

HiveForce Labs

# THREAT ADVISORY

 **ATTACK REPORT**

## **Water Saci Campaign: Multi-Stage Malware Spreading via WhatsApp Web**

Date of Publication

December 4, 2025

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2025368

# Summary

**First Seen:** 2025

**Targeted Country:** Brazil

**Malware:** SORVEPOTEL

**Affected Platform:** Windows


**Targeted Industries:** Finance, Banking, Cryptocurrency

**Campaign:** Water Saci

**Attack:** Water Saci is a rapidly evolving malware campaign spreading through malicious files delivered over WhatsApp and WhatsApp Web, using multi-stage scripted loaders to deploy a banking-focused backdoor. It conducts system reconnaissance, injects into legitimate processes, and propagates worm-style by hijacking victims' WhatsApp sessions. The latest wave is more advanced than the October attack, shifting from MSI/PowerShell loaders to more evasive Python-based and multi-format delivery. Overall, it represents a highly adaptive threat combining social engineering, stealth, and automated financial credential theft.



## Attack Regions



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# Attack Details

## #1

The Water Saci campaign is a financially motivated malware operation primarily targeting users in Brazil. It spreads mainly through WhatsApp and WhatsApp Web, where victims receive malicious files such as ZIP archives, PDFs, or HTA documents disguised as invoices, receipts, or business communications. Once opened, these files execute a multi-stage script chain that downloads additional components and installs the main payload, typically the SORVEPOTEL backdoor, a trojan built to steal banking information and maintain remote access to the infected system.

## #2

The attack chain is notable for its multi-format delivery and heavy obfuscation. The malware uses layered scripts (HTA -> script -> downloader -> automation loader) to evade detection and avoid dropping easily-scannable executables. The payload conducts reconnaissance on the victim's system, checking for banking activity, browser history, and installed security products. When sensitive activity is detected, Water Saci injects itself into legitimate processes to hide its presence and intercept credentials, session data, or financial information.

## #3

One of the most dangerous aspects of Water Saci is its worm-like propagation. After infection, the malware hijacks the victim's WhatsApp Web session and automatically forwards the same malicious files to all contacts and groups, exploiting trust relationships to spread rapidly. Combined with anti-sandbox checks and stealthy persistence mechanisms, the campaign is both fast-moving and difficult to analyze.

## #4

Compared to the [October attack](#), the new Water Saci campaign shows clear evolution. Earlier attacks relied primarily on MSI installers and PowerShell-based loaders, making the infection chain more traditional and easier to detect. The current wave replaces these components with Python-based scripts, more diverse file formats (including HTA), improved automation, and more sophisticated obfuscation. The shift suggests rapid development by the operators, possibly aided by automated code-conversion tools or AI, resulting in a more flexible, evasive, and scalable infection method.


## #5

Water Saci represents a modern hybrid of social engineering, automation, and stealth. By abusing a widely trusted platform like WhatsApp, using multi-stage scripting to hide activity, and adapting quickly between campaigns, the operators behind Water Saci continue to refine a highly effective financial-theft ecosystem.

# Recommendations



**Strengthen user awareness and training:** Warn users to be cautious with any file received over WhatsApp or WhatsApp Web, even if it appears to come from a known contact. Emphasize that ZIP, PDF, HTA, LNK, or other unexpected attachments should never be opened without verification. Encourage employees to verify suspicious messages via a secondary channel (phone call, SMS, email).



**Implement stricter controls on script execution:** Restrict or disable execution of HTA, VBS, PowerShell, and Python scripts for regular users whenever possible. Enforce PowerShell Constrained Language Mode and block high-risk file types at the endpoint or email/web gateway (ZIP, ISO, HTA, MSI, etc.). Deploy application allowlisting (AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control) to limit unauthorized scripts.



**Harden endpoints and browsers:** Ensure Windows systems are fully patched and that reputable endpoint protection (EDR or next-gen AV) is enabled. Block or alert on suspicious process behavior such as process hollowing, script spawning, or non-browser processes making network calls. Configure browsers to block unauthorized extensions and clear session cookies after high-risk activity.



**Monitor messaging platforms and automate detection:** Raise monitoring on WhatsApp Web usage within corporate environments, especially for large bursts of outbound ZIP/PDF file transfers. Set alerts for unusual automation patterns (e.g., browser automation tools, repetitive outbound messaging traffic). If feasible, isolate messaging applications in sandboxed browser profiles or dedicated virtual containers.



**Protect financial transactions and sensitive accounts:** Encourage the use of 2FA or hardware tokens for banking and internal systems. Require financial users or high-privilege staff to operate from hardened, secured workstations. Monitor for access to Brazilian banking sites or finance platforms initiated from unusual or newly installed processes.

# Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<u><b>TA0010</b></u> Exfiltration	<u><b>TA0042</b></u> Resource Development	<u><b>TA0001</b></u> Initial Access	<u><b>TA0002</b></u> Execution
<u><b>TA0005</b></u> Defense Evasion	<u><b>TA0008</b></u> Lateral Movement	<u><b>TA0009</b></u> Collection	<u><b>TA0011</b></u> Command and Control
<u><b>TA0007</b></u> Discovery	<u><b>TA0003</b></u> Persistence	<u><b>T1588.007</b></u> Artificial Intelligence	<u><b>T1041</b></u> Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
<u><b>T1056.003</b></u> Web Portal Capture	<u><b>T1056</b></u> Input Capture	<u><b>T1105</b></u> Ingress Tool Transfer	<u><b>T1588</b></u> Obtain Capabilities
<u><b>T1566</b></u> Phishing	<u><b>T1204</b></u> User Execution	<u><b>T1059</b></u> Command and Scripting Interpreter	<u><b>T1566.001</b></u> Spearphishing Attachment
<u><b>T1059.005</b></u> Visual Basic	<u><b>T1204.002</b></u> Malicious File	<u><b>T1059.001</b></u> PowerShell	<u><b>T1547</b></u> Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
<u><b>T1620</b></u> Reflective Code Loading	<u><b>T1055</b></u> Process Injection	<u><b>T1036</b></u> Masquerading	<u><b>T1027</b></u> Obfuscated Files or Information
<u><b>T1082</b></u> System Information Discovery	<u><b>T1217</b></u> Browser Bookmark Discovery	<u><b>T1071</b></u> Application Layer Protocol	<u><b>T1573</b></u> Encrypted Channel
<u><b>T1059.006</b></u> Python	<u><b>T1059.010</b></u> AutoHotKey & AutoIT	<u><b>T1614</b></u> System Location Discovery	<u><b>T1518</b></u> Software Discovery
<u><b>T1140</b></u> Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	<u><b>T1055.012</b></u> Process Hollowing	<u><b>T1614.001</b></u> System Language Discovery	<u><b>T1518.001</b></u> Security Software Discovery
<u><b>T1574</b></u> Hijack Execution Flow	<u><b>T1574.001</b></u> DLL	<u><b>T1497</b></u> Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	<u><b>T1547.001</b></u> Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
<u><b>T1083</b></u> File and Directory Discovery	<u><b>T1113</b></u> Screen Capture		



## ✂ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
SHA256	12f2e7e997480a3ea3150614664d6de4e6e229dacd6e8ff0ed74cd22207e753d, 15e8f315901ea12639665f1adb9d18a9ace1074a33d70e47ad43203eb8ebfba4, 2d95769a016b397333ba90fdc2f668f883c64774a2c0aaaf6b2d942bebbae9e0, 495697717be4a80c9db9fe2dbb40c57d4811ffe5ebceb9375666066b3dda73c3, 5db59a8a8c2ca54615a6079fa9035d2886c1ec2270ee508efbb0ff98c98b90be, 6745bb11b8c692be78ec7ade285094beef907ecb3a99f475afa284ccb e7565f2, 67ad7a950257cc5920b2119539049bcea3863bb2002f7118fcef57788f7eca59, 6ee5355b786282a6904806a4f55e59e9aad8067ae01b37afaf0009527e5c0205, 9b0996380c61060ed3bfec25962c56131ea0eac42c7f373216aab72fdb7b8ac7, a416cad095a6e77857f8fba4552ddc8ece41ce997b5086a4fbea5ac0fd fc4860, c03fecbf52c38cf363bbc4f94bbe183e394f921af756442b674f4fe5f2b2090c, de07516f39845fb91d9b4f78abeb32933f39282540f8920fe6508057e edcbbea, ebe37505fa162461515d50bd86cb0fd983a000d418f0be0f9098e087170909bd, ec69a53fd3ff11327aa98248bf55572f4ea8c1b40a12f49f5669f3df1f598353, f262434276f3fa09915479277f696585d0b0e4e72e72cbc924c658d7b b07a3ff
SHA1	a1c88a022e55d73a2894ddfb8b7bf5381d9f13dd
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Domains	centrogauchodabahia123[.]com, storehomeestusfluworkss[.]online
URLs	hxxp[://]centrogauchodabahia123[.]com/altor/installer[.]msi, hxxp[://]centrogauchodabahia123[.]com/altor/whatsz[.]py

## References


[https://www.trendmicro.com/en\\_us/research/25/l/water-saci.html](https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/l/water-saci.html)

<https://hivepro.com/threat-advisory/water-saci-brazils-whatsapp-borne-malware-storm/>

# What Next?

At Hive Pro, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

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