

HiveForce Labs

THREAT ADVISORY



ATTACK REPORT

COLDRIVER's ClickFix Campaign Targets Civil Voices

Date of Publication

September 26, 2025

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2025297

Summary

Attack Discovered: September 2025

Targeted Country: Russia


Targeted Industry: Civil Society

Actor: COLDRIVER (aka Nahr el bared, Nahr Elbard, Cobalt Edgewater, TA446, Seaborgium, TAG-53, BlueCharlie, Blue Callisto, Calisto, Star Blizzard, UNC4057, IRON FRONTIER, Grey Pro, Mythic Ursa, Gossamer Bear)

Malware: BAITSWITCH, SIMPLEFIX

Attack: COLDRIVER has rolled out a crafty new ClickFix campaign that preys on trust and urgency to infiltrate Russia's civil society. Masquerading as support resources for activists and think tanks, the group lures victims into running malicious commands disguised as a simple "security check." This sleight of hand triggers BAITSWITCH, a downloader that quietly paves the way for the SIMPLEFIX backdoor, giving attackers remote control over compromised systems. While technically lightweight, the operation is carefully tailored to COLDRIVER's long-running mission of monitoring and undermining dissidents, showing how even modest tools, when paired with clever deception, can pose a serious threat.

🔪 Attack Regions



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Powered by Bing

Attack Details

#1

In September 2025, a new ClickFix campaign targeting Russia's civil society was uncovered, linked to the threat actor COLDRIVER. Known for targeting NGOs, human rights defenders, and exiled activists, the group has expanded its arsenal with two new tools: an undocumented downloader dubbed BAITSWITCH, and a PowerShell backdoor named SIMPLEFIX. The campaign relies heavily on social engineering, with credential phishing serving as its main entry point. Attribution to COLDRIVER is made with medium confidence, based on overlaps in tactics, infrastructure, and victimology that strongly align with the group's past operations.

#2

The attack chain begins when a victim lands on a seemingly legitimate website disguised as a resource for Russian civil society and think tanks. Using the ClickFix method, the page deploys a clever trick: a fake Cloudflare Turnstile checkbox. When clicked, embedded JavaScript silently copies a malicious command to the victim's clipboard. The user is then nudged to paste and run this command in the Windows Run dialog, unknowingly launching BAITSWITCH through rundll32.exe. To maintain credibility, the site quickly redirects the user to a decoy Google Drive document.

#3

Once executed, BAITSWITCH sets up persistence and acts as a downloader for further payloads. It communicates with a threat actor-controlled domain using a hardcoded user-agent string, sending multiple HTTP requests to fetch instructions and eventually deliver the SIMPLEFIX backdoor. By leveraging CreateProcessA, BAITSWITCH executes commands directly on the endpoint, providing the attackers with an initial foothold.

#4

The next stage unfolds with a PowerShell stager that decodes and decrypts hidden payloads stored within obscure Windows registry keys. Using obfuscated Base64 and AES-encrypted data, the stager loads and executes SIMPLEFIX. This backdoor maintains persistence by running loops at regular three-minute intervals, dynamically generating user-agent strings, and sending periodic signals back to the command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.

#5

At its core, this campaign showcases COLDRIVER's steady evolution in combining social-engineering lures with lightweight custom malware. By exploiting trust and urgency, they manipulate victims into executing malicious commands themselves, bypassing many traditional defenses. While technically modest, tools like BAITSWITCH and SIMPLEFIX are effective in surveillance and espionage operations.

Recommendations



Be Cautious with Unexpected Prompts: If a website asks you to copy and run a command in the Windows Run dialog, treat it as a red flag. Legitimate services will never require you to do this.



Restrict Unnecessary Privileges: Ensure that users only have the permissions they truly need. Limiting administrator rights can stop malware from gaining a deeper foothold.



Isolate Risky Browsing Activities: Browser isolation technologies, such as cloud-based browsing or secure sandboxes, help contain threats that originate from malicious websites.



Keep Systems and Defenses Updated: Regularly patch operating systems, browsers, and security tools to reduce the risk of exploitation through old vulnerabilities.



Enhance Endpoint Protection: Deploy next-generation antivirus (NGAV) and endpoint detection & response (EDR) solutions to identify and block malware. Leverage behavioral analysis and machine learning-based detection to spot suspicious activity.



Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<u>TA0042</u> Resource Development	<u>TA0001</u> Initial Access	<u>TA0002</u> Execution	<u>TA0003</u> Persistence
<u>TA0005</u> Defense Evasion	<u>TA0007</u> Discovery	<u>TA0009</u> Collection	<u>TA0010</u> Exfiltration
<u>TA0011</u> Command and Control	<u>T1583</u> Acquire Infrastructure	<u>T1583.001</u> Domains	<u>T1583.006</u> Web Services
<u>T1585</u> Establish Accounts	<u>T1585.002</u> Email Accounts	<u>T1585.003</u> Cloud Accounts	<u>T1587</u> Develop Capabilities
<u>T1587.001</u> Malware	<u>T1608</u> Stage Capabilities	<u>T1608.001</u> Upload Malware	<u>T1608.003</u> Install Digital Certificate

<u>T1608.005</u> Link Target	<u>T1204</u> User Execution	<u>T1204.004</u> Malicious Copy and Paste	<u>T1059</u> Command and Scripting Interpreter
<u>T1059.001</u> PowerShell	<u>T1059.003</u> Windows Command Shell	<u>T1037</u> Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	<u>T1037.001</u> Logon Script (Windows)
<u>T1112</u> Modify Registry	<u>T1140</u> Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	<u>T1564</u> Hide Artifacts	<u>T1564.003</u> Hidden Window
<u>T1218</u> System Binary Proxy Execution	<u>T1218.011</u> Rundll32	<u>T1205</u> Traffic Signaling	<u>T1070</u> Indicator Removal
<u>T1070.003</u> Clear Command History	<u>T1027</u> Obfuscated Files or Information	<u>T1027.011</u> Fileless Storage	<u>T1027.013</u> Encrypted/Encoded File
<u>T1033</u> System Owner/User Discovery	<u>T1082</u> System Information Discovery	<u>T1135</u> Network Share Discovery	<u>T1016</u> System Network Configuration Discovery
<u>T1016.001</u> Internet Connection Discovery	<u>T1087</u> Account Discovery	<u>T1087.001</u> Local Account	<u>T1083</u> File and Directory Discovery
<u>T1049</u> System Network Connections Discovery	<u>T1057</u> Process Discovery	<u>T1018</u> Remote System Discovery	<u>T1046</u> Network Service Discovery
<u>T1124</u> System Time Discovery	<u>T1005</u> Data from Local System	<u>T1530</u> Data from Cloud Storage	<u>T1071</u> Application Layer Protocol
<u>T1071.001</u> Web Protocols	<u>T1104</u> Multi-Stage Channels	<u>T1001</u> Data Obfuscation	<u>T1001.003</u> Protocol or Service Impersonation
<u>T1105</u> Ingress Tool Transfer	<u>T1132</u> Data Encoding	<u>T1132.001</u> Standard Encoding	<u>T1573</u> Encrypted Channel
<u>T1573.002</u> Asymmetric Cryptography	<u>T1566</u> Phishing	<u>T1036</u> Masquerading	<u>T1059.007</u> JavaScript
<u>T1041</u> Exfiltration Over C2 Channel			

❌ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
Domains	preentootmist[.]org, blintepeeste[.]org, captchanom[.]top, southprovesolutions[.]com
URLs	hxxps[:]//preentootmist[.]org/?uinfo_message=Resilient_Voices, hxxps[:]//blintepeeste[.]org/?u_storages=Resilient_Voices_concept, hxxps[:]//captchanom[.]top/check/machinerie[.]dll, hxxps[:]//captchanom[.]top/coup/premier, hxxps[:]//captchanom[.]top/coup/deuxieme, hxxps[:]//captchanom[.]top/coup/troisieme, hxxps[:]//captchanom[.]top/coup/quatre, hxxps[:]//southprovesolutions[.]com/FvFLcsr23, hxxps[:]//southprovesolutions[.]com/Zxdf, hxxps[:]//southprovesolutions[.]com/KZouoRc, hxxps[:]//southprovesolutions[.]com/EPAWI, hxxps[:]//southprovesolutions[.]com/VUkXugsYgu, hxxps[:]//drive[.]google[.]com/file/d/1UiiDBT33N7unppa4UMS4NY2oOJ CM-96T/view
SHA256	87138f63974a8ccbbf5840c31165f1a4bf92a954baccfbf1e7e5525d750a a48, 62ab5a28801d2d7d607e591b7b2a1e9ae0bfc83f9ceda8a998e5e397b58 623a0, 16a79e36d9b371d1557310cb28d412207827db2759d795f4d8e27d5f5af af63f
Email	narnobudaeva[.]gmail[.]com

❌ References


<https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/coldriver-updates-arsenal-baitswitch-and-simplefix>

<https://hivepro.com/threat-advisory/coldriver-creeps-closer-with-lostkeys-malware/>

What Next?

At Hive Pro, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

Book a free demo with HivePro Uni5: Threat Exposure Management Platform.



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