

HiveForce Labs

THREAT ADVISORY



ATTACK REPORT

PHALT#BLYX: Fake BSOD Campaign Targets Hospitality

Date of Publication

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Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2026006

Summary

First Seen: Late 2025

Targeted Region: Europe

Targeted Platform: Windows

Targeted Industry: Hospitality


Threat Actor: Russian-linked (Unattributed)

Malware: DCRat

Campaign: PHALT#BLYX

Attack: PHALT#BLYX is an active malware campaign targeting the European hospitality sector through phishing emails impersonating Booking.com with fake reservation cancellations. The attack uses ClickFix social engineering and fake Blue Screen of Death tactics to trick victims into manually executing malicious PowerShell commands. The infection chain abuses legitimate Windows tools (MSBuild.exe) to bypass security controls and deploys DCRat, a Russian-linked remote access trojan capable of keylogging, remote control, and process injection. Organizations should monitor for suspicious MSBuild executions, Defender exclusion modifications, and connections to C2 infrastructure on port 3535.

Attack Regions



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Attack Details

#1

The PHALT#BLYX campaign is a sophisticated malware infection chain that combines phishing, social engineering, and abuse of trusted Windows tools to evade detection. It primarily targets the hospitality sector in Europe, especially hotel staff handling online reservations. The attack begins with phishing emails impersonating Booking.com, using urgent booking cancellation themes with significant financial charges to pressure recipients into clicking embedded links.

#2

Once the victim clicks the link, they are redirected to a convincing fake Booking.com webpage hosted on a malicious domain. The page first displays a fake browser error stating "Loading is taking too long" with a "Refresh page" button. Clicking this triggers a browser-based full-screen fake Windows Blue Screen of Death (BSOD). This technique, known as ClickFix, manipulates users into pressing Win+R and pasting a command that has already been silently copied to their clipboard.

#3

By following these instructions, the victim manually executes a malicious PowerShell command. This script downloads a malicious MSBuild project file (v.proj) and abuses MSBuild.exe, a legitimate Microsoft build tool, to compile and execute it locally. Before downloading payloads, the malware adds Windows Defender exclusions for the ProgramData directory and critical file extensions (.exe, .ps1, .proj). If running without admin privileges, it employs "UAC Spam", repeatedly prompting for elevation until the user complies. Persistence is established through an unconventional Internet Shortcut file (DeleteApp.url) in the Startup folder.

#4

The final payload is a customized DCRat variant, a well-known remote access trojan linked to Russian threat actors, evidenced by Russian-language debug strings found in the code. DCRat provides capabilities including remote control, keylogging, and process hollowing into legitimate binaries like aspnet_compiler.exe. The campaign demonstrates technical maturity, highlighting how modern threats increasingly rely on user interaction and trusted system tools rather than traditional exploit-based delivery methods.

Recommendations



User Awareness & Training: Educate employees to recognize phishing emails that use urgency, financial pressure, or impersonate trusted platforms like Booking.com. Train users to identify fake browser-based error screens and BSODs. Reinforce that legitimate system errors never ask users to run commands manually.



Restrict Trusted System Tools: Limit the use of high-risk built-in tools such as msbuild.exe and powershell.exe for non-developer users. Apply application control policies (WDAC/AppLocker) to prevent misuse of trusted binaries. Monitor and alert on unusual or user-initiated executions of these tools.



Enhance Endpoint Monitoring: Enable detailed process creation and command-line logging across endpoints. Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging to capture malicious scripts. Tune EDR solutions to detect process injection, persistence, and defense evasion behavior.



Strengthen Email & Web Security: Use advanced email filtering to detect brand impersonation and phishing campaigns. Block newly registered and look-alike domains via DNS and web gateways. Continuously test defenses through phishing simulations.



Incident Response Readiness: Create detection rules for abnormal MSBuild and PowerShell execution chains. Prepare response playbooks for RAT infections like DCRat. Ensure rapid isolation and forensic analysis of affected endpoints.



Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<u>TA0042</u> Resource Development	<u>TA0001</u> Initial Access	<u>TA0002</u> Execution	<u>TA0011</u> Command and Control
<u>TA0003</u> Persistence	<u>TA0005</u> Defense Evasion	<u>TA0004</u> Privilege Escalation	<u>TA0006</u> Credential Access
<u>T1566.002</u> Spearphishing Link	<u>T1566</u> Phishing	<u>T1059.001</u> PowerShell	<u>T1059</u> Command and Scripting Interpreter



<u>T1127</u> Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution	<u>T1204</u> User Execution	<u>T1562.001</u> Disable or Modify Tools	<u>T1562</u> Impair Defenses
<u>T1127.001</u> MSBuild	<u>T1204.002</u> Malicious File	<u>T1055.012</u> Process Hollowing	<u>T1055</u> Process Injection
<u>T1547.001</u> Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	<u>T1547</u> Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	<u>T1095</u> Non-Application Layer Protocol	<u>T1204.001</u> Malicious Link
<u>T1548</u> Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	<u>T1036.005</u> Match Legitimate Name or Location	<u>T1036</u> Masquerading	<u>T1027</u> Obfuscated Files or Information
<u>T1548.002</u> Bypass User Account Control	<u>T1027.002</u> Software Packing	<u>T1140</u> Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	<u>T1056.001</u> Keylogging
<u>T1056</u> Input Capture			

🔪 Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
IPv4	194[.]169[.]163[.]140, 193[.]221[.]200[.]233, 13[.]223[.]25[.]84
Domains	Oncameraworkout[.]com/ksbo, low-house[.]com, asj77[.]com, asj88[.]com, asj99[.]com, wmk77[.]com, 8eh18dhq9wd[.]click
URL	hxxp[:]//2fa-bns[.]com

TYPE	VALUE
File Names	Ps1.ps1, payload_1.ps1, .ps1, v.proj, v.proj.ps1, Stub.exe/Staxs.exe/tydb7.exe, Stub.exe, Stub.exe, Stub.exe, Stub.exe, Stub.exe, Stub.exe, Stub.exe, DeleteApp.url, Wwigu.exe, Wwigu.exe, Lbpjxefa.dll
SHA256	cd3604fb9fe210261de11921ff1bea0a7bf948ad477d063e17863ce de1fadc41, 13b25ae54f3a28f6d01be29bee045e1842b1ebb6fd8d6aca237837 91a461d9dd, 9fac0304cfa56ca5232f61034a796d99b921ba8405166743a5d1b44 7a7389e4f, cd3604fb9fe210261de11921ff1bea0a7bf948ad477d063e17863ce de1fadc41, 9fc15d50a3df0ac7fb043e098b890d9201c3bb56a592f168a3a89e7 581bc7a7d, bf374d8e2a37ff28b4dc9338b45bbf396b8bf088449d05f00aba3c39 c54a3731, 11c1cfce546980287e7d3440033191844b5e5e321052d685f4c9ee 49937fa688, 07845fcc83f3b490b9f6b80cb8ebde0be46507395d6cbad8bc57857 762f7213a, 08037de4a729634fa818ddf03ddd27c28c89f42158af5ede71cf0ae2 d78fa198, 2f3d0c15f1c90c5e004377293eaac02d441eb18b59a944b2f2b6201 bb36f0d63, 33f0672159bb8f89a809b1628a6cc7dddae7037a288785cff32d9a7 b24e86f4b, 6bd31dfd36ce82e588f37a9ad233c022e0a87b132dc01b93ebbab0 5b57e5defd, 1f520651958ae1ec9ee788eefe49b9b143630c340dbecd5e9abf560 80d2649de,

TYPE	VALUE
SHA256	9c891e9dc6fece95b44bb64123f89ddeab7c5efc95bf071fb4457996050f10a0, e68a69c93bf149778c4c05a3acb779999bc6d5bcd3d661bfd6656285f928c18e, 18c75d6f034a1ed389f22883a0007805c7e93af9e43852282aa0c6d5dafa970, 91696f9b909c479be23440a9e4072dd8c11716f2ad3241607b542b202ab831ce

References

<https://www.securonix.com/blog/analyzing-phalbtblyx-how-fake-bsods-and-trusted-build-tools-are-used-to-construct-a-malware-infection/>

What Next?

At Hive Pro, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

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