

HiveForce Labs

# THREAT ADVISORY

 **ATTACK REPORT**

## DeerStealer the \$200 Doorway to Your Digital Secrets

Date of Publication

September 25, 2025

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2025295

# Summary

**Attack Commenced:** May 2025


**Malware:** DeerStealer

**DeerStealer Pricing Model:** \$200 - \$3000

**Targeted Regions:** Worldwide

**Attack:** DeerStealer is a sophisticated information-stealing malware actively sold on dark-web forums and Telegram by the user LuciferXfiles. It disguises itself as legitimate software, such as fake document readers, to trick victims into execution while secretly harvesting passwords, financial data, cryptocurrency wallets, and browser information. With strong obfuscation and persistence techniques, DeerStealer poses a growing cybersecurity threat that continues to evolve across global attack campaigns.

## Attack Regions



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# Attack Details

## #1

DeerStealer is malware designed to steal confidential information from compromised systems. It is actively marketed on dark-web forums by a user known as 'LuciferXfiles' and is also advertised through various Telegram channels. The malware is sold via a tiered subscription model, with pricing starting at \$200 per month for the 'Premium' plan; \$450 per month for 'Thief'; \$1,500 per month for 'Thief+'; and \$3,000 per month for the 'Professional' package.

## #2

The creator markets the full package, which includes the malware loader, under the name 'XFiles Spyware.' DeerStealer operates covertly, often posing as legitimate software to trick users into executing it. Once active, it establishes persistence on compromised systems and exfiltrates sensitive information such as financial data, passwords, and cryptocurrency wallet details to remote servers.

## #3

Its capabilities also extend to harvesting browser cookies, instant messaging content, and VPN information. In earlier campaigns, it was distributed as a fake Google Authenticator app, with the malicious binary hosted on GitHub. Developed in the Delphi programming language, recent variants are disguised as fake document reader updates.

## #4

DeerStealer often masquerades as software like Adobe Acrobat Reader, enabling it to blend in and evade detection. It is typically delivered in ZIP archives containing executable (PE) files and supporting payloads. The malware uses data obfuscation, signed binaries, and rootkit-like techniques, making it difficult to detect and remove.

## #5

Its ability to switch between command-and-control (C2) servers further strengthens its persistence and adaptability. To maintain access, DeerStealer creates scheduled tasks that ensure automatic execution after system reboots. In May 2025, threat actors attempted multiple DeerStealer deployments, often delivered as the final payload through [HijackLoader](#). These attack chains commonly leveraged the ClickFix access method, redirecting victims to phishing pages that instructed them to execute malicious commands in the Windows Run Prompt.

# Recommendations



**Implement Advanced Endpoint Protection:** Deploy next-generation antivirus and endpoint detection solutions capable of detecting obfuscated binaries, rootkit-like behaviors, and malicious PE files to prevent malware execution.



**Protect Sensitive Data and Credentials:** Implement multi-factor authentication, secure password storage, and regular audits of financial, VPN, and crypto wallet credentials to reduce the impact if DeerStealer gains access.



**Implement Network Segmentation and Zero Trust Architecture:** Segment networks to limit ransomware spread across interconnected systems. Apply zero trust principles, verify identity and device posture before granting access, regardless of location. Use micro-segmentation tools to define fine-grained access rules.



**Regularly Review and Harden File System Permissions:** Audit permissions for sensitive directories and ensure that only essential processes and users have write access. Disable file sharing where not required and use access control lists (ACLs) to limit exposure.

## Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<b>TA0001</b> Initial Access	<b>TA0002</b> Execution	<b>TA0003</b> Persistence	<b>TA0004</b> Privilege Escalation
<b>TA0005</b> Defense Evasion	<b>TA0007</b> Discovery	<b>TA0009</b> Collection	<b>TA0011</b> Command and Control
<b>TA0010</b> Exfiltration	<b>T1566</b> Phishing	<b>T1189</b> Drive-by Compromise	<b>T1204</b> User Execution
<b>T1059</b> Command and Scripting Interpreter	<b>T1053.005</b> Scheduled Task	<b>T1053</b> Scheduled Task/Job	<b>T1036</b> Masquerading

<b>T1622</b> Debugger Evasion	<b>T1027</b> Obfuscated Files or Information	<b>T1014</b> Rootkit	<b>T1027.013</b> Encrypted/Encoded File
<b>T1497</b> Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	<b>T1082</b> System Information Discovery	<b>T1087</b> Account Discovery	<b>T1087.001</b> Local Account
<b>T1217</b> Browser Bookmark Discovery	<b>T1673</b> Virtual Machine Discovery	<b>T1574.001</b> DLL	<b>T1041</b> Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
<b>T1001</b> Data Obfuscation	<b>T1056</b> Input Capture	<b>T1548</b> Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	<b>T1548.002</b> Bypass User Account Control
<b>T1005</b> Data from Local System			

