

HiveForce Labs

THREAT ADVISORY

 **ATTACK REPORT**

Yurei Ransomware Haunts the Digital World Like a Restless Spirit

Date of Publication

September 17, 2025

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2025285

Summary

First Observed: September 5, 2025


Malware: Yurei Ransomware

Targeted Countries: Sri Lanka, Nigeria, India

Targeted Industries: Food Service, Manufacturing

Attack: Yurei ransomware, first spotted on September 5, 2025, is a Go-based malware speculated to be linked to Moroccan threat actors, targeting companies in Sri Lanka, Nigeria, and India. Derived from the open-source Prince ransomware, it encrypts files using the ChaCha20 algorithm and spreads across network drives.

Attack Regions



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Attack Details

#1

Yurei ransomware was first detected on September 5, 2025. The cybercriminal group behind the attack is suspected to be based in Morocco. The name 'Yurei' originates from Japanese folklore. The ransomware's darknet page initially disclosed a single victim a food manufacturing company in Sri Lanka. By September 9, 2025, two additional victims had been identified, one from Nigeria and another from India.

#2

The malware is written in the Go programming language and is derived from the open-source Prince ransomware, incorporating only minor alterations. This codebase has also been used in other campaigns, including those linked to CrazyHunter. Yurei encrypts files using the ChaCha20 algorithm, appending the .Yurei extension to affected files.

#3

Once encryption is complete, the ransomware initiates a secondary process that continuously searches for new network drives to include in its encryption scope, thereby expanding its attack surface. Victims find a ransom note named _README_Yurei.txt, which instructs them to visit a dedicated site and use an access token to enter a chat for negotiation.

#4

A notable weakness in Yurei's design is its failure to delete existing Shadow Copies. These are backup snapshots created by Windows Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS), which allow users to restore files or entire volumes if enabled. Unlike many ransomware variants that remove these backups to prevent recovery, Yurei leaves them intact.

#5

As a result, victims with enabled VSS can potentially recover files without complying with the attackers demands. This oversight highlights the ransomware's limited sophistication. Given this vulnerability, it is strongly recommended to enable and regularly create system snapshots via VSS as a defense mechanism. However, while this approach can aid in restoring files, it does not protect against evolving ransomware tactics, particularly data-theft-based extortion methods that are increasingly being adopted by malicious actors.

Recommendations



Strengthen Backup Strategies with Volume Shadow Copies: Enable the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) and configure automated snapshots of critical files and system states. Regularly test backup recovery to ensure that data can be restored without negotiating with threat actors. Implement offsite and immutable backups to safeguard against ransomware that targets local files.



Prepare for Data-Theft Based Extortion: Even if backups allow file restoration, be aware that attackers may exfiltrate sensitive data for further extortion. Encrypt sensitive data at rest and in transit and monitor data egress points to prevent unauthorized downloads.



Implement Network Segmentation and Zero Trust Architecture: Segment networks to limit ransomware spread across interconnected systems. Apply zero trust principles verify identity and device posture before granting access, regardless of location. Use micro-segmentation tools to define fine-grained access rules.



Regularly Review and Harden File System Permissions: Audit permissions for sensitive directories and ensure that only essential processes and users have write access. Disable file sharing where not required and use access control lists (ACLs) to limit exposure.



Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<u>TA0002</u> Execution	<u>TA0003</u> Persistence	<u>TA0004</u> Privilege Escalation	<u>TA0005</u> Defense Evasion
<u>TA0007</u> Discovery	<u>TA0008</u> Lateral Movement	<u>TA0009</u> Collection	<u>TA0011</u> Command and Control
<u>TA0010</u> Exfiltration	<u>TA0040</u> Impact	<u>T1005</u> Data from Local System	<u>T1489</u> Service Stop
<u>T1059</u> Command and Scripting Interpreter	<u>T1059.001</u> PowerShell	<u>T1543</u> Create or Modify System Process	<u>T1068</u> Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

T1562 Impair Defenses	T1083 File and Directory Discovery	T1021 Remote Services	T1135 Network Share Discovery
T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact	T1490 Inhibit System Recovery	T1071 Application Layer Protocol	T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

✂ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
SHA256	49c720758b8a87e42829ffb38a0d7fe2a8c36dc3007abfabbea76155185d2902, 4f88d3977a24fb160fc3ba69821287a197ae9b04493d705dc2fe939442ba6461, 1ea37e077e6b2463b8440065d5110377e2b4b4283ce9849ac5efad6d664a8e9e, 10700ee5caad40e74809921e11b7e3f2330521266c822ca4d21e14b22ef08e1d, 89a54d3a38d2364784368a40ab228403f1f1c1926892fe8355aa29d00eb36819, f5e122b60390bdcc1a17a24cce0cbca68475ad5abee6b211b5be2dea966c2634, 0303f89829763e734b1f9d4f46671e59bfaa1be5d8ec84d35a203efbfc b9bb15, afa927ca549aaba66867f21fc4a5d653884c349f8736ecc5be3620577cf9981f, d2539173bdc81503bf1b842a21d9599948e957cad76a283a52f5849323d8e04, 754865527bc33305d8dc89a88ffada71fa0180fe778e2106d5faa8e7a8801220, 84d68ba901462bb0918a852a01df885f986661954c14d9c4e8e40338df2a1cb8, 53397d36cab0a32695a50d179f289fa61fc946591bd97355ee98d350f7652079
TOR Address	fewcriet5rhoy66k6c4cyvb2pqrblxtx4mekj3s5l4jtt4t4kn4vheyd[.]onion
Filename	_README_Yurei.txt

Recent Breaches

<https://www.midcity.lk>

<https://www.thepromisenig.com>

<https://noblecorp.net>

References

<https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/yurei-the-ghost-of-open-source-ransomware/>


<https://github.com/oakkaya/Prince-Ransomware>

<https://hivepro.com/threat-advisory/go-based-crazyhunter-ransomware-strikes-taiwan/>

What Next?

At Hive Pro, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

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September 17, 2025 • 9:30 PM

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