

Threat Level

P Red

Hiveforce Labs

THREAT ADVISORY

M ATTACK REPORT

Supply Chain Attack on Chrome Browser Extensions

Date of Publication

January 24, 2025

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2025019

Summary


Attack Began: November 2024 **Targeted Region: Worldwide**

Targeted Industries: Technology, Advertising

Affected Platform: Google Chrome

Attack: A recent supply chain attack compromised over a dozen Chrome browser extensions, impacting hundreds of thousands of users. The attackers used phishing campaigns to target developers, gaining access via a malicious OAuth application to publish malware-laden updates. The malicious code harvested sensitive data, including API keys, session cookies, and credentials from services like ChatGPT and Facebook for Business. This campaign highlights the growing risk of supply chain attacks and the need for stronger security measures for developers and users alike.

X Attack Regions



Attack Details

- A recent sophisticated supply chain attack targeted Chrome browser extensions, impacting hundreds of thousands of users. The campaign exploited a phishing attack against extension developers, convincing them to authorize access to a malicious OAuth application disguised as "Privacy Policy Extension." Once access was granted, attackers deployed malicious versions of legitimate extensions through the Chrome Web Store. Among the compromised extensions were popular tools such as Cyberhaven, VPNCity, GraphQL Network Inspector, VidHelper and others.
- The malicious code injected into these extensions was designed to harvest sensitive user data, including API keys, session cookies, and authentication tokens. Notably, the attack targeted data from services such as ChatGPT and Facebook for Business, enabling the threat actors to collect credentials, session details, and user-specific metadata. This stolen data could potentially be sold, used for further cyberattacks, or abused to propagate fraudulent activities, such as running malicious Facebook Ads.
- Investigations revealed that the attacker's infrastructure had been active since at least 2023, leveraging phishing emails and malicious websites to distribute compromised extensions. The phishing emails used fake notifications about Chrome Web Store policy violations, redirecting victims to legitimate-looking Google login pages that allowed the attackers to hijack extension permissions. The malicious extensions used command-and-control (C2) servers to fetch configuration files that determined which data to target, enabling the attackers to customize their payload for each victim.
- Security researchers identified over a dozen compromised extensions and uncovered the attacker's broader infrastructure, which included a network of domains hosted on Vultr servers. These domains facilitated phishing, redirection, and data exfiltration activities, allowing the attackers to sustain their operations. The scale and methodology of this campaign highlight a shift in the attacker's tactics from distributing standalone malicious extensions to compromising legitimate ones via supply chain attacks.

Recommendations



identified Uninstall Compromised **Extensions: Immediately** remove compromised extensions. Only reinstall them after verifying a clean version has been published by the developer.



Revoke and Reset Credentials: Revoke session cookies, API keys, and authentication tokens linked to affected accounts. Change passwords for compromised services and enable two-factor authentication (2FA).



Secure Development Environment: Use robust security measures such as multi-factor authentication (MFA) for accessing developer accounts, code repositories, and distribution platforms.



Monitor for Suspicious Activity: Regularly review account activity logs for unauthorized access or unusual behavior, especially for financial or business accounts like Facebook for Business.



Stay Vigilant Against Phishing: Avoid clicking on suspicious links or granting permissions to unfamiliar apps. Always verify the authenticity of emails and requests from service providers before acting.

Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<u>TA0043</u>	<u>TA0042</u>	<u>TA0001</u>	<u>TA0002</u>
Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution
<u>TA0006</u>	<u>TA0008</u>	<u>TA0005</u>	<u>TA0010</u>
Credential Access	Lateral Movement	Defense Evasion	Exfiltration
<u>TA0011</u>	<u>T1589</u>	<u>T1204.002</u>	<u>T1204</u>
Command and Control	Gather Victim Identity Information	Malicious File	User Execution
<u>T1583</u>	<u>T1583.001</u>	<u>T1583.004</u>	<u>T1059</u>
Acquire Infrastructure	Domains	Server	Command and Scripting Interpreter
<u>T1586</u>	<u>T1587</u>	<u>T1195</u>	<u>T1566.002</u>
Compromise Accounts	Develop Capabilities	Supply Chain Compromise	Spearphishing Link

