

HiveForce Labs

THREAT ADVISORY

**ATTACK REPORT**

Cicada3301 The RaaS Predator Preying on Enterprises

Date of Publication

October 18, 2024

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2024401

Summary

Active Since: May 2024

Threat Actor: Repellent Scorpis


Malware: Cicada3301

Attack Countries: United States, United Kingdom, Denmark, United Arab Emirates, Switzerland, Japan, Italy, England, Thailand, Canada, Greenland, Mexico, Nicaragua, Honduras, Cuba, Guatemala, Panama, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Belize, El Salvador, Bahamas, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago, Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Grenada


Targeted Industries: Advertising, Construction, Consulting & Professional Services, Consumer, E-commerce, Education, Financial Services, Food & Beverage, Gaming, Government, Healthcare, Hospitality, IT, Legal, Manufacturing, Medicine, Military, Real Estate, Retail, Technology, Telecommunications, Transportation, Travel & Tourism

Attack: The Cicada3301 Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), distributed by Repellent Scorpis, has actively targeted businesses in key sectors, mainly in the United States and the United Kingdom, with 24 confirmed attacks. The group endorsed an affiliate program on the dark web forum "RAMP," recruiting partners for its expanding criminal network while strictly banning operations within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Attack Timeline



🗡️ Attack Regions



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Attack Details

#1

Since May 2024, the Cicada3301 Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), distributed by Repellent Scorpius, has been targeting businesses across various critical sectors. Their primary focus has been on victims in the United States and the United Kingdom, with a total of 24 confirmed attacks.

#2

On June 29, 2024, Cicada3301 introduced an affiliate program, promoting it on the underground dark web forum "RAMP". The group maintains strict guidelines, prohibiting affiliates from operating within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

#3

Cicada3301's roots date back to 2012 when it first emerged as a mysterious cryptographic puzzle group. Renowned for its notorious global scavenger hunt, it captivated participants with intricate ciphers and concealed clues in both digital and physical environments.

#4

To this day, the true motives and identity of the group remain cloaked in speculation, with theories suggesting it could be a secret society or a covert recruitment initiative for intelligence agencies. Cicada3301 ransomware is written in Rust and utilizes ChaCha20 and RSA encryption methods. It is compatible with various platforms, including Windows, Linux, ESXi, NAS, and even less common architectures like PowerPC.

#5

Its capabilities include shutting down virtual machines on ESXi and Hyper-V, terminating processes and services, deleting shadow copies, and encrypting network shares to maximize disruption. For files exceeding 100MB, the ransomware encrypts data in 1MB chunks.

#6

Cicada3301 exhibits notable similarities to **BlackCat** ransomware; however, key distinctions exist. Notably, it features only six command line options, which are fewer than those offered by BlackCat. Additionally, the ransom note is formatted as RECOVER-[encrypted_extension]-DATA.txt, while BlackCat uses RECOVER-[encrypted_extension]-FILES.txt. Cicada3301 accepts ransom payments in Bitcoin and Monero.

Recommendations



Implement the 3-2-1 Backup Rule: Maintain three total copies of your data, with two backups stored on different devices and one backup, kept offsite or in the cloud. This ensures redundancy and protects against data loss from ransomware attacks.



Implement Zero Trust Architecture: Adopt a Zero Trust security model that requires verification for every user and device attempting to access network resources, minimizing unauthorized access risks.



Enhance Network Segmentation: Divide your network into smaller segments to limit lateral movement by attackers. This containment strategy helps to restrict the spread of ransomware in the event of an infection.



Limit User Privileges: Apply the principle of least privilege by limiting user access rights to only those necessary for their role. This minimizes the risk of unauthorized access and potential data breaches.



Set Up Automated Alerts for Anomalous Behavior: Configure systems to automatically alert security teams for anomalous activities, such as large file transfers or unexpected process executions, particularly those resembling Cicada3301's tactics.



Regularly Test Backup Restores: Conduct frequent tests to verify the integrity of backup data and ensure that restoration processes work as intended. This practice helps identify any issues before an actual data recovery scenario arises.

Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

| | | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| <u>TA0002</u> Execution | <u>TA0003</u> Persistence | <u>TA0005</u> Defense Evasion | <u>TA0007</u> Discovery |
| <u>TA0008</u> Lateral Movement | <u>TA0011</u> Command and Control | <u>TA0010</u> Exfiltration | <u>TA0040</u> Impact |
| <u>T1041</u> Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | <u>T1574</u> Hijack Execution Flow | <u>T1543</u> Create or Modify System Process | <u>T1059</u> Command and Scripting Interpreter |
| <u>T1059.001</u> PowerShell | <u>T1070</u> Indicator Removal | <u>T1070.004</u> File Deletion | <u>T1046</u> Network Service Discovery |
| <u>T1016</u> System Network Configuration Discovery | <u>T1570</u> Lateral Tool Transfer | <u>T1486</u> Data Encrypted for Impact | <u>T1490</u> Inhibit System Recovery |
| <u>T1489</u> Service Stop | <u>T1562</u> Impair Defenses | <u>T1562.002</u> Disable Windows Event Logging | <u>T1562.001</u> Disable or Modify Tools |
| <u>T1562.004</u> Disable or Modify System Firewall | <u>T1070.001</u> Clear Windows Event Logs | <u>T1497</u> Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion | <u>T1030</u> Data Transfer Size Limits |

✂ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

| TYPE | VALUE |
|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| TOR Address | cicadabv7vicyvgz5khl7v2x5yygcgow7ryy6yppwmxii4eoobdaztqd[.]onion |
| IPv4 | 103[.]42[.]240[.]37, 91[.]238[.]181[.]238, 91[.]92[.]249[.]203 |
| File Path | C:\Users\Public\psexec0.exe |
| File Name | csrss.exe, veeam.exe, system32.exe |
| SHA256 | 078163d5c16f64caa5a14784323fd51451b8c831c73396b967b4e35e6879937b, 7b3022437b637c44f42741a92c7f7ed251845fd02dda642c0a47fde179bd984e, 3969e1a88a063155a6f61b0ca1ac33114c1a39151f3c7dd019084abd30553eab, 56e1d092c07322d9dad7d85d773953573cc3294b9e428b3bbbf935ca4d2f7e7, dd98133b825a1632879b689b864b15a66741208343bc8ba080354e0133181d69, 2d614f088f486f0870b3839ddb361e33efb73526a0a585f691874039f23171cc, 8ec114b29c7f2406809337b6c68ab30b0b7f0d1647829d56125e84662b84ea74, 0260258f6f083aff71c7549a6364cb05d54dd27f40ca1145e064353dd2a9e983, 2d73b3aefcfbb47c1a187ddee7a48a21af7c85eb49cbdc665db07375e36dc33 |

✂ Recent Breaches

<https://dubingroup.com/>

<https://corstat.com/>

<https://hughes-gill.com/>

<https://crownmortgagecompany.com/>

<https://designbymodel.com/>

<https://capitalprintingco.com/>

<https://www.brooker-cpa.com/>

<https://www.khoocpa.com/>

<https://www.blvdresidential.com/>
<https://www.kashima-coat.com/>
<https://bayoudesiardcc.com/>
<https://christen-sanitaer.ch/>
<https://www.findel.co.uk/>
<https://www.bfcpas.com/>
<https://www.hofmann-malerei.ch/>
<https://www.ebapc.com/>
<https://ufcw135.com/>
<https://www.dkgroup.com/>
<https://www.vvs-eksperten.dk/>
<https://silipos.com/>
<https://www.squareonecoatingsystems.com/>
<https://www.vossbelt.com/>
<https://tristardisplay.com/>
<https://www.railworks.com/narstco>


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<https://www.truesec.com/hub/blog/dissecting-the-cicada>
<https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/repellent-scorpius-cicada3301-ransomware/>
<https://hivepro.com/threat-advisory/blackcats-resurgence-despite-law-enforcement-disruptions/>

What Next?

At Hive Pro, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

Book a free demo with HivePro Uni5: Threat Exposure Management Platform.



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