

HiveForce Labs

# THREAT ADVISORY

 **ATTACK REPORT**

## **German Entities Under Attack: Sliver Implant Delivered via Malicious LNK Files**

Date of Publication

January 22, 2025

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2025015

# Summary

**Attack Discovered:** January 2025


**Targeted Countries:** Germany

**Affected Platform:** Windows

**Malware:** Silver

**Attack:** A new cyberattack targeting German organizations has been discovered. The attackers are using advanced methods to break into systems and avoid being detected. The attack starts with an archive file that contains a fake LNK file, which is likely spread through spear-phishing emails, although the exact way it starts is unclear. Once opened, the attack uses techniques like DLL Sideload, DLL Proxying, and deploying a tool called Sliver to gain access and stay hidden in the victim's network.

## Attack Regions



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Powered by Bing

# Attack Details

## #1

A sophisticated cyber campaign targeting German organizations has been uncovered, employing advanced techniques to infiltrate systems while maintaining a façade of legitimacy. The attack begins with a spear-phishing email delivering an archive file. This archive contains a deceptive LNK file disguised as a PDF, alongside legitimate executables, a malicious DLL, an encrypted DAT file, and a decoy document.

## #2

When the victim extracts the archive, only the LNK file is visible, while the other components stay hidden. Executing the LNK file opens a decoy document that looks like a legitimate Home Office Agreement. At the same time, it runs commands using `cmd.exe` to copy files to specific directories. A new directory named "Intel" is created in the user's local app data folder, where a legitimate Windows executable, `wksprt.exe`, is stored. Hidden files are also placed here. To ensure persistence, the LNK file creates a shortcut in the Startup folder, triggering `wksprt.exe` to run when the system starts up.

## #3

The attack exploits DLL sideloading and proxying techniques to carry out malicious actions. The legitimate `wksprt.exe` sideloads the malicious `IPHLPAPI.dll`, which pretends to be a system file. This malicious DLL then proxies function calls to a modified legitimate DLL, `IPHLPLAPI.dll`, while executing its own code. It decrypts `ccache.dat`, extracting shellcode that further decrypts and runs the final payload a Sliver implant.

## #4

Sliver implant is an open-source tool, commonly used for red-teaming, is repurposed by the attackers for their malicious activities. Once deployed, the implant connects to external endpoints, allowing the attackers to perform further operations within the compromised network.

## #5

The campaign is attributed to [APT29](#), a well-known Russian state-sponsored threat group, as several indicators suggests it can be their work. The attack reflects APT29's typical tactics, such as stager DLL usage, shellcode injection, and the deployment of the Sliver framework. However, the introduction of DLL proxying marks a notable evolution in their methods. By combining these sophisticated evasion techniques and persistence mechanisms, the attackers aim to secure prolonged access to high-value targets.

# Recommendations



**Enhanced Email Security:** Enhance email security by Implementing advanced spam filters, anti-phishing solutions, and email authentication protocols. Educate employees about identifying and reporting suspicious emails to prevent successful phishing attempts.



**Remain Vigilant:** It is essential to remain cautious. Be wary of clicking on suspicious links or visiting untrusted websites, as they may contain malicious content. Exercise caution when opening emails or messages from unknown sources, as they could be part of phishing attempts.



**Monitoring for Sliver Framework Activities:** Monitoring network traffic for unusual behavior, such as unexpected outbound connections, is crucial for detecting activities linked to the Sliver framework. By proactively analyzing network traffic and cross-referencing anomalies with known threat indicators, organizations can enhance their ability to identify and mitigate this threat effectively.



**Implement Application Whitelisting:** Establish application whitelisting policies to restrict the execution of LNK files and other potentially harmful components. Ensure that only trusted and verified applications can run on the system to mitigate unauthorized execution of malicious payloads.



**Use EDR Solutions for Enhanced Protection:** Implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions to spot and block harmful actions like DLL sideloading and shellcode injection. EDR tools can keep an eye on endpoint activities, helping to quickly identify and stop threats before they cause damage.

## Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<b><u>TA0001</u></b> Initial Access	<b><u>TA0002</u></b> Execution	<b><u>TA0003</u></b> Persistence	<b><u>TA0004</u></b> Privilege Escalation
<b><u>TA0005</u></b> Defense Evasion	<b><u>TA0011</u></b> Command and Control	<b><u>T1566</u></b> Phishing	<b><u>T1566.001</u></b> Spearphishing Attachment
<b><u>T1059</u></b> Command and Scripting Interpreter	<b><u>T1547</u></b> Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	<b><u>T1547.001</u></b> Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	<b><u>T1574</u></b> Hijack Execution Flow
<b><u>T1574.002</u></b> DLL Side-Loading	<b><u>T1027</u></b> Obfuscated Files or Information	<b><u>T1027.002</u></b> Software Packing	<b><u>T1071</u></b> Application Layer Protocol

<b>T1071.001</b> Web Protocols	<b>T1036</b> Masquerading	<b>T1204</b> User Execution	<b>T1204.002</b> Malicious File
<b>T1140</b> Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	<b>T1656</b> Impersonation		

## ✂ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
<b>SHA256</b>	83a70162ec391fde57a9943b5270c217d63d050aae94ae3efb75de45df5298be, f778825b254682ab5746d7b547df848406bb6357a74e2966b39a5fa5eae006c2, 9b613f6942c378a447c7b75874a8fff0ef7d7fd37785fdb81b45d4e4e2d9e63d, 86f8a979bd887955f0491a0ed5e00de2f3fe53e6eb5856fb823115ce43b7c0ca
<b>File Name</b>	Homeoffice-Vereinbarung-2025.7z
<b>URLs</b>	hxxp[:]//www[.]technikzweg[.]de/auth/auth/authenticate/samples[.]html hxxp[:]//www[.]technikzweg[.]de/auth/auth/authenticate/samples[.]php

## 🌀 References


<https://cyble.com/blog/sliver-implant-targets-german-entities-with-dll-sideloadng-and-proxyng-techniques/>

<https://www.hivepro.com/threat-advisory/apt29-a-deep-dive-into-russias-cyber-espionage/>

# What Next?

At Hive Pro, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

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