

HiveForce Labs

THREAT ADVISORY



ATTACK REPORT

DragonForce Is Selling DIY Ransomware Kits

Date of Publication

May 9, 2025

Last Update Date

June 3, 2025

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2025141

Summary

Active Since: December 2023

Malware: DragonForce Ransomware


Targeted Platforms: Windows, Linux, ESXi, and NAS

Targeted Industries: Aerospace, Banking, Business Services & Consulting, Chemical, Construction, Defense, Education, Electronics, Energy, Financial Services, Food Service, Government, Healthcare, Insurance, Legal, Logistics, Manufacturing, Maritime, Media, Oil and Gas, Political, Professional Services, Real Estate, Retail, Technology, Telecommunications, Textiles, Transportation, Utilities

Targeted Countries: Argentina, Australia, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States

Attack: DragonForce burst onto the cybercrime scene in late 2023 and has rapidly evolved into a ruthless, hybrid ransomware group blending hacktivism with profit-driven extortion. Known for targeting retailers and government entities, the group lures affiliates with customizable ransomware kits, ready-made infrastructure, and a cutthroat business model. Leveraging phishing, credential stuffing, and high-profile exploits like Log4Shell, DragonForce operates a multi-extortion playbook - stealing data, threatening leaks, and crippling critical systems.

✂ Attack Regions



CVE	NAME	AFFECTED PRODUCT	ZERO-DAY	CISA KEV	PATCH
CVE-2021-44228	Log4shell (Apache Log4j2 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability)	Apache Log4j2	✓	✓	✓
CVE-2023-46805	Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure Authentication Bypass Vulnerability	Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure	✓	✓	✓
CVE-2024-21412	Microsoft Windows Internet Shortcut Files Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability	Microsoft Windows Internet Shortcut Files	✓	✓	✓
CVE-2024-21887	Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure Command Injection Vulnerability	Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure	✓	✓	✓
CVE-2024-21893	Ivanti Connect Secure, Policy Secure, and Neurons Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Vulnerability	Pulse Connect Secure, ZTA gateways, Pulse Policy Secure	✓	✓	✓
CVE-2022-26134	Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center Remote Code Execution Vulnerability	Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center	✓	✓	✓
CVE-2024-57727	SimpleHelp Path Traversal Vulnerability	SimpleHelp remote support software v5.5.7 and before	✗	✓	✓
CVE-2024-57728	SimpleHelp Arbitrary File Upload Vulnerability	SimpleHelp remote support software v5.5.7 and before	✗	✗	✓
CVE-2024-57726	SimpleHelp Privilege Escalation Vulnerability	SimpleHelp remote support software v5.5.7 and before	✗	✗	✓

Attack Details

#1

Emerging in early December 2023, [DragonForce](#) quickly established itself within the cybercrime underworld. Originally known by their dark web data leak site DragonLeaks, the group has since rebranded and evolved into a formidable ransomware operation. By 2025, DragonForce had matured into a fully-fledged ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) collective, with a business model specifically designed to attract displaced cybercriminals and freelance affiliates.

#2

Offering a 20% revenue share lower than most RaaS offerings DragonForce compensates for this with enticing features. Affiliates receive white-label ransomware kits, allowing them to create distinct variants, compile their payloads, and customize ransom notes and file extensions. Additionally, they gain access to a ready-made infrastructure that includes negotiation tools, encrypted storage, and templated leak sites marketed under the brand RansomBay.

#3

Their campaigns employ a multi-extortion strategy, combining data theft with the threat of public data leaks and reputational damage via their leak sites. The group typically achieves initial access through phishing campaigns, exploitation of known vulnerabilities, or by leveraging leaked and stolen credentials to breach internet-facing systems.

#4

Over the years, they've actively exploited critical vulnerabilities such as Log4Shell in Apache Log4j2, multiple flaws in Ivanti Connect Secure, and a trio of security flaws in SimpleHelp as part of a recent supply chain attack targeting MSPs. The group leveraged this chain of vulnerabilities in the remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool before deploying ransomware across multiple endpoints. Credential stuffing attacks targeting Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) services and VPN portals using compromised username-password pairs also remain a favored tactic.

#5

Once inside a network, DragonForce operators deploy a suite of post-exploitation tools including Mimikatz, Advanced IP Scanner, PingCastle, and various remote management utilities to escalate privileges, conduct reconnaissance, and establish persistence within compromised environments.

#6

Affiliates have the capability to tailor the ransomware for different platforms, producing variants designed for Windows, Linux, VMware ESXi, and NAS systems, enabling them to strike a broad range of infrastructure. In one notable incident from February 2025, DragonForce exfiltrated and publicly leaked over 6 terabytes of sensitive data from a Middle Eastern organization after ransom negotiations failed. This event highlighted not only the group's aggressive extortion tactics but also the vast scale of data theft they are capable of executing.

Recommendations



Patch Management: Prioritize patching of high-risk vulnerabilities frequently exploited by DragonForce, including Log4Shell and Ivanti Connect Secure bugs. Implement a formal, rapid patching protocol for all critical infrastructure and public-facing systems.



