

HiveForce Labs

THREAT ADVISORY



ATTACK REPORT

Storm-0501's Shift to Cloud-Native Ransomware

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Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2025264

Summary

First Seen: 2021

Targeted Countries: Worldwide

Targeted Platforms: Windows


Threat Actor: Storm-0501

Targeted Industries: Critical infrastructure, Government, Law enforcement, Energy, Aerospace, Defense, Healthcare, and Financial services, Agriculture, Media, and Consumer goods

Attack: Storm-0501, active since 2021, has shifted from traditional ransomware to cloud-based attacks, exploiting identity misconfigurations and fragmented security in hybrid environments. In a recent campaign, the group abused gaps in cloud identity and security tool deployment to escalate privileges and execute ransomware directly in the cloud. Instead of relying on endpoint malware, they exfiltrated data, deleted backups, and enforced ransom demands through cloud-native operations. Organizations are advised to strengthen identity security, unify security controls, and close visibility gaps to counter this evolving threat.



Threat Actor's Timeline



Attack Regions



Storm-0501

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Attack Details

#1

Storm-0501 is a financially motivated threat actor that has evolved from traditional endpoint-based ransomware to sophisticated cloud-native campaigns, actively targeting organizations with hybrid environments. Instead of relying on malware to encrypt files on-premises, they exploit cloud capabilities to exfiltrate and destroy large volumes of data, bypassing conventional security controls and making remediation far more difficult. Storm-0501 targets globally, but most targeted countries include the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, Kenya, Bangladesh, and Peru.

#2

Their attacks often begin with the compromise of an on-premises Active Directory domain through privilege escalation and credential theft. After achieving domain administrator access, Storm-0501 pivots to the cloud by abusing Entra Connect Sync accounts, enumerating cloud users and resources, and hijacking privileged identities. By resetting passwords and registering new MFA methods, they secure persistence and expand control.

#3

With global administrator privileges, Storm-0501 escalates their reach across Azure subscriptions, exposing storage accounts, stealing access keys, and deleting or exfiltrating backups. They attempt to bypass safeguards like resource locks or immutability, and in some cases even leverage Azure Key Vaults to encrypt cloud data and block recovery.

#4

The final phase is extortion: after crippling the victim's cloud environment, Storm-0501 uses compromised collaboration tools, such as Microsoft Teams accounts, to deliver ransom demands. This cloud-centric methodology underscores the need for organizations to enforce strong identity protections, unify monitoring across tenants, and mandate multi-factor authentication for all privileged accounts.

Recommendations



On-Premises Protection: Enable tamper protection and run endpoint detection and response (EDR) in block and automated remediation modes to prevent lateral movement and malware persistence. Keep software patched, especially enterprise tools like Zoho ManageEngine. Monitor privileged accounts and block abuse of admin tools.



Cloud Identity Security: Enforce multifactor authentication (MFA) with phishing-resistant methods on all accounts, especially privileged users. Apply Conditional Access policies to limit access from untrusted IPs and devices. Restrict and audit Directory Synchronization Account permissions and enforce least privilege on all cloud identities.



Cloud Resource Safeguards: Use Microsoft Defender for Cloud to monitor Azure resources and enable resource locks and immutable storage policies to prevent unauthorized or accidental deletions. Enable backup solutions and private endpoints to secure storage accounts. Protect Azure Key Vaults with purge protection and logging.



General Hygiene and Monitoring: Use security exposure management to identify critical assets and assess attack paths. Continuously monitor authentication and cloud activity for anomalies and signs of compromise. Train users to recognize phishing, and maintain strong password policies and backup procedures to enable quick recovery from attacks.



Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<u>TA0040</u> Impact	<u>TA0001</u> Initial Access	<u>TA0002</u> Execution	<u>TA0011</u> Command and Control
<u>TA0003</u> Persistence	<u>TA0004</u> Privilege Escalation	<u>TA0005</u> Defense Evasion	<u>TA0006</u> Credential Access
<u>TA0010</u> Exfiltration	<u>TA0007</u> Discovery	<u>TA0008</u> Lateral Movement	<u>TA0009</u> Collection
<u>T1567.002</u> Exfiltration to Cloud Storage	<u>T1530</u> Data from Cloud Storage	<u>T1486</u> Data Encrypted for Impact	<u>T1485</u> Data Destruction
<u>T1484</u> Domain Policy Modification	<u>T1134</u> Access Token Manipulation	<u>T1562.001</u> Disable or Modify Tools	<u>T1562</u> Impair Defenses
<u>T1484.002</u> Domain Trust Modification	<u>T1134.002</u> Create Process with Token	<u>T1003.006</u> DCSync	<u>T1482</u> Domain Trust Discovery
<u>T1059</u> Command and Scripting Interpreter	<u>T1133</u> External Remote Services	<u>T1078</u> Valid Accounts	<u>T1078.004</u> Cloud Accounts
<u>T1059.009</u> Cloud API	<u>T1098.003</u> Additional Cloud Roles	<u>T1098</u> Account Manipulation	<u>T1003</u> OS Credential Dumping
<u>T1586</u> Compromise Accounts	<u>T1586.003</u> Cloud Accounts	<u>T1136.001</u> Local Account	<u>T1059.001</u> PowerShell



<u>T1136</u> Create Account	<u>T1087</u> Account Discovery	<u>T1087.002</u> Domain Account	<u>T1021</u> Remote Services
<u>T1567</u> Exfiltration Over Web Service	<u>T1053.005</u> Scheduled Task	<u>T1053</u> Scheduled Task/Job	

✂ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
SHA256	efb2f6452d7b0a63f6f2f4d8db49433259249df598391dd79f64df1e e3880a8d, a9aeb861817f3e4e74134622cbe298909e28d0fcc1e72f179a32adc 637293a40, caa21a8f13a0b77ff5808ad7725ff3af9b74ce5b67426c84538b8fa43 820a031, d37dc37fdcebbe0d265b8afad24198998ae8c3b2c6603a9258200ea 8a1bd7b4a, 53e2dec3e16a0ff000a8c8c279eeeca8b4437edb8ec8462bfb9f64d ed8072d9, 827f7178802b2e92988d7cff349648f334bc86317b0b628f4bb9264 285fccf5f, ee80f3e3ad43a283cbc83992e235e4c1b03ff3437c880be02ab1d15 d92a8348a, de09ec092b11a1396613846f6b082e1e1ee16ea270c895ec6e4f55 3a13716304, d065623a7d943c6e5a20ca9667aa3c41e639e153600e26ca0af5d7c 643384670, c08dd490860b54ae20fa9090274da9ffa1ba163f00d1e462e913cf8c 68c11ac1

✂ References

<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/08/27/storm-0501s-evolving-techniques-lead-to-cloud-based-ransomware/>

<https://cyble.com/threat-actor-profiles/storm-0501/>

What Next?

At Hive Pro, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

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