

HiveForce Labs

THREAT ADVISORY

 **ATTACK REPORT**

Subtle Snail's Silent Espionage Across Europe

Date of Publication

September 23, 2025

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2025292

Summary

Attack Discovered: 2025

Targeted Countries: Canada, USA, UK, France, UAE

Targeted Industries: Telecommunications, Aerospace, Defense


Actor: Subtle Snail (aka UNC1549, TA455, Smoke Sandstorm, Bohrium, DEV-0056, Yellow Dev 13)

Affected Platform: Windows

Malware: MINIBIKE

Attack: Subtle Snail (UNC1549), an Iran-linked espionage group, has been quietly crawling into Europe's telecom, aerospace, and defense sectors by posing as LinkedIn recruiters and offering fake job opportunities. Behind these convincing fronts hides the MINIBIKE backdoor, a custom tool that steals credentials, monitors communications, and exfiltrates sensitive files while blending into trusted applications and cloud traffic. With signed binaries, DLL sideloading, and clever use of Microsoft Azure services, Subtle Snail has turned everyday job hunting into a gateway for long-term espionage.

🔪 Attack Regions



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Attack Details

#1

Subtle Snail (aka UNC1549), an Iran-linked espionage group active since 2022, has been quietly infiltrating Europe's most critical industries. The group has compromised 34 devices across 11 organizations in the telecommunications, aerospace, and defense sectors. Their method is deceptively simple yet effective, posing as HR recruiters on LinkedIn and offering fake job opportunities. Behind these staged recruitment campaigns lies the MINIBIKE backdoor, a custom malware built to ensure long-term access and espionage inside targeted environments.

#2

Once engagement begins, Subtle Snail escalates with precision. They collect detailed intelligence on their targets from public sources such as LinkedIn, validate information through spear-phishing, and eventually deliver malicious ZIP files disguised as legitimate job materials. These archives contain signed binaries that, when executed, exploit DLL sideloading to inject malicious code into trusted applications.

#3

At the core of their toolkit is the MINIBIKE backdoor, which enables reconnaissance, credential theft, and stealthy execution of attacker commands. Subtle Snail develops unique DLLs for each victim, leveraging Windows' DLL search order hijacking for persistence and privilege escalation. With modules for keylogging, browser data theft, and credential harvesting, the group siphons off sensitive communications, authentication details, and even files from centralized storage systems.

#4

The group's ability to remain undetected is one of its greatest strengths. By routing command-and-control traffic through Microsoft Azure services and Virtual Private Servers, they camouflage malicious activity within legitimate cloud communications. Their malware encrypts data, fragments large files for discreet exfiltration, and stores logs in public user folders to avoid detection. Combined with registry-based persistence, these measures allow Subtle Snail to maintain a resilient foothold across system reboots and security scans.

#5

There is an overlap with another Iran-linked actor, Nimbus Manticore, which has focused on similar industries as those of Subtle Snail in Denmark, Sweden, and Portugal. While sharing infection techniques with Subtle Snail, Nimbus Manticore deploys an updated backdoor named MiniJunk and a stealer called MiniBrowse. Although related in tradecraft, Nimbus Manticore distinguishes itself with a specialized malware suite, a different command-and-control infrastructure, and narrower targeting preferences. For European organizations, the message is clear: defending against such advanced threats requires more than standard security controls.

Recommendations



Be cautious with job offers online: If you receive an unexpected job offer on LinkedIn or email, especially from an unknown recruiter, verify it directly through the company’s official website or HR department before opening any files or links.



Check file sources before opening: Avoid downloading ZIP files, PDFs, or executables from unknown or unverified senders. Subtle Snail relies heavily on fake recruitment files to deliver malware.



Watch for suspicious signs: Emails with mismatched sender names, login pages asking for unusual credentials, or job postings that feel “too perfect” should raise red flags.



Enhance Endpoint Protection: Deploy next-generation antivirus (NGAV) and endpoint detection & response (EDR) solutions to identify and block malware. Leverage behavioral analysis and machine learning-based detection to spot suspicious activity.



Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<u>TA0043</u> Reconnaissance	<u>TA0042</u> Resource Development	<u>TA0001</u> Initial Access	<u>TA0002</u> Execution
<u>TA0003</u> Persistence	<u>TA0004</u> Privilege Escalation	<u>TA0005</u> Defense Evasion	<u>TA0006</u> Credential Access
<u>TA0007</u> Discovery	<u>TA0009</u> Collection	<u>TA0010</u> Exfiltration	<u>TA0011</u> Command and Control
<u>T1589</u> Gather Victim Identity Information	<u>T1591</u> Gather Victim Org Information	<u>T1598</u> Phishing for Information	<u>T1598.003</u> Spearphishing Link
<u>T1583</u> Acquire Infrastructure	<u>T1583.001</u> Domains	<u>T1583.003</u> Virtual Private Server	<u>T1587</u> Develop Capabilities

<u>T1587.001</u> Malware	<u>T1585</u> Establish Accounts	<u>T1585.001</u> Social Media Accounts	<u>T1585.002</u> Email Accounts
<u>T1585.003</u> Cloud Accounts	<u>T1588</u> Obtain Capabilities	<u>T1588.003</u> Code Signing Certificates	<u>T1566</u> Phishing
<u>T1566.002</u> Spearphishing Link	<u>T1566.001</u> Spearphishing Attachment	<u>T1204</u> User Execution	<u>T1204.001</u> Malicious Link
<u>T1204.002</u> Malicious File	<u>T1059</u> Command and Scripting Interpreter	<u>T1059.003</u> Windows Command Shell	<u>T1016</u> System Network Configuration Discovery
<u>T1070</u> Indicator Removal	<u>T1574</u> Hijack Execution Flow	<u>T1574.001</u> DLL	<u>T1055</u> Process Injection
<u>T1055.012</u> Process Hollowing	<u>T1547</u> Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	<u>T1547.001</u> Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	<u>T1497</u> Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
<u>T1622</u> Debugger Evasion	<u>T1140</u> Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	<u>T1027</u> Obfuscated Files or Information	<u>T1027.007</u> Dynamic API Resolution
<u>T1036</u> Masquerading	<u>T1036.003</u> Rename Legitimate Utilities	<u>T1070.004</u> File Deletion	<u>T1056</u> Input Capture
<u>T1056.001</u> Keylogging	<u>T1555</u> Credentials from Password Stores	<u>T1555.003</u> Credentials from Web Browsers	<u>T1539</u> Steal Web Session Cookie
<u>T1552</u> Unsecured Credentials	<u>T1552.001</u> Credentials In Files	<u>T1552.004</u> Private Keys	<u>T1552.003</u> Bash History
<u>T1555.005</u> Password Managers	<u>T1087</u> Account Discovery	<u>T1016</u> System Network Configuration Discovery	<u>T1033</u> System Owner/User Discovery
<u>T1082</u> System Information Discovery	<u>T1069</u> Permission Groups Discovery	<u>T1069.002</u> Domain Groups	<u>T1083</u> File and Directory Discovery

<u>T1057</u> Process Discovery	<u>T1217</u> Browser Information Discovery	<u>T1005</u> Data from Local System	<u>T1119</u> Automated Collection
<u>T1560</u> Archive Collected Data	<u>T1560.001</u> Archive via Utility	<u>T1114</u> Email Collection	<u>T1114.001</u> Local Email Collection
<u>T1025</u> Data from Removable Media	<u>T1039</u> Data from Network Shared Drive	<u>T1115</u> Clipboard Data	<u>T1071</u> Application Layer Protocol
<u>T1071.001</u> Web Protocols	<u>T1020</u> Automated Exfiltration	<u>T1041</u> Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	<u>T1029</u> Scheduled Transfer