Credential Hygiene: Enforce the use of strong, unique passwords across all systems. Regularly scan for exposed credentials in data breaches and dark web dumps. Apply rate-limiting and account lockout mechanisms to prevent credential stuffing attacks.



Implement the 3-2-1 Backup Rule: Maintain three total copies of your data, with two backups stored on different devices and one backup kept offsite or in the cloud. This ensures redundancy and protects against data loss from ransomware attacks.



Network Segmentation & Zero Trust Implementation: Segment critical infrastructure to isolate sensitive data and limit lateral movement. Implement Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) by enforcing identity-based policies rather than traditional perimeter security.



Backup & Recovery Preparedness: Maintain offline, immutable, and regularly tested backups. Ensure recovery time objectives (RTOs) and recovery point objectives (RPOs) meet business continuity requirements in the event of ransomware deployment.



Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<u>TA0001</u> Initial Access	<u>TA0002</u> Execution	<u>TA0003</u> Persistence	<u>TA0005</u> Defense Evasion
<u>TA0006</u> Credential Access	<u>TA0007</u> Discovery	<u>TA0008</u> Lateral Movement	<u>TA0009</u> Collection
<u>TA0011</u> Command and Control	<u>TA0010</u> Exfiltration	<u>TA0040</u> Impact	<u>TA0042</u> Resource Development

<u>TA0004</u> Privilege Escalation	<u>T1566</u> Phishing	<u>T1190</u> Exploit Public-Facing Application	<u>T1078</u> Valid Accounts
<u>T1059</u> Command and Scripting Interpreter	<u>T1027</u> Obfuscated Files or Information	<u>T1070.004</u> File Deletion	<u>T1562.001</u> Disable or Modify Tools
<u>T1562</u> Impair Defenses	<u>T1003</u> OS Credential Dumping	<u>T1046</u> Network Service Discovery	<u>T1087</u> Account Discovery
<u>T1018</u> Remote System Discovery	<u>T1482</u> Domain Trust Discovery	<u>T1560</u> Archive Collected Data	<u>T1005</u> Data from Local System
<u>T1041</u> Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	<u>T1486</u> Data Encrypted for Impact	<u>T1490</u> Inhibit System Recovery	<u>T1531</u> Account Access Removal
<u>T1491</u> Defacement	<u>T1588</u> Obtain Capabilities	<u>T1588.006</u> Vulnerabilities	<u>T1204</u> User Execution
<u>T1204.002</u> Malicious File	<u>T1070</u> Indicator Removal	<u>T1083</u> File and Directory Discovery	<u>T1082</u> System Information Discovery
<u>T1133</u> External Remote Services	<u>T1059.001</u> PowerShell	<u>T1547</u> Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	<u>T1547.001</u> Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
<u>T1053</u> Scheduled Task/Job	<u>T1053.005</u> Scheduled Task	<u>T1543</u> Create or Modify System Process	<u>T1543.003</u> Windows Service
<u>T1078.002</u> Domain Accounts	<u>T1070.001</u> Clear Windows Event Logs	<u>T1003.001</u> LSASS Memory	<u>T1016</u> System Network Configuration Discovery
<u>T1021.001</u> Remote Desktop Protocol	<u>T1021</u> Remote Services	<u>T1021.002</u> SMB/Windows Admin Shares	<u>T1071.001</u> Web Protocols
<u>T1071</u> Application Layer Protocol	<u>T1569.002</u> Service Execution	<u>T1569</u> System Services	<u>T1203</u> Exploitation for Client Execution

