

HiveForce Labs

# THREAT ADVISORY

**ATTACK REPORT**

## NetSupport RAT Exploited in Horns&Hooves Cyberattack

Date of Publication

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Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2024450

# Summary

**Attack Began:** March 2023

**Malware:** NetSupport RAT, BurnsRAT

**Targeted Region:** Russia

**Targeted Industries:** Retailers, Service Businesses, Private Users

**Campaign Name:** Horns&Hooves

**Affected Platform:** Windows

**Threat Actor:** TA569

**Attack:** The Horns&Hooves campaign, active since March 2023, targets Russian users by delivering malware disguised as legitimate business documents. Utilizing malicious JScript files, attackers aim to install the NetSupport RAT (Remote Access Trojan) on victims' systems. The campaign has evolved from HTA scripts to more sophisticated obfuscated JavaScript files to evade detection. Connections to other cybercriminal groups, particularly TA569, highlight the collaborative nature of these threats and the need for ongoing vigilance in cybersecurity.

## Attack Regions



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# Attack Details

## #1

The Horns&Hooves campaign, active since March 2023, is a cyberattack targeting primarily Russian users, retailers, and service businesses through malicious emails. These emails, disguised as legitimate business inquiries, contain ZIP archives with JScript (JS) scripts masquerading as requests for proposals, price quotes, or claims.

## #2

Initially, these scripts used the HTA format before switching to JS, and their contents often included decoy documents like fake PDFs or Russian registry extracts to enhance believability. Over time, the scripts evolved to obfuscate their true nature further, embedding malicious payloads within the ZIP files or script code itself.

## #3

The malware payload is primarily [NetSupport RAT](#), a legitimate remote administration tool exploited by attackers for unauthorized control over victims' systems. The installation process involves downloading a decoy document to distract users while using Windows utilities like curl and bitsadmin to install the RAT.

## #4

Additional tools, such as BurnsRAT and RMS, were briefly employed in earlier campaign phases but were later abandoned in favor of streamlined approaches. These payloads provided attackers remote access, enabling the theft of sensitive data, installation of other malware like Rhadamanthys and Meduza stealers, or resale of system access on the dark web.

## #5

Attribution of the Horns&Hooves campaign points to the TA569 group, also known as Mustard Tempest or Gold Prelude, known for selling access to compromised systems. Evidence includes the reuse of license files, configuration file similarities, and shared security keys for the NetSupport client.

## #6

TA569 typically leverages compromised access for ransomware deployment or data theft, but it also facilitates secondary cybercrime activities by selling access to other threat actors. The campaign underscores the risks posed by abused legitimate tools and highlights the importance of robust defenses against social engineering tactics and script-based malware.

# Recommendations



**Enhance Email Security:** Organizations should implement advanced email filtering solutions to detect and quarantine emails with suspicious attachments, especially ZIP archives containing JavaScript or HTA files. Additionally, businesses should educate employees to identify phishing attempts by providing training on recognizing unusual requests or unsolicited proposals.



**Strengthen Endpoint Protection:** Deploying endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions is essential for monitoring suspicious activities. These tools can block malicious scripts before they execute. Antivirus programs should be updated regularly to detect and neutralize emerging threats, including malware disguised as legitimate business communications.



**Limit Execution of Untrusted Scripts:** Restrict the execution of scripts from unknown or untrusted sources. IT administrators can enforce policies that prevent JavaScript, HTA, or other executable files from running unless explicitly approved. For additional security, consider disabling Windows utilities like bitsadmin and PowerShell on non-administrative machines.



**Implement Network Monitoring:** Network monitoring tools can detect anomalies, such as unexpected connections to command-and-control servers. By identifying these connections, organizations can quickly isolate affected systems to prevent further compromise. Regular audits of network traffic should be conducted to ensure no unauthorized activities occur.



## Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<b><u>TA0011</u></b> Command and Control	<b><u>TA0003</u></b> Persistence	<b><u>TA0004</u></b> Privilege Escalation	<b><u>TA0005</u></b> Defense Evasion
<b><u>TA0001</u></b> Initial Access	<b><u>TA0042</u></b> Resource Development	<b><u>TA0002</u></b> Execution	<b><u>TA0009</u></b> Collection
<b><u>T1059</u></b> Command and Scripting Interpreter	<b><u>T1566.001</u></b> Spearphishing Attachment	<b><u>T1566</u></b> Phishing	<b><u>T1218.005</u></b> Mshta
<b><u>T1574.002</u></b> DLL Side-Loading	<b><u>T1574</u></b> Hijack Execution Flow	<b><u>T1041</u></b> Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	<b><u>T1584</u></b> Compromise Infrastructure

<b><u>T1059.007</u></b> JavaScript	<b><u>T1059.001</u></b> PowerShell	<b><u>T1059.005</u></b> Visual Basic	<b><u>T1036</u></b> Masquerading
<b><u>T1140</u></b> Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	<b><u>T1027</u></b> Obfuscated Files or Information	<b><u>T1204</u></b> User Execution	<b><u>T1204.002</u></b> Malicious File
<b><u>T1123</u></b> Audio Capture	<b><u>T1218</u></b> System Binary Proxy Execution	<b><u>T1059.003</u></b> Windows Command Shell	

## 🔪 Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
<b>MD5</b>	327a1f32572b4606ae19085769042e51, 34eb579dc89e1dc0507ad646a8dce8be, b3bde532cfbb95c567c069ca5f90652c, 29362dcdb6c57dde0c112e25c9706dcf, 882f2de65605dd90ee17fb65a01fe2c7, 5f4284115ab9641f1532bb64b650aad6, 0fea857a35b972899e8f1f60ee58e450, 20014b80a139ed256621b9c0ac4d7076, 7f0ee078c8902f12d6d9e300dabf6aed, 63647520b36144e31fb8ad7dd10e3d21, 8096e00aa7877b863ef5a437f55c8277, 12ab1bc0989b32c55743df9b8c46af5a, 50dc5faa02227c0aefa8b54c8e5b2b0d, e760a5ce807c756451072376f88760d7, b03c67239e1e774077995bac331a8950, ba69cc9f087411995c64ca0d96da7b69, 051552b4da740a3af5bd5643b1dc239a, edfb8d26fa34436f2e92d5be1cb5901b, 3e86f6fc7ed037f3c9560cc59aa7aacc, ae4d6812f5638d95a82b3fa3d4f92861, 67677c815070ca2e3ebd57a6adb58d2e, 17a78f50e32679f228c43823faabedfd, b9956282a0fed076ed083892e498ac69, 1b41e64c60ca9dfadeb063cd822ab089

TYPE	VALUE
<b>Domains</b>	xoomep1[.]com, xoomep2[.]com, labudanka1[.]com, labudanka2[.]com, gribidi1[.]com, gribidi2[.]com, shetrn1[.]com, shetrn2[.]com
<b>URLs</b>	hxxp://193[.]42[.]32[.]138/api/ hxxp://87[.]251[.]67[.]51/api/ hxxp://31[.]44[.]4[.]40/test/bat_install.bat, hxxps://golden-scalen[.]com/files/*, hxxp://188[.]227[.]58[.]243/pretencia/www.php, hxxp://188[.]227[.]58[.]243/zayavka/www.php, hxxp://188[.]227[.]58[.]243/pretencia/installet_bat_vbs.bat, hxxp://188[.]227[.]106[.]124/test/js/www.php, hxxp://188[.]227[.]106[.]124/test/js/BLD.exe, hxxp://188[.]227[.]106[.]124/test/js/1.js, hxxp://45[.]133[.]16[.]135/zayavka/www.php, hxxp://45[.]133[.]16[.]135/zayavka/666.bat, hxxp://45[.]133[.]16[.]135/zayavka/1.yay, hxxp://golden-scalen[.]com/ngg_cl.zip

## References


<https://securelist.com/horns-n-hooves-campaign-delivering-netsupport-rat/114740/>

<https://www.hivepro.com/threat-advisory/the-rise-of-netsupport-rat-recent-infections-and-sector-impact/>

# What Next?

At Hive Pro, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

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