1A6ED5AE51C4B1A1A801B6CF818DAFC
5A01981D3F31AF47614E51E6C216BED70D921D60
6EBD7498FC3B744CED371C379BA537077DD97036
Filenames
SitePut.exe, EfsNetAutoUser.exe, NetAutoUser.exe, miniscreen.dll, auto.exe, auto_sign.exe, DotNet4.5.exe, link.exe, ManagedEngine32_v2.dll, ManagedEngine64_v2.dll
IPv4 Addresses
104[.]233[.]192[.]1
104[.]233[.]210[.]229
43[.]228[.]126[.]4
103[.]251[.]112[.]11
Domains
xzs[.]868id[.]com
xz[.]868id[.]com
q[.]822th[.]com
www[.]881vn[.]com
gobr[.]868id[.]com
brproxy[.]868id[.]com
www[.]cs01[.]shop
MITRE ATT&CK TTPs
Initial Access: T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Applications)
Execution: T1059 (Command and Scripting Interpreter), T1059.001 (PowerShell), T1059.003 (Windows Command Shell)
Privilege Escalation: T1068 (Exploitation for Privilege Escalation), T1112 (Modify Registry)
Persistence: T1546 (Event Triggered Execution), T1027.009 (Embedded Payloads)
Defense Evasion: T1027 (Obfuscation), T1140 (Deobfuscate/Decode Files)
Discovery: T1083 (File and Directory Discovery)
Credential Access: TA0006
Command & Control: T1071.001 (Web Protocols), T1090 (Proxy), T1008 (Fallback Channels)
Impact: T1565 (Data Manipulation), T1499 (Endpoint DoS)
Resource Development: T1583 (Acquire Infrastructure), T1587.001 (Malware Development), T1588.003 (Code Signing Certificates)
Collection: T1219 (Remote Access Software), T1119 (Automated Collection)
References
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