

Threat Level

HiveForce Labs THREAT ADVISORY



Threat Actors Exploit Docker and Kubernetes for Crypto Mining

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A1

Summary

First Seen: September 2024 Targeted Countries: Worldwide Malware: XMRig Affected Platforms: Docker Swarm and Kubernetes Attack: A new cryptojacking campaign that exploits Docker and Kubernetes environments to mine cryptocurrency by accessing exposed Docker API endpoints without authentication. The attack enables lateral movement within cloud infrastructures, allowing threat actors to compromise multiple systems by leveraging

enhanced security measures in containerized infrastructures to prevent exploitation.

malicious Docker images and scripts. This campaign highlights the urgent need for

X Attack Regions

THREAT ADVISORY • ATTACK REPORT (Amber)

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Attack Details

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In recent times, attackers have been increasingly exploiting container orchestration platforms like Docker Swarm and Kubernetes to mine cryptocurrency. A new cryptojacking campaign targets the Docker Engine API and can move laterally to Docker Swarm, Kubernetes, and SSH servers. The campaign begins with the threat actor accessing exposed Docker API endpoints without authentication, a common vulnerability in cloud environments.

Threat actors utilize tools like masscan and zgrab to identify these vulnerable endpoints across the internet. Once a target is found, the malware leverages the Docker API to create an Alpine container, which mounts the host's file system and executes a malicious shell command to download an initialization script that kicks off the infection process.

One of the key features of this attack is its ability to enable lateral movement within cloud infrastructures, allowing it to spread from one compromised container to others running Docker or Kubernetes. The threat actor operates a command and control (C2) server that hosts malicious payloads and manages infected hosts through a controlled Docker Swarm cluster. The campaign involves using Docker Hub to distribute malicious images, specifically from a user account named nmlmweb3, which remains active and has several repositories.



The attack initiates with a command that retrieves an initialization script (init.sh) from a remote server. This script prepares the container for further exploitation by ensuring essential data transfer tools are installed and then downloading a cryptocurrency miner (XMRig) to execute within the container. The script employs dynamic linker hijacking techniques to conceal the mining process from system monitoring tools by modifying system files to hide the miner's presence. This multi-faceted approach underscores the need for robust security measures in containerized environments.

#5

The malware employs various strategies for lateral movement, including targeting Kubernetes environments by scanning local networks for open Kubelet APIs (port 10250) and attempting to execute commands within discovered pods. It also scans for Docker Engine ports and uses found endpoints to deploy additional malicious containers. Furthermore, the malware looks for SSH servers within the local network and attempts to exploit them for further access.

Recommendations



Secure API Endpoints: Ensure that all Docker and Kubernetes API endpoints are secured with strong authentication mechanisms. Disable unauthenticated access to the Docker Engine API and configure Kubernetes to require authentication for all requests. Use role-based access control (RBAC) to limit permissions based on user roles.



Regularly Update and Patch Systems: Keep Docker, Kubernetes, and all related software up to date with the latest security patches. Regularly review and update container images to ensure they do not contain known vulnerabilities. Utilize automated tools to scan for outdated components and apply updates promptly.



Implement Network Segmentation: Segment your network to limit the exposure of sensitive systems. Use firewalls to restrict access to Docker and Kubernetes APIs from untrusted networks. Implement network policies within Kubernetes to control traffic flow between pods and limit lateral movement.



Monitor for Anomalous Activity: Deploy monitoring solutions that can detect unusual behavior within your containerized environments. Set up alerts for suspicious activities, such as unexpected container creation or unusual resource consumption patterns indicative of cryptojacking attempts.

