

HiveForce Labs

THREAT ADVISORY

 **ATTACK REPORT**

Winos4.0: Stealthy Malware Campaign Targets Taiwanese Enterprises

Date of Publication

February 28, 2025

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2025062

Summary

Attack Discovered: January 2025


Targeted Countries: Taiwan

Affected Platforms: Microsoft Windows

Malware: Winos4.0

Attack: A new phishing campaign is actively targeting companies in Taiwan, deploying the Winos 4.0 malware under the guise of official emails from the country's National Taxation Bureau. The attackers are using this tactic to trick recipients into opening malicious attachments, ultimately compromising their systems. Once infected, the malware steals sensitive data, which can be leveraged for future attacks. Additionally, researchers have uncovered a second attack chain that delivers an online module capable of capturing screenshots from WeChat and online banking platforms, further expanding the threat's scope.

Attack Regions



© Australian Bureau of Statistics, GeoNames, Microsoft, Navinfo, Open Places, OpenStreetMap, Overture Maps Foundation, TomTom, Zenrin

Powered by Bing

Attack Details

#1 In January 2025, a targeted cyberattack against Taiwanese companies was uncovered, deploying Winos4.0, a sophisticated malware framework. The attack begins with phishing emails masquerading as official notices from Taiwan's National Taxation Bureau, tricking recipients into opening an attached ZIP file. Previously, Winos4.0 was distributed through gaming-related applications. Inside the archive, attackers have hidden malicious DLL files that initiate the infection. Once executed, a loader launches a rogue DLL, which then fetches and deploys the Winos4.0 module from its command-and-control (C2) server.

#2 To enhance its stealth, the attackers structured the ZIP file to mimic a legitimate directory, replacing the real ApowerREC.exe with a compromised version. When executed, the fake application calls a function that decrypts embedded data, extracting shellcode that contains key configuration details such as C2 IP addresses, registry keys, and feature flags. The malware checks system permissions by accessing the Windows registry and attempting to run ApowerREC.exe with administrative privileges. If successful, it escalates its attack, executing additional payloads.

#3 Winos4.0 incorporates multiple stealth techniques, including anti-sandboxing measures. It takes screenshots at short intervals and compares them to detect signs of a virtualized environment. If the system appears genuine, the malware downloads an encrypted payload from its C2 server and stores it in the Windows registry. Once decrypted, this payload launches eight malicious threads responsible for persistence, keylogging, clipboard monitoring, and USB device tracking. Additionally, the malware captures screenshots of applications containing specific keywords and stores them in a hidden system folder.

#4 To maintain long-term access, Winos4.0 disables security prompts, bypasses User Account Control (UAC), and monitors active TCP connections. The campaign employs multiple attack chains, including one that leverages Python311.dll, a module compiled from a Python script using Nuitka. This module decrypts shellcode and generates additional DLLs, which are then stored in registry values for execution. Some Winos4.0 variants include specialized modules designed to capture screenshots of WeChat conversations and online banking sessions, further expanding its espionage capabilities.

#5 Security researchers have linked Winos4.0 operations to Silver Fox (also known as Void Arachne), citing overlaps in malware usage and attack methodologies across different campaigns. The malware's reliance on registry keys and encrypted configurations makes forensic analysis challenging, allowing attackers to maintain persistence while evading detection. However, cybersecurity teams continue to track these threats, deploying countermeasures to mitigate their impact.

Recommendations



Enhance Email Security: Implement robust email filtering to block phishing emails impersonating trusted entities. Use email authentication mechanisms like DMARC, SPF, and DKIM to prevent spoofed emails. Educate employees on identifying phishing attempts, especially those mimicking government agencies.



Restrict Execution of Untrusted Files: To minimize the risk of malware infections, enforce strict application whitelisting, allowing only trusted and verified software to run. This approach prevents unauthorized executables and DLLs from being executed, particularly those originating from suspicious ZIP file attachments.



Enhance Endpoint Protection: Deploy next-generation antivirus (NGAV) and endpoint detection & response (EDR) solutions to identify and block malware. Leverage behavioral analysis and machine learning-based detection to spot suspicious activity.



Implement Least Privilege Access: Restricting administrative privileges is crucial in preventing malware from gaining deep system access. Only essential personnel should have elevated privileges, reducing the risk of unauthorized software installations or system modifications. Non-administrative users should be blocked from executing unverified applications, ensuring that potential threats cannot take hold.



Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<u>TA0001</u> Initial Access	<u>TA0002</u> Execution	<u>TA0003</u> Persistence	<u>TA0004</u> Privilege Escalation
<u>TA0005</u> Defense Evasion	<u>TA0007</u> Discovery	<u>TA0009</u> Collection	<u>TA0010</u> Exfiltration
<u>TA0011</u> Command and Control	<u>T1566</u> Phishing	<u>T1566.001</u> Spearphishing Attachment	<u>T1547</u> Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
<u>T1113</u> Screen Capture	<u>T1115</u> Clipboard Data	<u>T1056</u> Input Capture	<u>T1056.001</u> Keylogging

<u>T1560</u> Archive Collected Data	<u>T1140</u> Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	<u>T1036</u> Masquerading	<u>T1204</u> User Execution
<u>T1204.002</u> Malicious File	<u>T1059</u> Command and Scripting Interpreter	<u>T1059.006</u> Python	<u>T1497</u> Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
<u>T1068</u> Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	<u>T1112</u> Modify Registry	<u>T1548</u> Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	<u>T1548.002</u> Bypass User Account Control
<u>T1025</u> Data from Removable Media	<u>T1564</u> Hide Artifacts	<u>T1082</u> System Information Discovery	<u>T1656</u> Impersonation

