



Threat Level



HiveForce Labs

# THREAT ADVISORY

## ⚔️ ATTACK REPORT

### UNC1069's Social Engineering Operations Focused on Crypto Sector

Date of Publication

February 17, 2026

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2026046

# Summary

**First Seen: 2018**

## Threat Actor: UNC1069 (alias CryptoCore, MASAN)

**Targeted Regions:** United States, Canada, Norway, Austria, Netherlands, United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Monaco, South Korea, India, Israel, Hong Kong

**Targeted Products:** macOS, Windows, Telegram, Chromium-Based Browsers (Google Chrome, Brave, Microsoft Edge), Zoom

**Targeted Industries:** Cryptocurrency, FinTech, Financial Services, High Tech, Manufacturing, Transportation


**Malware:** WAVESHAPER, SUGARLOADER, SILENCELIFT, HYPERCALL, DEEPBREATH, CHROMEPU

**Attack:** UNC1069, a financially motivated North Korea-linked threat actor, conducted a targeted intrusion against a financial technology (FinTech) entity in the cryptocurrency sector. The attack leveraged a compromised Telegram account, a spoofed Zoom meeting featuring AI-generated deepfake video, and a ClickFix infection vector to trick the victim into executing malicious commands. The intrusion resulted in the deployment of seven distinct malware families designed to harvest credentials, browser data, messaging content, and session tokens, facilitating cryptocurrency theft.

# Attack Regions



JINC1969



## Targeted

### Non-Targeted

# Attack Details

**#1**

The North Korea-linked actor UNC1069 targeted cryptocurrency employees to obtain system access and steal funds. Contact began through Telegram using a hijacked executive account. After a brief rapport, the victim received a scheduling link from Calendly that led to a counterfeit Zoom meeting page hosted by the attacker. A fabricated video of a cryptocurrency CEO reinforced legitimacy. The group relied on generative-AI tools to prepare scripts, visuals, and operational research for the deception.

**#2**

During the call, the attacker staged audio problems and guided the victim through troubleshooting commands. These commands executed malicious instructions: macOS fetched a payload through shell piping, while Windows used mshta to run the same file. An immediate AppleScript event marked the infection chain and deployed WAVESHAPER, a macOS C++ backdoor. It collected host identifiers, hardware details, and running processes, and transmitted them to command servers.

**#3**

WAVESHAPER installed HYPERCALL, a Go downloader that retrieved additional malware. Three components followed. HIDDENCALL enabled direct remote control. SUGARLOADER established persistence through a launch daemon. SILENCELIFT transmitted system status and could disrupt Telegram communications when run with root privileges.

**#4**

Data theft relied on two miners. DEEPBREATH bypassed macOS privacy controls by abusing full disk permissions from Apple Finder access. It extracted Keychain credentials, browser data from Google Chrome, Brave Software Brave, and Microsoft Edge, plus Telegram files and Apple Notes databases. The data was compressed and exfiltrated to a remote server.

**#5**

CHROMEPUH, delivered by SUGARLOADER, posed as a Google Docs offline extension and persisted as a browser messaging host. It logged keystrokes, captured credentials, extracted cookies, and uploaded the information to the attacker's infrastructure.

# Recommendations



**Restrict Unsigned Script Execution on macOS:** Configure macOS systems to prevent unauthorized AppleScript and shell script execution. Enforce Gatekeeper policies and restrict curl-to-shell piping through endpoint security policies.



**Audit macOS Launch Daemons and Agents:** Regularly inspect /Library/LaunchDaemons/ and /Library/LaunchAgents/ directories for unauthorized plist files, particularly those mimicking Apple naming conventions such as com.apple.system.updater.plist.



**Monitor TCC Database Integrity:** Implement monitoring for unauthorized modifications to the macOS TCC database (TCC.db). Alert on any process that stages, copies, or modifies the TCC folder or database outside of normal user consent workflows.



**Inspect Chrome Native Messaging Hosts:** Audit NativeMessagingHosts directories under Google Chrome, Brave, and other Chromium-based browser application support paths for unauthorized extensions or manifest files, such as com.google.docs.offline.json.



**Enforce Meeting Link Verification Policies:** Educate employees to verify meeting links received via messaging platforms, particularly Telegram. Establish organizational procedures to confirm meeting invitations through secondary communication channels before clicking links.



**Monitor for Anomalous Curl and WebSocket Activity:** Implement detection rules for curl commands with suspicious user agents (e.g., "audio"), curl-to-shell piping, and WebSocket connections to unknown domains on TCP port 443.



