

HiveForce Labs

THREAT ADVISORY

 **ATTACK REPORT**

Secret Blizzard Strikes Moscow with ApolloShadow

Date of Publication

August 1, 2025

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2025237

Summary

Attack Discovered: February 2025

Targeted City: Moscow


Targeted Industry: Diplomats

Malware: ApolloShadow

Actor: Secret Blizzard (aka Turla, Waterbug, Venomous Bear, Group 88, SIG2, SIG15, SIG23, Iron Hunter, CTG-8875, Pacifier APT, ATK 13, ITG12, Makersmark, Krypton, Belugasturgeon, Popeye, Wraith, TAG-0530, UNC4210, SUMMIT, Pensive Ursa, Blue Python, G0010, Hippo Team, Pfinet, Snake, UAC-0003, UAC-0024, UAC-0144, Uroburos)

Attack: The Russian state-sponsored group Secret Blizzard is running a targeted cyber-espionage operation against diplomats in Moscow. By leveraging an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) position, likely made possible through cooperation with local internet service providers, they intercept network traffic and redirect victims to a deceptive captive portal. There, targets are tricked into downloading a fake Kaspersky Anti-Virus installer that silently drops ApolloShadow malware. This malware installs a rogue trusted root certificate, allowing the attackers to maintain long-term access and intercept encrypted communications. Secret Blizzard also uses stealthy techniques to map networks, evade defenses, and extract sensitive intelligence without being detected.

✂ Attack Regions



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Attack Details

#1

A sophisticated cyberespionage campaign, orchestrated by the Russian state-sponsored group Secret Blizzard, has been quietly targeting foreign embassies in Moscow. Active since at least 2024, the operation poses a serious threat to diplomatic missions by leveraging an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) position, likely enabled by Russia's internal surveillance systems such as SORM. This privileged access allows the attackers to intercept and manipulate internet traffic, particularly for victims dependent on local internet service providers. The initial stage of the attack involves redirecting victims to a captive portal, tricking them into downloading and executing a custom malware strain known as ApolloShadow, which is cleverly disguised as a legitimate Kaspersky Anti-Virus installer.

#2

Once the malware is executed, it begins a series of actions to establish a persistent and privileged foothold. ApolloShadow first checks the ProcessToken for elevated privileges and, if needed, displays a User Account Control (UAC) prompt to get the user to install malicious root certificates. This key tactic is a cornerstone of the attack, as the rogue certificates allow the attackers to strip TLS/SSL encryption from web traffic, exposing even secure communications. The malware also employs command and scripting interpreters to run obfuscated scripts that hinder detection and reverse engineering.

#3

To maintain long-term access, the attackers implement several robust persistence mechanisms. A key tactic is the creation of a stealthy admin-level user account named "UpdatusUser" using the NetUserAdd Windows API, which is protected with a hardcoded, non-expiring password. Furthermore, ApolloShadow deliberately manipulates network configurations, changing all network types to "Private." This subtle change weakens firewall restrictions, making the host more vulnerable to lateral movement across the internal environment and facilitating the attackers' ability to extend their control. The malware also decodes and runs a second-stage VBScript payload delivered via its command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.

#4

The malware masquerades its C2 traffic by making requests to a non-existent /registered resource on a digicert.com subdomain. The attackers use DNS hijacking to redirect this seemingly legitimate communication to their own C2 servers, allowing them to issue commands and exfiltrate data without triggering immediate network alerts. ApolloShadow exhibits adaptive behavior, collecting detailed system and network information from the compromised host, which is then encoded and exfiltrated. This strategic gathering of intelligence is a primary objective of the espionage campaign, providing the attackers with critical insights into the diplomatic network.

Recommendations



Use a Trusted, Secure Connection for All Internet Activity: Whenever you go online, especially when accessing sensitive information, make sure your internet traffic is routed through a secure, encrypted tunnel. This can be done by using a reliable Virtual Private Network (VPN). Ideally, choose a VPN provider that operates independently and isn't influenced by governments or organizations that could misuse your data.



Limit Access: Give users only the access they truly need to do their jobs, nothing more. Turn on multifactor authentication (MFA) to add an extra layer of security. Regularly review how admin accounts are being used and avoid using one super-powerful account across your whole network. Also, try to limit who has admin access on individual machines. These steps make it much harder for attackers to move around if they get in and help you catch suspicious activity early.



Keep a Close Watch on User Groups: Regularly check who's in high-privilege groups like Administrators, Remote Desktop Users, and Enterprise Admins. Attackers often sneak their accounts into these groups to stay hidden and keep access for longer. Spotting unexpected changes early can help you kick them out before they do more damage.



Enhance Endpoint Protection: Deploy next-generation antivirus (NGAV) and endpoint detection & response (EDR) solutions to identify and block malware. Leverage behavioral analysis and machine learning-based detection to spot suspicious activity.



Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<u>TA0002</u> Execution	<u>TA0003</u> Persistence	<u>TA0004</u> Privilege Escalation	<u>TA0005</u> Defense Evasion
<u>TA0006</u> Credential Access	<u>TA0007</u> Discovery	<u>TA0010</u> Exfiltration	<u>TA0011</u> Command and Control
<u>T1557</u> Adversary-in-the-Middle	<u>T1036</u> Masquerading	<u>T1036.005</u> Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location	<u>T1068</u> Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

<u>T1132</u> Data Encoding	<u>T1132.001</u> Standard Encoding	<u>T1041</u> Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	<u>T1059</u> Command and Scripting Interpreter
<u>T1059.005</u> Visual Basic	<u>T1027</u> Obfuscated Files or Information	<u>T1140</u> Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	<u>T1548</u> Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
<u>T1548.002</u> Bypass User Account Control	<u>T1112</u> Modify Registry	<u>T1070</u> Indicator Removal	<u>T1070.004</u> File Deletion
<u>T1136</u> Create Account	<u>T1559</u> Inter-Process Communication	<u>T1559.001</u> Component Object Model	<u>T1553</u> Subvert Trust Controls
<u>T1553.004</u> Install Root Certificate	<u>T1087</u> Account Discovery	<u>T1071</u> Application Layer Protocol	<u>T1082</u> System Information Discovery

❌ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
Domain	kav-certificates[.]info
IPv4	45[.]61[.]149[.]109
SHA256	13fafb1ae2d5de024e68f2e2fc820bc79ef0690c40dbfd70246bcc394c52ea20
Filename	CertificateDB.exe


❌ References

<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/07/31/frozen-in-transit-secret-blizzards-aitm-campaign-against-diplomats/>

What Next?

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