

HiveForce Labs

# THREAT ADVISORY

 **ATTACK REPORT**

## **Stealth in the System: HoldingHands RAT Masquerades as Tax Bureau**

Date of Publication

June 18, 2025

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2025192

# Summary

**Attack Commenced:** March 2025

**Targeted Country:** Taiwan

**Affected Platforms:** Microsoft Windows

**Malware:** HoldingHands RAT (aka Gh0stBins)

**Attack:** A stealthy cyberattack targeting Taiwanese users in early 2025 disguised itself as official tax emails, tricking victims into opening malware-laced attachments. Behind the scenes, a modified Remote Access Trojan called HoldingHands quietly hijacked systems, using layers of encryption, privilege escalation, and Windows system tools to evade detection and stay hidden. This highly targeted campaign evolved over time, with attackers refining their methods and using familiar-looking files to gain user trust while silently taking control of infected machines.

## 🔪 Attack Regions



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# Attack Details

**#1** In March 2025, a targeted phishing campaign emerged against organizations in Taiwan. Attackers posed as government agencies or business partners, sending deceptive emails themed around taxes, pensions, and invoices. These messages included ZIP file attachments that, once opened, initiated a multi-stage infection chain. Hidden within the archive was a malicious dynamic link library (DLL) which, when executed, enabled deeper system compromise. In the final stage, the attackers deployed HoldingHands (aka Gh0stBins), a remote access trojan (RAT) designed to maintain long-term access and control over infected systems.

**#2** The phishing emails often included PDF attachments crafted to appear legitimate, encouraging recipients to click on embedded links. In some cases, the malware was hidden inside password-protected ZIP files to evade detection and analysis. Once extracted, these files triggered a sequence that quietly decrypted and launched malicious code in the background, using legitimate-looking programs to disguise its activity.

**#3** The malware checked for signs of analysis, such as low system memory, and terminated itself if it detected a virtual environment. It also attempted to gain elevated privileges by mimicking trusted system processes. If successful, it created registry entries to mark the system as infected and dropped additional components into key system folders. To avoid reinfection or detection, the attack ceased if it found specific files indicating a prior compromise.

**#4** A tampered Windows component was also used to ensure the malware only executed under specific conditions, for instance, when launched by trusted system processes and when antivirus software was inactive. After gaining persistence, the malware renamed and moved files within the system to survive reboots and continue operating undetected.

**#5** This March activity aligns with an earlier campaign observed in January 2025, in which a targeted phishing operation against Taiwanese users delivered a variant of the [Winos 4.0](#) malware. The infrastructure and tactics used in both incidents suggest a single threat actor refining their tools and delivery methods. By leveraging stealth and layered infection strategies, the group maintains a strong foothold within targeted environments. The campaign's ultimate goal appears to be the theft of sensitive data, likely to support future attacks or broader cyberespionage objectives.

# Recommendations



**Be cautious with suspicious emails:** Watch out for unexpected emails, especially ones that claim to be from government agencies or business partners. If you receive messages like fake tax notices or unexpected invoices, don't click anything right away. Instead, confirm their legitimacy through trusted, official sources.



**Think twice before opening ZIP attachments:** Avoid opening ZIP file attachments especially if they're password-protected or contain multiple files. These are often used by attackers to sneak malware past security tools.



**Limit user privileges:** Restrict admin rights on user accounts. If malware does get in, limited privileges can help stop it from spreading or doing serious damage.



**Enhance Endpoint Protection:** Deploy next-generation antivirus (NGAV) and endpoint detection & response (EDR) solutions to identify and block malware. Leverage behavioral analysis and machine learning-based detection to spot suspicious activity.



## Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<b><u>TA0001</u></b> Initial Access	<b><u>TA0002</u></b> Execution	<b><u>TA0003</u></b> Persistence	<b><u>TA0004</u></b> Privilege Escalation
<b><u>TA0005</u></b> Defense Evasion	<b><u>TA0007</u></b> Discovery	<b><u>TA0011</u></b> Command and Control	<b><u>T1566</u></b> Phishing
<b><u>T1566.001</u></b> Spearphishing Attachment	<b><u>T1566.002</u></b> Spearphishing Link	<b><u>T1036</u></b> Masquerading	<b><u>T1204</u></b> User Execution
<b><u>T1204.001</u></b> Malicious Link	<b><u>T1574</u></b> Hijack Execution Flow	<b><u>T1574.001</u></b> DLL	<b><u>T1027</u></b> Obfuscated Files or Information

<b><u>T1140</u></b> Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	<b><u>T1059</u></b> Command and Scripting Interpreter	<b><u>T1068</u></b> Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	<b><u>T1497</u></b> Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
<b><u>T1082</u></b> System Information Discovery	<b><u>T1547</u></b> Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	<b><u>T1547.001</u></b> Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	<b><u>T1656</u></b> Impersonation

