

HiveForce Labs

# THREAT ADVISORY

 **ATTACK REPORT**

## **Earth Kasha Returns with New Tools in Its Cyber Espionage Campaign**

Date of Publication

May 9, 2025

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2025142

# Summary

**Attack Discovered:** March 2025

**Actor:** Earth Kasha (aka MirrorFace, Operation LiberalFace)


**Malware:** NOOPDOOR, ANEL, ROAMINGMOUSE

**Affected Industries:** Government and Public Sector organizations

**Targeted Countries:** Taiwan and Japan

**Attack:** A new espionage campaign by Earth Kasha, part of China's APT10, is targeting government and public institutions in Taiwan and Japan. The attackers use spear-phishing emails with malicious Excel files to deploy ROAMINGMOUSE, which drops and runs malware through DLL sideloading. This leads to the in-memory execution of ANEL and, later, the stealthy NOOPDOOR backdoor, which supports encrypted DNS communications and evasion techniques, demonstrating Earth Kasha's continued evolution in cyber-espionage.

## 🔪 Attack Regions



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# Attack Details

## #1

In March 2025, a new cyber-espionage campaign emerged, targeting government and public sector organizations in Taiwan and Japan. This operation is attributed to Earth Kasha, a part of the well-known APT10 threat actor umbrella. Earth Kasha has a long history of espionage activities dating back to 2017, consistently adapting its techniques and expanding its target scope.

## #2

The attack begins with a spear-phishing email, carefully crafted and sent from a legitimate email account to build trust. The email includes a OneDrive link that downloads a ZIP file containing a malicious macro-enabled Excel document, designed to catch the recipient's attention through relevant filenames and subject lines. This Excel file acts as a dropper known as ROAMINGMOUSE, previously seen in Earth Kasha's operations.

## #3

Once opened, ROAMINGMOUSE decodes an embedded ZIP archive using Base64, drops it to disk, and extracts its contents. The dropped components are placed in system-related directories. It then launches a legitimate executable as a parameter of explorer.exe using WMI, which loads a malicious DLL named JSFC.dll via DLL sideloading. If the target machine runs McAfee software, the malware adapts by using a batch file in the startup folder to execute the payload without relying on WMI.

## #4

The dropped DLL, JSFC.dll, acts as a loader called ANELDR, which decrypts and runs an encrypted ANEL payload directly in memory. The decryption process combines AES-256-CBC, LZO compression, and custom encryption layers such as ChaCha20 and XOR. A key enhancement in this campaign is the added support for executing BOFs in memory, expanding ANEL's capabilities.

## #5

Once installed, ANEL enables Earth Kasha to gather screenshots, inspect running processes, and review domain details to determine if the compromised machine belongs to a high-value target. If the system is deemed relevant, the attackers move to a second stage by deploying NOOPDOOR, a long-running backdoor exclusively used by Earth Kasha.

## #6

To maintain persistence, the group may use SharpHide, launching NOOPDOOR via Hidden Start while suppressing any visible UI using MSBuild in autorun. NOOPDOOR itself has received updates in this campaign, including support for DoH a privacy-preserving method of resolving domain names. It uses public DNS services, with the malware generating C2 domains using a DGA tied to the current date and time. The resulting IP addresses are returned in the HTTPS response body, making detection more difficult. Earth Kasha previously conducted a campaign dubbed [Operation AkaiRyū](#), during which they deployed a customized AsyncRAT and resurrected the ANEL backdoor.

# Recommendations



**Strengthen Email Security:** Set up smart email filters to catch tricky phishing emails before they reach inboxes, especially ones with dangerous links or attachments. Also, teach your team how to spot suspicious emails like those with odd OneDrive links or ZIP files so they don't accidentally open something harmful.



**Turn Off Macros When Possible:** Stop Office apps (like Excel and Word) from running macros unless they're really needed. Set up rules to prevent files from running macros unless they're from a trusted source.



**Watch for Hidden Program Launches:** Monitor your systems for trusted programs (like explorer.exe) running unknown files or being used to sneak in malware. Pay special attention to anything using WMI (a Windows tool) to run programs in the background.



**Block Suspicious Internet Connections:** Use DNS filtering tools to block access to risky websites or unknown servers. Look out for unusual DNS traffic or patterns that might signal malware calling home using encrypted channels (like DoH).



**Enhance Endpoint Protection:** Deploy next-generation antivirus (NGAV) and endpoint detection & response (EDR) solutions to identify and block malware. Leverage behavioral analysis and machine learning-based detection to spot suspicious activity.



## Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<b><u>TA0001</u></b> Initial Access	<b><u>TA0002</u></b> Execution	<b><u>TA0003</u></b> Persistence	<b><u>TA0005</u></b> Defense Evasion
<b><u>TA0007</u></b> Discovery	<b><u>TA0009</u></b> Collection	<b><u>TA0010</u></b> Exfiltration	<b><u>TA0011</u></b> Command and Control
<b><u>T1566</u></b> Phishing	<b><u>T1566.002</u></b> Spearphishing Link	<b><u>T1047</u></b> Windows Management Instrumentation	<b><u>T1071</u></b> Application Layer Protocol

