

Hiveforce Labs

THREAT ADVISORY

X ATTACK REPORT

Southeast Asia Becomes a Hotspot for China-Linked Cyber Espionage

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Summary

Attack Commenced: June 2024

Malware: PlugX, Rakshasa

Targeted Countries: Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar,

Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam

Targeted Industries: Government, Aviation, Telecommunication, Media

Attack: A sophisticated China-linked APT campaign targeted high-profile organizations in Southeast Asia, focusing on intelligence gathering through advanced techniques and legitimate tools to evade detection. Leveraging living-off-the-land binaries, custom malware, and secure communication proxies, the attackers demonstrated remarkable stealth and persistence.

X Attack Regions



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Attack Details

- A highly sophisticated APT operation linked to China targeted prominent organizations across Southeast Asia. The victims included government ministries, an air traffic control agency, a telecommunications provider, and a media. The primary goal was intelligence collection, achieved through advanced methods and using legitimate tools to avoid detection.
- The campaign began with extensive reconnaissance. The attackers employed open-source tools like Dismap and NBTScan to analyze network structures and locate vulnerabilities. Public utilities, such as FastReverseProxy (FRP), exposed internal servers to external networks, facilitating deeper infiltration.
- On May 27, 2024, the attackers executed a PowerShell command to modify the registry and disable Remote UAC filtering, thereby elevating privileges for remote administrative access. For payload delivery, the attackers leveraged Impacket, executing commands through Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).
- A keylogger masquerading as ChromeUpdate.exe was uploaded to intercept credentials. By May 28, they had established persistence by creating registry entries and scheduled tasks, disguising malicious files as legitimate.NET framework components.
- The campaign heavily relied on living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) like PowerShell, Reg.exe, and WMI to blend malicious activities with legitimate processes. Tools such as Stowaway and Rakshasa enabled secure command-and-control (C2) communications, while the versatile remote access Trojan PlugX (Korplug) expanded their capabilities. Throughout the campaign, the attackers demonstrated persistence and precision, exfiltrating valuable intelligence over several months.

Recommendations

- Enhance Network Visibility and Monitoring: Use IDS tools to monitor for unusual activity and network scans, such as those conducted by Dismap and NBTScan. Ensure critical systems are segmented from less sensitive ones to limit lateral movement in case of a breach.
- Code and System Hardening: Harden systems and networks and deploy code to minimize vulnerabilities. Use code analysis and penetration testing tools to identify and address any weak points in software or websites.



Use Application Whitelisting: Implement application whitelisting to prevent unauthorized or malicious software from running on your systems, allowing only trusted applications to execute.



Zero Trust Architecture: Implement a Zero Trust security model, where all users and devices are continuously authenticated and verified, regardless of their location within the network.

Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs **MITRE ATT**

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	TA0001 Initial Access	TA0002 Execution	TA0003 Persistence	TA0004 Privilege Escalation
	TA0005 Defense Evasion	TA0006 Credential Access	TA0007 Discovery	TA0009 Collection
	TA0011 Command and Control	TA0010 Exfiltration	TA0043 Reconnaissance	TA0042 Resource Development
	T1595 Active Scanning	T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning	T1590 Gather Victim Network Information	T1590.006 Network Security Appliances
0 0	T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application	T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter	T1059.001 PowerShell	T1059.003 Windows Command Shell
0	T1112 Modify Registry	T1053.005 Scheduled Task	T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation	T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
	T1588.002 Tool	T1588 Obtain Capabilities	T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution	T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
	T1056.001 Keylogging	T1082 System Information Discovery	00000001110	10110101100

X Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

ТҮРЕ	VALUE
IPv4	45[.]123[.]188[.]180, 198[.]244[.]237[.]131
IPv4:PORT	38[.]60[.]146[.]78[:]443, 118[.]107[.]219[.]66[:]443
SHA256	d312b0e1968beae5a2ff3be2d8efc6d1bfdab3b1aec6faf8eafa295c47230 194, 33cb9f06338a9ea17107abbdc478071bbe097f80a835bbac462c4bb17cd 0b798, 8b6d081be732743aa6f6bccfb68b3f21878aa36723c1311f50406d752aac c9fa, 89707a5bf9862a9effb1618a1a285a8d027fb343f6103f4bc68f736889f0a 86e, 9fe3ff51443c41fe0be01a55a3a5fbfb261bcf63b3b0cd67f65a2c00a6d52f f3, e6cecba25abd092bfccba825298edecd2fdee6c428d9ae85399fabc54355 e31f, 779b4a5f53d3128ab53dd8e13c362d6d077c3eb4987f878d7ef3416c801 ef0dd, e9572549b2f35f32861ffc9be160e9c8f86e4d9d3dd43c3727f0df4dc2acc 944, e0f3b8028a2969e280efdd770978a54181fc242dd26cbf0a22e922f1e6a1 b951, b7472c6f6cba47ec85fa147c78f3a7a40a4fc5913fe41654ab499a7b1bd4 ea2e, 3e4d86c4e1d463b99478f960c9c00f7d11cd0d1fb8dd2948e8340b7bc35 50904, fb603072418da9150673ac9826a46a2b2462c8fc0afeacb2034ecb2b7d6 66001, 340e872c814d221989ca2cb93819b9ad307572851b5b3f8bfcf791ff08e0 e677, 80c3effc8f017b26c549bed8ba82097a6be7a59e383dd35adc917bf661e0 a754, 9b1794a1c8c59631d95178c7c4e2f5917b84864b342b4cfdab8f0990c3d bf5d2, ca0eeb4b71d4124dec785a9492970e9b1cfaa4cab0e8ca4486fc14b2e25 6d7f7,

ТҮРЕ	VALUE
SHA256	d7b85b92fb185272b89a7ff27424bff22a5a6542f6bde9838482aa9f8797 9828, fa6de0d0bc9d83a3942aa8b3a12a5924dc662bec32cb3c2f212a0a0c0a4 ebc7a, 10029f14f2718362144b0e9b660994e8fb944af9ce9fcff04925f8b0615bb 509, aa096f18e712ac0604e18d16441b672fcb393de9edf3ff4393519c48ab26 a158, 386eb7aa33c76ce671d6685f79512597f1fab28ea46c8ec7d89e5834008 1e2bd


References

https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/china-southeast-asia-espionage

What Next?

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