<u>T1586.003</u>	<u>T1566</u>	<u>T1059.007</u>	<u>T1550.001</u>
Cloud Accounts	Phishing	JavaScript	Application Access Token
<u>T1550</u>	<u>T1528</u>	<u>T1539</u>	<u>T1036</u>
Use Alternate Authentication Material	Steal Application Access Token	Steal Web Session Cookie	Masquerading
<u>T1071.001</u>	<u>T1071</u>	<u>T1105</u>	<u>T1041</u>
Web Protocols	Application Layer Protocol	Ingress Tool Transfer	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
<u>T1567.002</u>	<u>T1589.002</u>	, 01011010110	
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage	Email Addresses	010101010101	

X Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

	11010110 201 200010101010109 010000000
ТҮРЕ	VALUE
MD5	4e42ac21ed5898fd75221a2f1164a107, b4690045862e6c21fb180dd6dcb6b6b3
SHA256	b0827dc54349b10098a7370ada4ea44ba668b264ccca2db5676be1 c32e6cc154, d303047205dabec8e2d34431e920ebe3478ca80a18f57bf454da09 4aca0e10aa
IPv4	149[.]28[.]117[.]236, 45[.]77[.]5[.]196, 65[.]20[.]99[.]178, 108[.]61[.]23[.]192, 136[.]244[.]113[.]231, 136[.]244[.]115[.]219, 137[.]220[.]48[.]214, 140[.]82[.]45[.]42, 144[.]202[.]101[.]155, 149[.]248[.]2[.]160, 149[.]248[.]44[.]88, 149[.]248[.]56[.]63, 149[.]28[.]124[.]84, 155[.]138[.]253[.]165, 185[.]92[.]222[.]127, 45[.]76[.]225[.]148

ТҮРЕ	VALUE
URLs	https[://]app[.]checkpolicy[.]site/accept-terms- policy?e=victim[@]example[.]com, https[://]app[.]checkpolicy[.]site/extension-privacy- policy?e=victime[@]example[.]com, https[://]graphqlnetwork[.]pro/ai-graphqlnetwork
Email	chromewebstore-noreply[@]chromeforextension[.]com, chromewebstore-noreply[@]supportchromestore[.]com
Domains	adsblockforyoutube[.]site, adskiper[.]net, aiforgemini[.]com, bardaiforchrome[.]live, blockforads[.]com, castorus[.]info, chataiassistant[.]pro, chatgptextension[.]site, chatgptextension[.]com, checkpolicy[.]site, chromeforextension[.]com, chromewebstore-noreply[.]com, cyberhavenext[.]pro, dearflip[.]pro, extensionbuysell[.]com, extensionpolicy[.]net, extensionpolicy[.]net, extensionpolicyprivacy[.]com, geminiforads[.]com, goodenhancerblocker[.]site, gpt4chrome[.]live, gptforads[.]info, gptforbusiness[.]site, graphqlnetwork[.]pro, internetdownloadmanager[.]pro, internetdownloadmanager[.]pro, internetdownloadmanager[.]pro, internxtvpn[.]pro, linewizeconnect[.]com, locallyext[.]ink, moonsift[.]store, openaigptforgg[.]site, parrottalks[.]info,

ТҮРЕ	VALUE	
Domains	pieadblock[.]pro, policyextension[.]info, primusext[.]pro, promptheusgpt[.]info, savechatgpt[.]site, savegpt[.]pro, savegptforchrome[.]com, savegptforyou[.]live, savgptforchrome[.]pro, searchaiassitant[.]info, searchcopilot[.]co, searchgptchat[.]info, supportchromestore[.]com, tinamind[.]info, ultrablock[.]pro, uvoice[.]live, videodownloadhelper[.]pro, vidnozflex[.]live, wakelet[.]ink, wayinai[.]live, youtubeadsblocker[.]live, ytbadblocker[.]com, yujaverity[.]info	


References

https://blog.sekoia.io/targeted-supply-chain-attack-against-chrome-browser-extensions/

What Next?

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January 24, 2025 6:30 AM