<b><u>T1071.004</u></b> DNS	<b><u>T1547</u></b> Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	<b><u>T1036</u></b> Masquerading	<b><u>T1204</u></b> User Execution
<b><u>T1573</u></b> Encrypted Channel	<b><u>T1573.002</u></b> Asymmetric Cryptography	<b><u>T1574</u></b> Hijack Execution Flow	<b><u>T1574.001</u></b> DLL
<b><u>T1497</u></b> Virtualization/Sandbo x Evasion	<b><u>T1027</u></b> Obfuscated Files or Information	<b><u>T1140</u></b> Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	<b><u>T1059</u></b> Command and Scripting Interpreter
<b><u>T1113</u></b> Screen Capture	<b><u>T1057</u></b> Process Discovery	<b><u>T1572</u></b> Protocol Tunneling	<b><u>T1637</u></b> Dynamic Resolution
<b><u>T1637.001</u></b> Domain Generation Algorithms			

## 🔪 Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
<b>Domains</b>	srnbr[.]net, kyolpon[.]com
<b>IPv4</b>	172[.]233[.]73[.]249, 172[.]105[.]62[.]188, 192[.]46[.]215[.]56, 139[.]162[.]38[.]102, 139[.]84[.]131[.]62, 139[.]84[.]136[.]105, 45[.]32[.]116[.]146, 45[.]77[.]252[.]85, 208[.]85[.]18[.]4
<b>SHA256</b>	1e0a7737a484699d035c0568771c4834c0ff3fb9ba87aded3c86705e10e9bb0e, 2110b9a4c74d1c8be1aed6ebcff2351cad3d16574026fe4697a9c70810fb1d9e, 488201c08219f5cbd79d16702fb909d4e8ad8fa76819a21e0f262e2935e58dd2, 517ef26be8b9fb1af0e9780b244827af4937ad2fa4778a0bd2d9c65502ce54e1,

TYPE	VALUE
SHA256	63e813b5bf94bdec9ce35c9d7311f76c3a35728d158ade0a6487fc99c73d cf31, 69e2a259e0136b61a3acad3f8fad2c012c75c9d8e26e66a3f0af1e7c23506 b5c, 6edf72495e03ca757fa55beb2ea02492f2e7a4b85ca287a9d08bbe60e390 c618, 705e5f1245e59566895b1d456aee32d4bff672a6a00f2cd390d7d50c1231 6dee, 712b81f1a82b9ea9a304220ed87c47c329392c2ce040ed3bff936fe33456 acff, 72ece359a3c6f286d174b9cccc7c963577749e38e28f5ecf00dd4c267478a 693, 75d6f82962f380f7726142490068879240c3c507427f477cf25268b524c3 0339, 7b61ed1049ba5f5b8d9725f32cff1ef1e72ef46e2a1dd87bd2b33e73e733 3f44, 8cdcd674a0269945dd4c526b5868efb6df8854a127fd5449e57e89905511 391d, 9569c4044f8cf32bc9a0513ed7c4497bb6ab71b701c53e58719ef259b371 6751, 9c24b60574f39b0565442a79a629a2944672f56acca555e81275e507938 2d98b, 9e4c155f4d096d9a0529e83fd21197f3dba20cc4eef48045fd018334384d d513, a12a34d329ccc305dca2306e2d698945f1413c013fe99d4bb069db2127f4 7806, a14c9ae22ca8bdb4971a03f61b2bcc5f140abb51c6922ab7c92ea09ee14d d3bd, a347e1efbfca3722c9e8cc86eba3b288f7e4fae9d386f2a8969faffb125a74 c5, ac8c36075ac0085c7d1e96b3fc08c15a151373186e564486dd91d2e49b2 dd287, ad050545b65ecbb2178f678c654d84d14986a77051897927e56b5c2893c 33608, b56aa48721cd1119a9e06ed9c2f923a1dda5f9aa079dc0e4fd66ab37e336 49e8, cb0848d79d2eef76e1d4ff602e0844d03b614d4c25a1b5e3f0ae5c33ea55 00b9, cf6ed83d7dcc13f500486044d1af606ceb12c387568ccbb498e01cc7d800 5dbd, e123fa2abf1a2f12af9f1828b317d486d1df63aff801d591c5e939eb06eb4c fc, e5b99572581df7a5116511be3f03b9f1a90611235b8288d9f59141876ad b1ef1, eeec3a94500ecd025ecdd559e15e4679e26c1347e534944721abe416b49 f3871,

TYPE	VALUE
SHA256	f502102c5c598d5b9e24f689a3b09b1d2f6702226049a573c421b765867391b3, fc8c574088af4f74cf84c5c04d522bb1665f548cb17c6192552eb9b783401009, 362b0959b639ab720b007110a1032320970dd252aa07fc8825bb48e8fdd14332, 78f7b98b1e6f089f5789019dab23ac38f77c662fd651ee212d8451ee61b2fc0c, 7fb4c9f041d4411311437e12427aaf09d369bc384faa2de4b5bc8ae36a42190e, 4f3ec89d5ea0a513afa3f49434f67b7e1540a4a8a93d078def950bd94d444723

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<https://hivepro.com/threat-advisory/operation-akairyu-mirrorface-expands-cyberespionage-to-europe-with-revived-tools/>


[https://www.trendmicro.com/en\\_us/research/24/k/return-of-anel-in-the-recent-earth-kasha-spearphishing-campaign.html](https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/24/k/return-of-anel-in-the-recent-earth-kasha-spearphishing-campaign.html)

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# What Next?

At Hive Pro, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

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