T1499

Endpoint Denial of Service

T1068

Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

T1195

Supply Chain Compromise

T1105

Ingress Tool Transfer

✖ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
SHA1	343220b0e37841dc002407860057eb10dbeea94d, ae2967d021890a6a2a8c403a569b9e6d56e03abd, c98e394a3e33c616d251d426fc986229ede57b0f, f710573c1d18355ecdf3131aa69a6dfe8e674758, 011894f40bab6963133d46a1976fa587a4b66378, 0b22b6e5269ec241b82450a7e65009685a3010fb, 196c08fbab4119d75afb209a05999ce269ffe3cf, 1f5ae3b51b2dbf9419f4b7d51725a49023abc81c, 229e073dbcbb72bdfee2c244e5d066ad949d2582, 29baab2551064fa30fb18955ccc8f332bd68ddd4, 577b110a8bfa6526b21bb728e14bd6494dc67f71, 7db52047c72529d27a39f2e1a9ffb8f1f0ddc774, 81185dd73f2e042a947a1bf77f429de08778b6e9, a4bdd6cef0ed43a4d08f373edc8e146bb15ca0f9, b3e0785dbe60369634ac6a6b5d241849c1f929de, b571e60a6d2d9ab78da1c14327c0d26f34117daa, bcfac98117d9a52a3196a7bd041b49d5ff0cfb8c, e164bbaf848fa5d46fa42f62402a1c55330ef562, e1c0482b43fe57c93535119d085596cd2d90560a, eada05f4bfd4876c57c24cd4b41f7a40ea97274c, fc75a3800d8c2fa49b27b632dc9d7fb611b65201
TOR Address	3pktcrbcmssvrnwe5skburdwe2h3v6ibdnn5kbjqihsg6eu6s6b7ryqd[.]on ion, ljbw7iiodqzpg6ooewbgn6mv2pinoer3k5pzdecoejsw5nyoe73zvad[.]o nion, Kfgjwkho24xiwckcf53x7qyruobbkx4eqn2c6oe4hprbn23rcp6qcqd[.]o nion, Rnc6scfbqslz5aqxfg5hrjel5qomxsclltc6jvhahi6qwt7op5qc7iad[.]onion, rrrbay3nf4c2wxmhprc6eotjlpqkeowfuobodic4x4nzqtosx3ebirid[.]onio n, rrrbayguhgtgxr dg5myxkdc2cxei25u6brknfqkl3a35nse7f2arblyd[.]onion , rrrbaygxp3f2qtgvfqk6ffhdrm24ucxvbr6mhxsga4faefqyd77w7tqd[.]oni on, Z3wqggtxft7id3ibr7srivv5gjof5fwg76slewnzwwakjuf3nlhukdid[.]onion



TYPE	VALUE
Tox ID	1C054B722BCBF41A918EF3C485712742088F5C3E81B2FDD91ADEA6B A55F4A856D90A65E99D20, 258C79F73CCC1E56863030CD02C2C7C4347F80CAD43DD6A5B219A6 18FD17853C7BB1029DAE31
File Name	PUSH PUSH PUUUUUUSH.bat
SHA256	cee6a7663fad90c807c9f5ea8f689afd0e4ece04f8c55d7a047a7215db6 be210
File Path	C:\Users\<user>\Videos\PUSH PUSH PUUUUUUSH.bat, C:\ProgramData\JWrapper-Remote Access\JWAppsSharedConfig\working\toolbox- 9759076704687761247\win.exe



Patch Links

- <https://logging.apache.org/security.html>
- <https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/CVE-2023-46805-Authentication-Bypass-CVE-2024-21887-Command-Injection-for-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-and-Ivanti-Policy-Secure-Gateways>
- <https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-21412>
- <https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/CVE-2024-21888-Privilege-Escalation-for-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-and-Ivanti-Policy-Secure>
- <https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-79016>
- <https://simple-help.com/kb---security-vulnerabilities-01-2025#security-vulnerabilities-in-simplehelp-5-5-7-and-earlier>



Recent Breaches

- <https://citrusmagic.com>
- <https://rrsfoodservice.com>
- <https://www.irisid.com>
- <https://www.cityofgroveok.gov>
- <https://www.setpointsystems.com>
- <https://pratthomes.com>
- <https://pryor-morrow.com>
- <https://kraftkisarna.se>
- <https://ossman.co.uk>
- <https://www.harrissteelco.com>
- <https://stitaly.it>
- <https://millercaggiano.com>
- <https://dac-law.com>



<https://www.precisiontextiles-usa.com>
<https://www.texlaenergy.com>
<https://iacc.holdings>
<https://www.condista.com>
<https://altara.com>
<https://net-move.com>
<https://industrialdynamics.com>
<https://www.dermatologysolutions.com>
<https://southernavionics.com>
<https://atlplasticsurgeon.com>
<https://jtalleycorp.com>
<https://www.philsmithauto.com>
<https://thaonlesvosges.fr>
<https://architekturbuero-heller.de>
<https://www.colemanmaterials.com>
<https://yadea.com>
<https://dtsservices.uk>
<https://moncaro.com>
<https://kleen-pak.com>
<https://vercoes.co.nz>
<https://steel-dynamics.co.uk>
<https://cotswold-fayre.co.uk>
<https://eleetwoodworking.com>
<https://www.gsfloor.com>
<https://tristrameuropean.co.nz>
<https://www.albawani.net>
<https://accelerator.no>
<https://oandsassociates.com>
<https://nasltd.com>
<https://heartcentre.net.au>
<https://cogitis.fr>


References

<https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/dragonforce-ransomware-gang-from-hacktivists-to-high-street-extortionists/>
<https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2025/05/27/dragonforce-actors-target-simplehelp-vulnerabilities-to-attack-msp-customers/>
<https://hivepro.com/threat-advisory/dragonforce-unleashes-chaos-with-leaked-lockbit-builder/>
<https://blog.checkpoint.com/security/dragonforce-ransomware-redefining-hybrid-extortion-in-2025/>
<https://www.cloudsek.com/threatintelligence/hackivist-group-dragonforce-malaysia-releases-windows-lpe-exploit-discloses-plans-to-evolve-into-a-ransomware-group>

What Next?

At Hive Pro, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

Book a free demo with HivePro Uni5: Threat Exposure Management Platform.



REPORT GENERATED ON
May 9, 2025 • 3:30 AM

