

HiveForce Labs

THREAT ADVISORY

**ATTACK REPORT**

BellaCPP: The New C++ Variant of BellaCiao Malware

Date of Publication

December 26, 2024

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2024473

Summary

Attack Began: 2024

Malware: BellaCiao, BellaCPP


Targeted Region: Asia

Affected Platform: Windows

Threat Actor: Charming Kitten (aka Magic Hound, APT 35, Cobalt Illusion, Cobalt Mirage, TEMP.Beanie, Timberworm, Tarh Andishan, TA453, Phosphorus, TunnelVision, UNC788, Yellow Garuda, Educated Manticore, Mint Sandstorm, Ballistic Bobcat, CharmingCypress)

Attack: A new variant of the BellaCiao malware, called BellaCPP, has recently been identified, rewritten in C++ instead of its original .NET implementation. This shift highlights efforts by attackers to create more versatile and harder-to-detect malware. BellaCPP operates as a Windows service, using DLL files and domain generation algorithms to establish covert communication channels. Attributed to the Charming Kitten APT group, this variant underscores the need for robust cybersecurity measures to counter evolving threats.

Attack Regions



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Attack Details

#1

Recently, researchers identified a new variant of the [BellaCiao](#) malware, called BellaCPP, rewritten in C++ instead of its original .NET implementation. This discovery highlights a shift in tactics by threat actors, demonstrating their efforts to create more versatile and difficult-to-detect malware. BellaCPP was first identified on a compromised system in Asia, where its predecessor, the .NET-based BellaCiao, had already been deployed. This suggests that the malware may be part of a coordinated and layered attack strategy.

#2

BellaCPP operates as a Windows service, leveraging a DLL file named "adhapl.dll." The malware installs itself in the C:\Windows\System32 directory and uses an export function called "ServiceMain" to execute its payload. It decrypts specific strings during runtime, loads a secondary DLL named "D3D12_1core.dll," and generates domain names based on predetermined patterns. These capabilities indicate that BellaCPP is designed to establish covert communication channels potentially for command-and-control purposes while evading detection.

#3

Researchers noted several similarities between BellaCPP and the original BellaCiao, particularly in their domain generation algorithms and network communication techniques. These overlaps, combined with evidence of both versions being found on the same machine, point toward their likely use by the [Charming Kitten](#) advanced persistent threat (APT) group. Charming Kitten, also known as Phosphorus or APT35, is widely believed to be linked to Iranian state-sponsored cyber operations. Researchers attribute this variant to the group with medium-to-high confidence based on its behavior and characteristics.

#4

The emergence of BellaCPP highlights the evolving threat landscape, where attackers are adopting new programming languages and methods to improve their malware's stealth and effectiveness. By rewriting the malware in C++, the attackers can better evade detection and analysis tools designed for .NET-based threats. This adaptation underscores the importance of robust cybersecurity measures, including behavioral analysis, network monitoring, and endpoint protection, to detect and mitigate such sophisticated attacks.

Recommendations



Implement Robust Endpoint Protection: Deploy advanced endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions across all systems to detect and block suspicious activities, such as unauthorized DLL files or unusual service behaviors. These solutions should be configured to monitor for anomalies like the creation of hidden services or the loading of unknown DLLs.



Regularly Update and Patch Software: Ensure that all systems are kept up to date with the latest security patches and software updates. Attackers often exploit vulnerabilities in outdated software, so maintaining a proactive patch management strategy can minimize the risk of exploitation.



Network Monitoring and Threat Detection: Employ continuous network monitoring to detect any unusual or suspicious network traffic. In particular, monitor for domain-generation algorithms (DGAs) and other indicators of command-and-control (C2) communication commonly used by advanced persistent threats (APTs) like Charming Kitten.



Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<u>TA0005</u> Defense Evasion	<u>TA0010</u> Exfiltration	<u>TA0002</u> Execution	<u>TA0011</u> Command and Control
<u>TA0003</u> Persistence	<u>T1059.001</u> PowerShell	<u>T1041</u> Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	<u>T1027</u> Obfuscated Files or Information
<u>T1071.004</u> DNS	<u>T1071</u> Application Layer Protocol	<u>T1568.002</u> Domain Generation Algorithms	<u>T1568</u> Dynamic Resolution
<u>T1543.003</u> Windows Service	<u>T1543</u> Create or Modify System Process	<u>T1059</u> Command and Scripting Interpreter	

🔪 Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
MD5	327a1f32572b4606ae19085769042e51, 34eb579dc89e1dc0507ad646a8dce8be, b3bde532cfbb95c567c069ca5f90652c, 29362dcd6c57dde0c112e25c9706dcf, 882f2de65605dd90ee17fb65a01fe2c7, 5f4284115ab9641f1532bb64b650aad6, 0fea857a35b972899e8f1f60ee58e450, 20014b80a139ed256621b9c0ac4d7076, 7f0ee078c8902f12d6d9e300dabf6aed, 63647520b36144e31fb8ad7dd10e3d21, 8096e00aa7877b863ef5a437f55c8277, 12ab1bc0989b32c55743df9b8c46af5a, 50dc5faa02227c0aefa8b54c8e5b2b0d, e760a5ce807c756451072376f88760d7, b03c67239e1e774077995bac331a8950, ba69cc9f087411995c64ca0d96da7b69, 051552b4da740a3af5bd5643b1dc239a, edfb8d26fa34436f2e92d5be1cb5901b, 3e86f6fc7ed037f3c9560cc59aa7aacc, ae4d6812f5638d95a82b3fa3d4f92861, 67677c815070ca2e3ebd57a6adb58d2e, 17a78f50e32679f228c43823faabedfd, b9956282a0fed076ed083892e498ac69, 1b41e64c60ca9dfadeb063cd822ab089
SHA1	dccdfc77dd2803b3c5a97af0851efa0aa5bbeeb, 2D22F3744A9DADA4638486FB26B3404364C1418B, 1DD27A926E98C9305BD1689A9F7C33E0E3070D4B, 2873D5C7B215A68BF02697BA169078919AEEE474, 0431FE37BF744D5416E2F2A3220C5DC696E0FDA3, 9F6C7D3F02F6E214F56C3A3FC218A564FB8CB3C0, D0EB6CB3CA82D2D2E1D30AF4DFE7ED744111C6D7, 7697329BD6AFAA0874E8EF1AE81AD27BAA1863EC, D3D67296C8FE2B10A3626EEEE0B9BCC26157DE99, AC5B30AEA5F5C36FF6918A7545740F7FB4301650, 7995FC3EE9A9A97561774D1652A768D9586C259A, 74D53B909C75C5850C0C0EAAD71AD98CA3546064,
SHA256	0F696B7505255119B3CA53F57C2F829FC282D227D7A1577E6986 87A199800EF1, 8DD77DFD8DA749741FA9AADBE82E62B273C1C3565DEBBB753FA FEDB18A9F50C0, D967148E4289FD6B831C4BC9EC5BB808A384BD7D334FB2D1AB3 A498F680315C7,

TYPE	VALUE
SHA256	81B6911BEC25C314C256E3E04E1826169359BFCBBED76ACD14F1 8A05BAFOA28A, 6A5F8868456CE708C7D6318C10A27BFB576DA1A02FF8F8575D20 07F5C2F88E54, B2B3E8B3DA25215FF5DC3965DA852A27FEFDE958C6D06DDFFE36 087BD0F6D1A5, C8AC671B0AB1BDDABB229A0F28D0E52B2EFBCC7415254CEB720 452FA4AC7942A, 1BCB35DEB900C2C12F2B96071A24023A026FFB09464CFD446F8B F6D928C1365E, 5ECBFC037A992FA71B6DA1229308840692589F019F5FFD77EFAEF ECD322179F1, 5F2C954DC7B35C4D31084CE43D7E5F88FFD803F848DBDD77F311 2ACA01325D06, e4e3f09c4257269cef6cfbebc83c8a60376ce5e547080502e3e408a 3f9916218, 7E761786FF674DE0ADCBD62ED6ADCB5237B2E23D5E6E2A4799F 23037463513C5
File Name	Adhapl[.]dll
Domain	systemupdate[.]info

References

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
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What Next?

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