

HiveForce Labs

# THREAT ADVISORY



## ATTACK REPORT

### **Silent Lynx APT: Espionage Operations Targeting Central Asia's Critical Infrastructure**

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Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2025337

# Summary

**First Seen:** Late 2024

**Targeted Regions:** Central Asia (Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), Russia, Azerbaijan, China

**Targeted Platforms:** Windows

**Targeted Industries:** Government, Diplomats, Think-tanks, Finance, Mining, Transport & Communications


**Threat Actor:** Silent Lynx ( aka YoroTrooper, Sturgeon Phisher, Cavalry Werewolf, ShadowSilk)

**Malware:** Silent Loader, LAPLAS, SilentSweeper

**Campaign:** Operation Peek-a-Baku

**Attack:** Silent Lynx is an APT group conducting espionage across Central Asia since late 2024, targeting government, diplomatic, and infrastructure entities through phishing campaigns themed around regional summits. Their operation “Peek-A-Baku” uses malicious RAR or ZIP attachments that deploy PowerShell-based loaders and custom implants like Silent Loader and LAPLAS. The group leverages GitHub, Ligolo-ng, and Telegram for command-and-control, blending legitimate services with malicious traffic. Ongoing activity indicates sustained intelligence-gathering focused on Central Asian geopolitical and economic affairs.

## Attack Regions



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# Attack Details

## #1

Silent Lynx is an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group active since late 2024, conducting cyber-espionage campaigns primarily across Central Asia, with a focus on governmental, diplomatic, financial, and strategic infrastructure sectors. The campaign, tracked as Operation “Peek-A-Baku”, seeks to collect sensitive political and economic intelligence, especially information related to regional initiatives under the UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA). Attribution analysis suggests the actor may operate out of Kazakhstan, with notable overlaps in tooling and objectives with the espionage group YoroTrooper, indicating potential shared resources or collaboration.

## #2

The group’s targeting is highly selective and aligned with key geopolitical events. Lures often reference diplomatic summits and strategic cooperation meetings in Dushanbe, Astana, and Baku, using email attachments themed around policy or infrastructure topics such as mining and transport corridors, including the China-Tajikistan Highway. These spear-phishing campaigns use RAR or ZIP archives containing malicious LNK or ISO files, which deliver PowerShell stagers disguised behind decoy documents. While the social-engineering content is contextually relevant, language inconsistencies in filenames suggest automation or non-native Russian proficiency.

## #3

Technically, Silent Lynx uses a multi-stage infection chain that combines custom malware with open-source utilities. The attack sequence typically begins with an LNK shortcut that launches a Base64-encoded PowerShell script, hosted on GitHub, to download and execute implants. Key tools include Silent Loader (C++ loader with PowerShell payloads), LAPLAS (C++ reverse shell using TCP/TLS), and SilentSweeper (.NET implant). To maintain access and conceal activity, the group employs Ligolo-ng, an open-source tunneling tool, allowing encrypted command and data traffic to flow through compromised hosts.

## #4

Silent Lynx’s infrastructure spans multiple countries, with command-and-control (C2) servers identified in Russia and the Netherlands. Some variants also use Telegram bots with hardcoded tokens for issuing commands and exfiltrating data, a tactic that enhances stealth but has also exposed operational details during analysis. The actor demonstrates moderate technical capability, relying on persistent reuse of infrastructure, open-source tooling, and encoding techniques that balance simplicity with effectiveness against traditional defenses.

# Recommendations



**Restrict PowerShell usage:** Enforce Constrained Language Mode for non-admin users. Enable PowerShell Script Block Logging and Module Logging (Event IDs 4103, 4104) to capture encoded commands.



**Block risky file types:** Configure email gateways to quarantine RAR, ISO, and LNK attachments, which Silent Lynx uses in phishing campaigns. Use sandbox detonation for compressed or password-protected archives before delivery.



**Monitor encoded command patterns:** Hunt for powershell.exe instances using -EncodedCommand, -nop, or -w hidden arguments. Alert on any PowerShell execution chained from explorer.exe, winword.exe, or Outlook processes.



**Network filtering:** Block known C2 IPs and domains. Detect outbound traffic to GitHub raw URLs used as payload hosts. Monitor for Ligolo-ng tunneling behavior unusual, persistent TLS or TCP connections to unfamiliar IPs on nonstandard ports.



**Application allowlisting:** Use Windows AppLocker or WDAC to prevent execution of unauthorized binaries and scripts in user directories.

## Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

|                                      |                                              |                                      |                                    |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| <u>TA0001</u><br>Initial Access      | <u>TA0002</u><br>Execution                   | <u>TA0003</u><br>Persistence         | <u>TA0010</u><br>Exfiltration      |
| <u>TA0005</u><br>Defense Evasion     | <u>TA0004</u><br>Privilege Escalation        | <u>TA0011</u><br>Command and Control | <u>T1053</u><br>Scheduled Task/Job |
| <u>TA0011</u><br>Command and Control | <u>T1566.001</u><br>Spearphishing Attachment | <u>T1566</u><br>Phishing             | <u>T1204</u><br>User Execution     |