✂ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
MD5	b40533e67e70b7ff7bb53d34a4b9170e, 67e09818d1aa650896a432b1de54d376, 63080b45ca4978fb5d2d71387dbaf610, 25d3a014c332aaa3adce429d0e714e31, 424f887f651371aa3058cf7c8e908d2a, 8db7338c487143a4d43ed1a22fec49a7, 7d887893a6107d7ae902e6771f30e080, a933c623e3b047292efd55e0e424c732
SHA256	0e4ff052250ade1edaab87de194e87a9afeff903695799bcbcb3571918b131100, 23c0b4f1733284934c071df2bf953a1a894bb77c84cff71d9bfcf80ce3dc4c16, 0b2c137ef9087cb4635e110f8e12bb0ed43b6d6e30c62d1f880db20778b73c9a, 6780116ec3eb7d26cf721607e14f352957a495d97d74234aade67adbdc3ed339, 41d60b7090607e0d4048a3317b45ec7af637d27e5c3e6e89ea8bdcad62c15bf9, 4260328c81e13a65a081be30958d94b945fea6f2a483d051c52537798b100c69, a37d36ade863966fb8520ea819b1fd580bc13314fac6e73cb62f74192021dab9,

TYPE	VALUE
SHA256	5d832f1da0c7e07927dcf72d6a6f011bfc7737dc34f39c561d1457af83e04e70, ffeacef025ef32ad092eea4761e4eec3c96d4ac46682a0ae15c9303b5c654e3e, c22b12d8b1e21468ed5d163efbf7fee306e357053d454e1683ddc3fe14d25db5, 4da158293f93db27906e364a33e5adf8de07a97edaba052d4a9c1c3c3a7f234d, 061c28a9cf06c9f338655a520d13d9b0373ba9826a2759f989985713b5a4ba2b, bc9f2abce42141329b2ecd0bf5d63e329a657a0d7f33ccdf78b87cf4e172fbd1, e69c7ea1301e8d723f775ee911900bf7caf8dcd9c85728f178f0703c4e6c5c0, e77b7ec4ace252d37956d6a68663692e6bde90cdbbb07c1b8990bfaa311ecfb2, b43487153219d960b585c5e3ea5bb38f6ea04ec9830cca183eb39ccc95d15793, 1b629042b5f08b7460975b5ecabc5b195fcbdf76ea50416f512a3ae7a677614a, f8a1c69c03002222980963a5d50ab9257bc4a1f2f486c3e7912d75558432be88, 954de96c7fcc84fb062ca1e68831ae5745cf091ef5fb2cb2622edf2358e749e0, afe679de1a84301048ce1313a057af456e7ee055519b3693654bbb7312083876, 9ec7899729aac48481272d4b305ceffa7799dcdad88d02278ee14315a0a8cc1, 3b4667af3a3e6ed905ae73683ee78d2c608a00e566ae446003da47947320097f, a4f5251c81f080d80d1f75ad4cc8f5bc751e7c6df5addcfca268d59107737bd0, cf0c50670102e7fc6499e8d912ce1f5bd389fad5358d5cae53884593c337ac2e, 3b58fd0c0ef8a42226be4d26a64235da059986ec7f5990d5c50d47b7a6cfadcd, 7c77865f27b8f749b7df805ee76cf6e4575cbe0c4d9c29b75f8260210a802fce, d2db5b9b554470f5e9ad26f37b6b3f4f3dae336b3deea3f189933d007c17e3d8, b9b3ba39dbb6f4da3ed492140ffc167bde5dee005a35228ce156bed413af622d, 53ff76014f650b3180bc87a23d40dc861a005f47a6977cb2fba8907259c3cf7a, b405ae67c4ad4704c2ae33b2cf60f5b0ccdaaff65c2ec44f5913664805d446c9b,

TYPE	VALUE
SHA256	5985bf904c546c2474cbf94d6d6b2a18a4c82a1407c23a5a5eca3cd828f03826, 8e7771ed1126b79c9a6a1093b2598282221cad8524c061943185272fbe58142d, f54fccb26a6f65de0d0e09324c84e8d85e7549d4d04e0aa81e4c7b1ae2f3c0f8, 054483046c9f593114bc3ddc3613f71af6b30d2e4b7e7faec1f26e72ae6d7669, 95d246e4956ad5e6b167a3d9d939542d6d80ec7301f337e00bb109cc220432cf, 9b186530f291f0e6ebc981399c956e1de3ba26b0315b945a263250c06831f281
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TYPE	VALUE
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
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September 23, 2025 • 7:30 AM

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