✂ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
IPv4	43[.]137[.]42[.]254, 206[.]238[.]221[.]60, 206[.]238[.]221[.]240, 124[.]156[.]100[.]172, 206[.]238[.]221[.]244
Domains	1234[.]360sdgg[.]com, 9001[.]360sdgg[.]com, 9002[.]360sdgg[.]com, 9003[.]360sdgg[.]com, 9005[.]360sdgg[.]com, 9006[.]360sdgg[.]com, 9007[.]360sdgg[.]com, 9009[.]360sdgg[.]com, 9010[.]360sdgg[.]com, ffggsa-1329400280[.]cos[.]ap-guangzhou[.]myqcloud[.]com, fuued5-1329400280[.]cos[.]ap-guangzhou[.]myqcloud[.]com, 0107-1333855056[.]cos[.]ap-guangzhou[.]myqcloud[.]com, rgghrt1140120-1336065333[.]cos[.]ap-guangzhou[.]myqcloud[.]com, hei-1333855056[.]cos[.]ap-guangzhou[.]myqcloud[.]com, chakan202501-1329400280[.]cos[.]ap-guangzhou[.]myqcloud[.]com, wrwyrdujtw114117-1336065333[.]cos[.]ap-guangzhou[.]myqcloud[.]com,

TYPE	VALUE
Domains	fdsjg114-1336065333[.]cos[.]ap-guangzhou[.]myqcloud[.]com, sjujfde-1329400280[.]cos[.]ap-guangzhou[.]myqcloud[.]com, htrfe4-1329400280[.]cos[.]ap-guangzhou[.]myqcloud[.]com, 0611-1333855056[.]cos[.]ap-guangzhou[.]myqcloud[.]com, twzfw[.]vip
SHA256	36afc6d5dfb0257b3b053373e91c9a0a726c7d269211bc937704349a6b4 be9b9, 0e3c9af7066ec72406eac25cca0b312894f02d6d08245a3ccef5c029bc297 bd2, 67395af91263f71cd600961a1fd33ddc222958e83094afdde916190a0dd5 d79c, f4d3477a19ff468d234a5e39652157b2181c8b51c754b900bcfa13339f57 7e7c, c9a8db23d089aa71466b4bde51a51a8cfdcc28e8df33b4c63ce867bd381e 5fe5, e2b75baeb7ed21fb8f27984f941286770d1c3c0b60fce8d7fa5b167bd24b a6dc, dffbfeefc632b20d2ef867553684e9971ab76e1223e743604a5275713423b 6168, 20c34b5f0983021414b168913c3da267caf298d8f0f5e3ec0ce97db5f4f48 316, 6c33715a14fdc917b5b09b6e1b5dad07bb769493eafbf7ca1023830b4059 e003, 75a4d75c35724140149c9c5056c1bcbd328bbe1e5d1d1ef34205ed5442d 2b348, fed394a3653b7c6fcc1b277eda6e18eb0983a7e024be5b51e5188b3cfb95 12e8, a067d848f099e6d1e465f9761a5b85392d550303bfa75fac920d444fd980 c949, c55757075259fa4be6941dd273c4a4a2fcc29e6ba427dec124b25b299b35 05fe, 64a876e6cb3cf3122febc84a00ec3e0740c054cff955164971c470e1b5e5f 1bb, d4ac82de8dda9796579cd8ea0f84b43c7a980cdb0e9cdb8abe8981a2d21 5ed2f, 268c72f5482374660a132d1b91cac0c04b4724a214db4f052eb421e36c28 2921, 0a4bbb998bd3a3bcc72cf759689a5656dc74590b731d0affbfc317cf484ed 28b, 79c64d2e77acdbcbdb35cbb29497941335d7e3ab6ebb474064f095e745f 0d643, 7f22305679e46e1fd5043beb136108197c0921643ce0d680f990a3018ad e485b,

TYPE	VALUE
SHA256	594d907855d35ee7689a568e4ac43e4e0ed90de047d91b0253ef79da71e cbc08, 1f3b041eee1ece8cf6aa5c742aeb8c0ac2266cccecca7888772509227c4f8 669, 514933468ac1dd9f7db4e2693f1be7f84deb35c33f8f9934fad32caaae9ef 611, 7a5b26f6dd7b8e0d648e9804ec932603b7d7a5f76c7a8c537ab0c2be54f5 1fa9, 8b1b9a789136ca3abe25938204845c351aaf0c97c0708ade8d4d8ba4ded 95ba7, 1ad1f2eec961bc7a35abeac486f843b7caece0929b13f1dab47fbdc0406ac 4e3, 4c1ea827713f1eb57cc0e8e9d171d4e21d116f846b174bc05114eef5674c 9653, 1a342426d59e7fdc4abfb74c2225f68382172e03b0f8d496a57ae647411f 0fbd, 2ce73cbfab0beb3663c0151ba7c310e4dbf69f295d8a18114435506483d7 74ac, 0a4bbb998bd3a3bcc72cf759689a5656dc74590b731d0affbfc317cf484ed 28b, 514933468ac1dd9f7db4e2693f1be7f84deb35c33f8f9934fad32caaae9ef 611, 76ac08358f230bca3e8b8448b3c177094aeac25402b929f5f73869ec7717 3a44


References

<https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/winos-spreads-via-impersonation-of-official-email-to-target-users-in-taiwan>

What Next?

At Hive Pro, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

Book a free demo with HivePro Uni5: Threat Exposure Management Platform.



REPORT GENERATED ON

February 27, 2025 • 4:10 AM

© 2025 All Rights are Reserved by Hive Pro



More at www.hivepro.com