## ✂ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
<b>IPv4</b>	154[.]91[.]85[.]204, 154[.]86[.]22[.]47, 156[.]251[.]17[.]17, 206[.]238[.]179[.]173, 206[.]238[.]220[.]60, 206[.]238[.]199[.]22, 154[.]91[.]85[.]201, 206[.]238[.]221[.]182, 206[.]238[.]196[.]32, 154[.]91[.]64[.]45, 206[.]238[.]115[.]207, 156[.]251[.]17[.]12, 107[.]149[.]253[.]183
<b>Domains</b>	00-1321729461[.]cos[.]ap-guangzhou[.]myqcloud[.]com, 6-1321729461[.]cos[.]ap-guangzhou[.]myqcloud[.]com, twzfte-1340224852[.]cos[.]ap-guangzhou[.]myqcloud[.]com, cq1tw[.]top, twcz[.]pro, twczb[.]com, twnc[.]ink, twnic[.]icu, twnic[.]ink, twnic[.]ltd, twnic[.]xin, twsa[.]top, tsw[.]cc, tsw[.]club, tsw[.]info, tsw[.]ink, tsw[.]ltd, tsw[.]pro, tsw[.]vip,

TYPE	VALUE
<b>Domains</b>	twsww[.]xin, twswz[.]top, twswzz[.]xin, twtgtw[.]net, twzfw[.]vip
<b>SHA256</b>	6558dfb070421c674b377a0a6090593fa0c44d5b0dec5325a648583f92175c e2, d3a270d782e62574983b28bd35076b569a0b65236e7f841a63b0558f2e3a2 31c, a8430ce490d5c5fab1521f3297e2d277ee7e7c49e7357c208878f7fd5f76393 1, 7d3f352ded285118e916336da6e6182778a54dc88d4fb7353136f028ac9b81 e0, 143f434e3a2cac478fb672b77d6c04cdf25287d234a52ee157f4f1a2b06f802 2, c25e80cd10e7741b5f3e0b246822e0af5237026d5227842f6cf4907daa0398 48, 7263550339c2a35f356bb874fb3a619b76f2d602064beada75049e7c2927a6 dc, a8b6c06daeede6199e69f4cafd79299219def5bf913a31829dede98a8ad2aaa 9, 6fcd6aef0678d3c6d5f8c2cb660356b25f68c73e7ee24fbb721216a547d17ffa, ed72721837c991621639b4e86ffe0c2693ef1a545741b5513d204a1e3e008d 8c, 65edd9e1a38fd3da79c8a556eb2c7c595125ffec9f7483e2e6e189a08cc5d41 2, 0a0375648bc9368bccfd3d657d26976d5b1f975381d1858d001404d807334 058, e809582facdd27337aa46b4a11dd11f5d0c7d7428ebdc8c895ea80777e4da 5f, 59d2433264d8ec9e9797918be3aa7132dbeb71e141f6e5c64c0d6f1cb44529 34, ac957ba4796f06c4bf0c0afb8674bb30eb95cef85bc68ced3ee1aa30e3acff, 9296adb71bc98140a59b19f68476d45dbb38cc60b9e263d07d14e7178f195 989, 636c2ccffce7d4591b0d5708469070b839f221400b38189c734004641929ae 05, 31ffa4e3638c9e094275051629cc3ac0a8c7d6ae8415bbfcacc4c605c7f0df39, da3deea591b59b1a0f7e11db2f729a263439a05f3e8b0de97bbac99154297c ea, e2269b38655a4d75078362856c16594e195cd647c56b8c55883b8e1286baa 658, 52632d9e24f42c4651cf8db3abc37845e693818d64ab0b11c235eddf8e011b 2f, 7200155f3e30dbbd4c4c26ce2c7bd4878ab992b619d80b43c0bd9e1739008 2fc,

TYPE	VALUE
SHA256	e516b102a2a6001eafb055e42feb9000691e2353c7e87e34ddaa99d7d8af16fd, a9ddd4e4d54336ce110fdc769ff7c4940f8d89b45ee8dc24f56fc3ea00c18873, a12d17cca038cdbf79b72356e5d20b17722c7b20bd2ee308601bac901890f3f4, b1ac2178c90c8eafd8121d21acbae7a0eb0cbc156d4a5f692f44b28856a23481, a6c1629b4450f713b02d24f088c4f26b0416c6a7924dcf0477425f3a67a2e3ff, 3ce81c163ddedb132116cdf92aae197ced0b94f3fc3d1036f5c41b084a256a03, a19fdfc131e8fbe063289c83a3cdefb9fb9fb6f1f92c83b892d3519a381623db, db15f45f69f863510986fb2198a8a6b3d55d8ccc8a2ed4bb30bc27bdd1bf151c, bf1a7938f61a9905e1b151c7a5f925a2ce3870b7c3e80f6e0fc07715bdc258b7, f42c6949c6d8ecf648bacca08cde568f11ec2663221a97dae5fbf01218e8775a

## References


<https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/threat-group-targets-companies-in-taiwan>

<https://hivepro.com/threat-advisory/winos4-0-stealthy-malware-campaign-targets-taiwanese-enterprises/>

# What Next?

At Hive Pro, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

Book a free demo with HivePro Uni5: Threat Exposure Management Platform.



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