|                                                        |                                                          |                                                       |                                                          |
|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| <b><u>T1027</u></b><br>Obfuscated Files or Information | <b><u>T1059</u></b><br>Command and Scripting Interpreter | <b><u>T1027.013</u></b><br>Encrypted/Encoded File     | <b><u>T1204.002</u></b><br>Malicious File                |
| <b><u>T1204.001</u></b><br>Malicious Link              | <b><u>T1106</u></b><br>Native API                        | <b><u>T1053.005</u></b><br>Scheduled Task             | <b><u>T1053</u></b><br>Scheduled Task/Job                |
| <b><u>T1059.001</u></b><br>PowerShell                  | <b><u>T1036</u></b><br>Masquerading                      | <b><u>T1095</u></b><br>Non-Application Layer Protocol | <b><u>T1090</u></b><br>Proxy                             |
| <b><u>T1041</u></b><br>Exfiltration Over C2 Channel    | <b><u>T1059.005</u></b><br>Visual Basic                  | <b><u>T1547.009</u></b><br>Shortcut Modification      | <b><u>T1547</u></b><br>Boot or Logon Autostart Execution |
| <b><u>T1071.001</u></b><br>Web Protocols               | <b><u>T1071</u></b><br>Application Layer Protocol        | <b><u>T1572</u></b><br>Protocol Tunneling             | <b><u>T1567</u></b><br>Exfiltration Over Web Service     |

## ✂ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

| TYPE              | VALUE                                                                                                             |
|-------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>IPv4</b>       | 62[.]113[.]66[.]137,<br>206[.]189[.]11[.]142,<br>62[.]113[.]66[.]7,<br>37[.]18[.]27[.]27,<br>62[.][.]113[.]66[.]7 |
| <b>Host Names</b> | updates-check-microsoft[.]ddns[.]net,<br>catalog-update-update-microsoft[.]serveftp[.]com                         |
| <b>URL</b>        | hxxp[:]//206[.]189[.]11[.]142/                                                                                    |

| TYPE   | VALUE                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| SHA256 | ef627bad812c25a665e886044217371f9e817770b892f65cff5877b<br>02458374e,<br>5b58133de33e818e082a5661d151326bce5eeddea0ef4d860024c1<br>dbb9f94639,<br>5bae9c364ee4f89af83e1c7d3d6ee93e7f2ea7bd72f9da47d78a88a<br>b5cfbd5d4,<br>72a36e1da800b5acec485ba8fa603cd2713de4ecc78498fcb5d306fc<br>3e448c7b,<br>5e3533df6aa40e86063dd0c9d1cd235f4523d8a67d864aa958403d<br>7b3273eaaf,<br>b58f672e7fe22b3a41b507211480c660003823f814d58c04334ca9b<br>7cdd01f92,<br>ae51aef21ea4b422ef0c7eb025356e45d1ce405d66afbb3f6479d10<br>d0600bcfd,<br>0bce0e213690120afc94b53390d93a8874562de5ddcc5511c7b9b9<br>d95cf8a15d,<br>821f1ee371482bfa9b5ff1aff33705ed16e0147a9375d7a9969974c4<br>3b9e16e8,<br>262f9c63c46a0c20d1feecbd0cad75dcb8f731aa5982fef47d2a8721<br>7ecda45b,<br>123901fa1f91f68dacd9ec972e2137be7e1586f69e419fc12d82ab36<br>2ace0ba9,<br>6cb54ec004ff8b311e73ef8a8f69b8dd043b7b84c5499f4c6d79d462<br>cea941d8,<br>97969978799100c7be211b9bf8a152bbd826ba6cb55377284537b3<br>81a4814216,<br>9de8bbc961ff450332f40935b739d6d546f4b2abf45aec713e86b37<br>b0799526d,<br>b5a4f459bdf7947f27474840062cfce14ee2b1a0ef84da100679bc4<br>aa2fcf77,<br>ffda4f894ca784ce34386c52b18d61c399eb2fc8c9af721933a5de1a<br>8fff9e1b,<br>2c8efe6eb9f02bf003d489e846111ef3c6cab32168e6f02af7396e93<br>938118dd,<br>1531f13142fc0ebfb7b406d99a02ec6441fc9e40725fe2d2ac111197<br>80995cd3,<br>67cf0e32ad30a594442be87a99882fa4ac86494994eee23bdd2133<br>7adb804d3f,<br>036a60aa2c62c8a9be89a2060e4300476aef1af2fd4d3dd8cac1bb2<br>86c520959,<br>32035c9d3b81ad72913f8db42038fcf6d95b51d4d84208067fe22cf<br>6323f133c, |

| TYPE   | VALUE                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| SHA256 | a639a9043334dcd95e7cd239f8816851517ebb3850c6066a4f64ac39281242a3,<br>a83a8eb3b522c4517b8512f7f4e9335485fd5684b8653cde7f3b9b65c432fa81,<br>26aca51d555a0ea6d80715d8c6a9f49fea158dee11631735e16ea75c443a5802,<br>303f03ae338fddfe77c6afab496ea5c3593d7831571ce697e2253d4b6ca8a69a,<br>40d4d7b0bc47b1d30167dd7fc9bd6bd34d99b8e0ae2c4537f94716e58e7a5aeb,<br>b0ac155b99bc5cf17ecfd8d3c26037456bc59643344a3a30a92e2c71c4c6ce8d,<br>b87712a6eea5310319043414eabe69462e12738d4f460e66a59c3acb5f30e32e |

## References


<https://www.segrite.com/blog/operation-peek-a-baku-silent-lynx-apt-dushanbe-espionage/>

<https://hivepro.com/threat-advisory/silent-lynx-campaigns-targeting-central-asian-governments/>

# What Next?

At Hive Pro, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

Book a free demo with HivePro Uni5: Threat Exposure Management Platform.



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