**Reset Credentials and Session Tokens Post-Incident:** If compromise is suspected, immediately reset all iCloud Keychain credentials, browser-stored passwords, Telegram session data, and Apple Notes data on affected systems. Revoke and rotate all cryptocurrency wallet keys and API tokens.



**Enable XProtect Behavioral Service Monitoring:** Leverage macOS XProtect Behavioral Service (XBS) detections by monitoring the XPdb SQLite database at /var/protected/xprotect/XPdb for behavioral violations that may indicate malware execution.



**Restrict mshta Execution on Windows:** Block or monitor mshta.exe execution through application control policies, as UNC1069 uses this Living-off-the-Land Binary (LOLBIN) as part of the Windows infection chain.



**Strengthen Anti-Deepfake Awareness Training:** Conduct targeted security awareness training focused on AI-generated deepfake video and audio used in social engineering attacks, particularly for employees in cryptocurrency, finance, and venture capital roles.



# Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

Tactic	Technique	Sub-technique
Initial Access	<a href="#">T1566: Phishing</a>	<a href="#">T1566.003: Spearphishing via Service</a>
		<a href="#">T1566.004: Spearphishing Voice</a>
Execution	<a href="#">T1204: User Execution</a>	<a href="#">T1204.002: Malicious File</a>
	<a href="#">T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter</a>	<a href="#">T1059.004: Unix Shell</a> <a href="#">T1059.002: AppleScript</a>
	<a href="#">T1218: System Binary Proxy Execution</a>	<a href="#">T1218.005: Mshta</a>
Persistence	<a href="#">T1543: Create or Modify System Process</a>	<a href="#">T1543.004: Launch Daemon</a>
	<a href="#">T1176: Browser Extensions</a>	
Defense Evasion	<a href="#">T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information</a>	<a href="#">T1027.002: Software Packing</a>
	<a href="#">T1620: Reflective Code Loading</a>	
	<a href="#">T1036: Masquerading</a>	<a href="#">T1036.005: Match Legitimate Name or Location</a>
Credential Access	<a href="#">T1555: Credentials from Password Stores</a>	<a href="#">T1555.001: Keychain</a>
		<a href="#">T1555.003: Credentials from Web Browsers</a>
	<a href="#">T1056: Input Capture</a>	<a href="#">T1056.001: Keylogging</a>
Collection	<a href="#">T1005: Data from Local System</a>	
	<a href="#">T1185: Browser Session Hijacking</a>	
	<a href="#">T1074: Data Staged</a>	<a href="#">T1074.001: Local Data Staging</a>
Exfiltration	<a href="#">T1041: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel</a>	
Command and Control	<a href="#">T1071: Application Layer Protocol</a>	<a href="#">T1071.001: Web Protocols</a>
	<a href="#">T1102: Web Service</a>	<a href="#">T1071.004: DNS</a>

# ⌘ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
Domains	mylingocoin[.]com, zoom[.]uswe05[.]us, breakdream[.]com, dreamdie[.]com, support-zoom[.]us, supportzm[.]com, zmsupport[.]com, cmailer[.]pro
URLs	hxxp[:]//mylingocoin[.]com/audio/fix/6454694440, hxxp[:]//cmailer[.]pro[:80]/upload
SHA256	b452C2da7c012eda25a1403b3313444b5eb7C2c3e25eee489f1bd256f8434735, 1a30d6cdb0b98feed62563be8050db55ae0156ed437701d36a7b46aa bf086ede, b525837273dde06b86b5f93f9aeC2C29665324105b0b66f6df8188475 4f8080d, c8f7608d4e19f6cb03680941bbd09fe969668bcb09c7ca985048a22e0 14dffcd, 603848f37ab932dccef98ee27e3c5af9221d3b6ccfe457ccf93cb572495 ac325, c3e5d878a30a6c46e22d1dd2089b32086c91f13f8b9c413aa84e1dbaa 03b9375, 03f00a143b8929585c122d490b6a3895d639c17d92C2223917e3a9ca 1b8d30f9
File Path	/Library/Caches/System Settings, /Library/OSRecovery/SystemUpdater, /Library/Caches/com.apple.mond, /Library/SystemSettings/com.apple.system.settings, /Library/Fonts/com.apple.logd, /Library/SystemSettings/.CacheLogs.db, /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.system.updater.plist, /Library/OSRecovery/com.apple.os.config, /Library/Caches/.Logs.db


# References

<https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc1069-targets-cryptocurrency-ai-social-engineering>

# What Next?

At **Hive Pro**, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

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