

HiveForce Labs

# THREAT ADVISORY

 **ATTACK REPORT**

## ClickFix Con: Phishing Scam Turns Video Calls into Malware Havens

Date of Publication

October 25, 2024

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2024410

# Summary

**Attack Commenced:** March 2024

**Campaign:** ClickFix

**Malware:** Stealc, Rhadamanthys, AMOS Stealer


**Affected Platforms:** Windows and macOS

**Targeted Region:** Worldwide

**Targeted Industries:** Transport, Logistics

**Attack:** In 2024, the ClickFix phishing method intensified as cybercriminals employed deceptive Google Meet pages, phishing emails, and fake websites to spread malware. Groups such as the Slavic Nation Empire (SNE) and Scamquerteo were instrumental in this trend, managing to evade conventional security protocols and targeting users on both Windows and macOS platforms.

## Attack Regions



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# Attack Details

## #1

In May 2024, a rise in cyber threats exploiting fake Google Meet pages surfaced as part of a broader phishing campaign known as ClickFix. This method enables malware distribution through compromised websites, phishing emails, and fake video conferencing platforms that imitate Google Meet.

## #2

The goal is to trick victims into running malicious code, often delivered via a PowerShell script using a [ClearFake](#) cluster to install various malware, including infostealers. These fraudulent Google Meet pages display fake pop-ups claiming microphone or headset problems, prompting users to click a "fix" button.

## #3

For Windows users, this leads to the installation of malware like Stealc and Rhadamanthys, while macOS users are served with AMOS Stealer. These attacks are hazardous as they evade typical security measures like Google Safe Browsing.

## #4

Earlier, in March 2024, the initial access broker [TA571](#) began employing the ClickFix technique in phishing campaigns. As the year progressed, cybercriminals expanded the use of ClickFix by embedding it into compromised software websites, primarily via fake CAPTCHA pages.

## #5

Recent campaigns have been linked to two cybercrime groups, the Slavic Nation Empire (SNE) and Scamquerteo, who have been fueling this surge in sophisticated phishing and malware attacks.

# Recommendations



**Recognize Phishing Indicators:** Educate users to spot suspicious elements, such as fake video call interfaces, unexpected pop-ups, and "fix" buttons for supposed audio or video issues. Train employees to avoid clicking unknown or suspicious prompts in video calls.



**Deploy Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR):** EDR solutions can detect and respond to suspicious activities, such as attempts to install infostealers like Stealc and AMOS. Ensure your EDR can identify unusual PowerShell activity and stealthy malware variants.



**Analyze Traffic to Malicious IPs:** Use network monitoring to detect traffic to malicious domains and IPs linked to known malware servers. Look for connections attempting to contact command-and-control (C2) servers associated with malware like Stealc and Rhadamanthys.

## Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<b><u>TA0042</u></b> Resource Development	<b><u>TA0001</u></b> Initial Access	<b><u>TA0002</u></b> Execution	<b><u>TA0003</u></b> Persistence
<b><u>TA0005</u></b> Defense Evasion	<b><u>TA0007</u></b> Discovery	<b><u>TA0011</u></b> Command and Control	<b><u>TA0010</u></b> Exfiltration
<b><u>T1566</u></b> Phishing	<b><u>T1566.002</u></b> Spearphishing Link	<b><u>T1071.001</u></b> Web Protocols	<b><u>T1059</u></b> Command and Scripting Interpreter
<b><u>T1059.001</u></b> PowerShell	<b><u>T1204</u></b> User Execution	<b><u>T1204.002</u></b> Malicious File	<b><u>T1036</u></b> Masquerading
<b><u>T1036.005</u></b> Match Legitimate Name or Location	<b><u>T1070</u></b> Indicator Removal	<b><u>T1027</u></b> Obfuscated Files or Information	<b><u>T1059.003</u></b> Windows Command Shell
<b><u>T1189</u></b> Drive-by Compromise	<b><u>T1574</u></b> Hijack Execution Flow	<b><u>T1105</u></b> Ingress Tool Transfer	<b><u>T1071</u></b> Application Layer Protocol
<b><u>T1588.001</u></b> Malware	<b><u>T1588</u></b> Obtain Capabilities		

# ✂ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
<b>Domains</b>	meet[.]google[.]us-join[.]com, meet[.]googie[.]com-join[.]us, meet[.]google[.]com-join[.]us, meet[.]google[.]web-join[.]com, meet[.]google[.]webjoining[.]com, meet[.]google[.]cdm-join[.]us, meet[.]google[.]us07host[.]com, googiedrivers[.]com, alienmanfc6[.]com, apunanwu[.]com, bowerchalke[.]com, carolinejuskus[.]com, cautrucanhtuan[.]com, cphoops[.]com, dekhke[.]com, iloanshop[.]com, kansaskollection[.]com, lirelasuisse[.]com, mdalies[.]com, mensadvancega[.]com, mishapagerealty[.]com, modoodeul[.]com, pabloarruda[.]com, pakoyayinlari[.]com, patrickcateman[.]com, phperl[.]com, stonance[.]com, utv4fun[.]com, us18web-zoom[.]us, webapizmland[.]com, us01web-zoom[.]us, us03web-zoom[.]us, us07web-zoom[.]us, us08web-zoom[.]us, us09web-zoom[.]us, us10web-zoom[.]us, us30web-zoom[.]us, us40web-zoom[.]us, us45web-zoom[.]us, us50web-zoom[.]us, us60web-zoom[.]us, us70web-zoom[.]us,