Potential <u>MITRE ATT&CK</u> TTPs

| <u>TA0006</u> | <u>TA0005</u> | <u>TA0001</u> | <u>TA0002</u> |
|------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Credential Access | Defense Evasion | Initial Access | Execution |
| <u>TA0011</u> | <u>TA0008</u> | <u>TA0040</u> | <u>TA0003</u> |
| Command and Control | Lateral Movement | Impact | Persistence |
| <u>T1021.004</u> | <u>T1021</u> | <u>T1574</u> | <u>T1059</u> |
| SSH | Remote Services | Hijack Execution Flow | Command and Scripting Interpreter |
| <u>T1027.004</u> | <u>T1027</u> | <u>T1496</u> | <u>T1562.004</u> |
| Compile After Delivery | Obfuscated Files or Information | Resource Hijacking | Disable or Modify System Firewall |

| <u>T1562</u> | <u>T1574.006</u> | <u>T1552.007</u> | <u>T1552</u> |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| Impair Defenses | Dynamic Linker Hijacking | Container API | Unsecured Credentials |
| <u>T1609</u> | <u>T1613</u> | <u>T1525</u> | <u>T1564.012</u> |
| Container Administration Command | Container and Resource Discovery | Implant Internal Image | File/Path Exclusions |
| <u>T1564</u> | <u>T1078</u> | | |
| Hide Artifacts | Valid Accounts | | |

X Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

| ТҮРЕ | VALUE | | |
|--------|---|--|--|
| SHA256 | 9d02707b895728b4229abd863aa6967d67cd8ce302b30dbcd946959 e719842ad, 700635abe402248ccf3ca339195b53701d989adb6e34c014b92909a2 a1d5a0ff, 2514e5233c512803eff99d4e16821ecc3b80cd5983e743fb25aa1bcc1 7c77c79, 6157a74926cfd66b959d036b1725a63c704b76af33f59591c15fbf8591 7f76fa, 6f426065e502e40da89bbc8295e9ca039f28b50e531b33293cee1928f d971936, 78ebc26741fc6bba0781c6743c0a3d3d296613cc8a2bce56ef46d9bf6 03c7264, e6985878b938bd1fba3e9ddf097ba1419ff6d77c3026abdd621504f5c 4186441, d99bd3a62188213894684d8f9b4f39dbf1453cc7707bac7f7b8f484d1 13534b0, 505237e566b9e8f4a83edbe45986bbe0e893c1ca4c5837c97c6c4700c fa0930a, e4c4400a4317a193f49c0c53888ec2f27e20b276c2e6ee1a5fd6eacf3f 2a0214, c5391314ce789ff28195858a126c8a10a4f9216e8bd1a8ef71d11c85c4 f5175c, 0af1b8cd042b6e2972c8ef43d98c0a0642047ec89493d315909629bcf 185dffd | | |

| ТҮРЕ | VALUE |
|---------|---|
| Domains | solscan[.]live, x[.]solscan[.]live |
| IPv4 | 164[.]68[.]106[.]96 |
| URLs | <pre>hxxp[://]192[.]155[.]94[.]199/sh/xmr[.]sh[.]sh, hxxp[://]45[.]9[.]148[.]35/aws, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/bin/64bit/xmrig, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/bin/pnscan_1[.]12+git20180612[.]orig[.]tar[.]gz, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/bin/xmr/x86_64, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/bin/xmrig, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/data/docker[.]container[.]local[.]spread[.]txt, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/data/docker[.]container[.]local[.]spread[.]txt, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/sdata/docker[.]container[.]local[.]spread[.]txt, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/san_threads[.]dat, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/sh/init[.]sh, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/sh/kube[.]lateral[.]sh, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/sh/search[.]sh, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/sh/spread_docker_local[.]sh, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/sh/spread_docker_local[.]sh, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/sh/spread_sh[.]sh, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/sh/spread_sh[.]sh, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/sh/spread_sh[.]sh, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/sh/spread_sh[.]sh, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/sh/spread_sh[.]sh, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/sh/spread_sh[.]sh, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/sh/xmr[.]sh[.]sh, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/sh/xmr[.]sh[.]sh, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/sh/xmr[.]sh[.]sh, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/up/kube_in[.]php?target=<ip address="">, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/up/kube_in[.]php?target=<ip address="">, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/up/kube_in[.]php?target=<ip address="">, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/up/kube_in[.]php?target=<ip address="">, hxxp[://]solscan[.]live/up/kube_in[.]php,</ip></ip></ip></ip></pre> |

Seferences

https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/threat-actors-leveraging-dockerswarm-kubernetes-mine-cryptocurrency/

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Contextualize

Uni5 Threat Exposure Management

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