## ✂ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
<b>SHA256</b>	a03cec07324b0c3227e4f060b0fefc24d35482dfe690bc86df1a53211629837e, b7ee370878fb4290097311e652222d8bab91c44a94063ea192100d4fd9dad14, 49ad6431fb67c29e1a2745092232898c491652ddf7115e0332382b42466d0734, ce62130f0392b40ab047392b47d523f66a55260c9fc2ec3d3727fab13fc87933, d4b3a879fb6907c39a3b843ec5272a005e8fec25d8012c4a9fe9d0ada9f71d1f, e189e7fe9cd6d63ecece8b8e8fafb773003db6009fb0c45dc2b21e77167938ba, 0feaaabe6d0a2e29b636cf1f5f9d1b3f727518507ffc93fc881d64feefa2ab81, 623ff1e6662986ab36336919fde5c48805b4a87b97af6f9abe09732e9ac45b8f, 1432faeddf57877873e8608ace13739ca66e8ce12b3453531e7eec4753df21d, 6f1bfbb8ba6d4eb4e7ce3ff16f1b8e95d601a5eccdd0d743141ac7c3841b11f3,

TYPE	VALUE
<b>SHA256</b>	<p>263484f65c76fd3be147ad124a1feaa5240a1d0ce1695855f08f6c6968d1a30d,  5ec174af8a18a5516b8a6e11d8a27481d70df14d1edb67c48b5458ff44df9146,  24475ae7781189075f64a2de1a7d1fd69b341b7adee67f0bd2286cfbf1f0b7f9,  eb17f8296482b0c096a2249844a62988b6abdd8ffe8cbbe3398f422968d46875,  e34d753f2b992cf74c1b9db61bad4d6c6089ab8ef9fb942c865290b2dd64b4ad,  9163f9237ad869a74715f9b126f7c577bd1f12afb8eae37ba07c11f00a39fa3e,  4640d425d8d43a95e903d759183993a87bafcb9816850efe57ccfca4ace889ec,  569ac32f692253b8ab7f411fec83f31ed1f7be40ac5c4027f41a58073fef8d7d,  5e2839553458547a92fff7348862063b30510e805a550e02d94a89bd8fd0768d,  66282239297c60bad7eeae274e8a2916ce95afeb932d3be64bb615ea2be1e07a,  a6f6175998e96fcecadd5f9b3746db5ced144ae97c017ad98b2caa9d0be8a3cb5,  b116c1e0f92dca485565d5f7f3b572d7f01724062320597733b9dbf6dd84dee1,  b5ab21ddb7cb5fbbedee68296a3d98f687e9acd8ebcc4539f7fd234197de2227,  cb08d8a7bca589704d20b421768ad01f7c38be0c3ea11b4b77777e6d0b5e5956,  d9db8cdef549e4ad0e33754d589a4c299e7082c3a0b5efdee1a0218a0a1bf1ee,  E24c311a64f57fd16ffc98f339d5d537c16851dc54d7bb3db8778c26ccb5f2d1</p>
<b>Domains</b>	<p>telluricaphelion[.]com,  loadinnhr[.]today,  nacreousoculus[.]pro,  upcdnnodes[.]cfd,  sciecdn[.]cfd,  cloused-flow[.]site,  debianlist[.]cfd,  soft-metal-software[.]cfd,  quitarlosi[.]cfd,  cdnnode-01[.]cfd,  sonorous-horizon-cfd[.]cfd,  servicesmesh[.]pro,  ncloud-servers[.]shop,  brokpolok[.]shop,</p>

TYPE	VALUE
<b>Domains</b>	d-nodes[.]shop, uplink-mirrors[.]shop, gg2024[.]info, authenticator-gogle[.]com, autheticator-gogle[.]com, authenticcatorgoogle[.]com, authenticattor-googl[.]com, paradiso4[.]fun, authenticcator-descktop[.]com, updater-pro[.]com, gg2024[.]com, authenticator-googl[.]com, authenficatorgoogle[.]com, bflow-musico[.]fun, authenticatorgoogle[.]com, authenticatorgoogle[.]com, chromstore-authenticator[.]com, authentifficatorgogle[.]com, authenticator-googl[.]com
<b>File Path</b>	C:\Users\[user-name]\AppData\Roaming\DebugdebugIRG_debug\ZZDCDNTCCJTZXI UKRCZH, C:\Users\[user-name]\AppData\Roaming\Outspan, C:\ProgramData\DebugdebugIRG_debug, C:\Users\[ user-name]\AppData\Roaming\ValidArchive4, C:\Users\[ user-name]\AppData\Roaming\DebugdebugIRG_debug
<b>Filename</b>	Reader_pl_install.zip
<b>IPv4</b>	104[.]21[.]112[.]1, 103[.]246[.]144[.]118, 172[.]67[.]195[.]171

## References

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
<https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/deerstealer-campaign-analysis/>

<https://hivepro.com/threat-advisory/hijackloader-a-deceptive-modular-malware-loader/>

# What Next?

At Hive Pro, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

Book a free demo with HivePro Uni5: Threat Exposure Management Platform.



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