TYPE	VALUE
<p><b>Domains</b></p>	<p>us77web-zoom[.]us,  us80web-zoom[.]us,  us85web-zoom[.]us,  us95web-zoom[.]us,  us004web-zoom[.]us,  us005web-zoom[.]us,  us006web-zoom[.]us,  us007web-zoom[.]us,  us008web-zoom[.]us,  us050web-zoom[.]us,  us055web-zoom[.]us,  us500web-zoom[.]us,  us505web-zoom[.]us,  us555web-zoom[.]us,  us002webzoom[.]us,  us003webzoom[.]us,  us4web-zoom[.]us,  us5web-zoom[.]us,  us6web-zoom[.]us,  us01web[.]us,  us03web[.]us,  us08web[.]us,  us09web[.]us,  us15web[.]us,  us20web[.]us,  us40web[.]us,  us50web[.]us,  us55web[.]us,  web05-zoom[.]us,  webroom-zoom[.]us,  doculuma[.]com,  fatoreader[.]com,  fatoreader[.]net,  gamascript[.]com,  verdascript[.]com,  veriscroll[.]com,  calipsoproject[.]com,  lunacy3[.]com,  lunacy4[.]com,  projectcalipso[.]com,  thecalipsoproject[.]com,  web3dev[.]buzz,  battleforge[.]cc,  battleultimate[.]xyz,  mybattleforge[.]xyz,  myultimate[.]xyz,</p>

TYPE	VALUE
<p><b>Domains</b></p>	<p>playbattleforge[.]org,  playbattleforge[.]xyz,  playultimate[.]xyz,  tooldream[.]live,  ultimategame[.]xyz,  ultimateplay[.]xyz,  argongame[.]com,  darkblow[.]com,  missingfrontier[.]com,  nightpredators[.]com,  riotrevelry[.]com,  thewatch[.]com,  us12web[.]us,  webjoining[.]com,  Web3 web browser,  sleipnirbrowser[.]org,  sleipnirbrowser[.]xyz,  cozyland[.]xyz,  cozymeta[.]com,  cozymeta[.]fun,  cozymeta[.]xyz,  cozyweb3[.]com,  cozyworld[.]io,  worldcozy[.]com,  ngtmeta[.]io,  ngtmetaland[.]io,  ngtmetaweb[.]com,  ngtproject[.]com,  ngtstudio[.]io,  ngtstudio[.]online,  ngtverse[.]org,  night-support[.]xyz,  nightstudio[.]io,  nightstudioweb[.]xyz,  lastnuggets[.]com,  mor-dex[.]world,  mordex[.]blog,  mordex[.]digital,  mordex[.]homes,  nor-tex[.]eu,  nor-tex[.]pro,  nor-tex[.]world,  nor-tex[.]xyz,  nort-ex[.]eu,  nort-ex[.]lol,</p>

TYPE	VALUE
<b>Domains</b>	nort-ex[.]world, nortex-app[.]pro, nortex-app[.]us, nortex-app[.]xyz, nortex[.]app, nortex[.]blog, nortex[.]digital, nortex[.]life, nortex[.]limited, nortex[.]lol, nortex[.]luk, nortexapp[.]com, nortexapp[.]digital, nortexapp[.]io, nortexapp[.]me, nortexapp[.]pro, nortexapp[.]xyz, nortexmessenger[.]blog, nortexmessenger[.]digital, nortexmessenger[.]pro, nortexmessenger[.]us
<b>URLs</b>	hxxp[:]//95[.]182[.]97[.]58/84b7b6f977dd1c65[.]php, hxxps[:]//meet[.]google[.]com-join[.]us/wmq-qcdn-orj, hxxps[:]//meet[.]google[.]us-join[.]com/ywk-batf-sfh, hxxps[:]//meet[.]google[.]us07host[.]com/coc-btru-ays, hxxps[:]//meet[.]google[.]webjoining[.]com/exw-jfaj-hpa, hxxps[:]//googledrivers[.]com/fix-error, hxxp[:]//91[.]103[.]140[.]200[:]:9078/3936a074a2f65761a5eb8/6fmfpmi 7[.]fww4p, hxxps[:]//carolinejuskus[.]com/kusaka[.]php?call=launcher, hxxps[:]//carolinejuskus[.]com/f9dfbcf6a999/7cc2f5dc3c76/load[.]51f8 527e20dcb05ffd8586b853937a8a[.]php?call=launcher, hxxp[:]//85[.]209[.]11[.]155/joinsystem, hxxp[:]//77[.]221[.]157[.]170[:]:3004/server[.]js, hxxps[:]//us18web-zoom[.]us/stealc[.]exe, hxxps[:]//us18web-zoom[.]us/ram[.]exe, hxxps[:]//webapizmland[.]com/api/cmdruned,
<b>IPv4</b>	77[.]221[.]157[.]170, 95[.]182[.]97[.]58, 91[.]103[.]140[.]200, 85[.]209[.]11[.]155,
<b>SHA256</b>	92a8cc4e385f170db300de8d423686eeeeec72a32475a9356d967bee9e3 453138,



TYPE	VALUE
SHA256	a834be6d2bec10f39019606451b507742b7e87ac8d19dc0643ae58df183f773c, 2853a61188b4446be57543858adcc704e8534326d4d84ac44a60743b1a44cbfe, 94379fa0a97cc2ecd8d5514d0b46c65b0d46ff9bb8d5a4a29cf55a473da550d5

## References

<https://blog.sekoia.io/clickfix-tactic-the-phantom-meet/>


<https://hivepro.com/threat-advisory/ta866-makes-a-comeback-with-extensive-email-campaign/>

<https://hivepro.com/threat-advisory/atomic-stealer-sneaks-in-via-fake-browser-updates/>

# What Next?

At **Hive Pro**, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

Book a free demo with **HivePro Uni5**: Threat Exposure Management Platform.



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**October 25, 2024 • 5:00 AM**

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