

HiveForce Labs

# THREAT ADVISORY

 **ATTACK REPORT**

## **PEAKLIGHT Downloader the Stealthy Malware Living in Memory**

Date of Publication

August 26, 2024

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2024328

# Summary


**Malware:** PEAKLIGHT Downloader, Lumma Stealer, SHADOWLADDER (aka Hijack Loader, DOILoader, IDAT Loader), CryptBot

**Affected Platform:** Windows

**Targeted Region:** Worldwide

**Attack:** The PEAKLIGHT Downloader is an advanced and elusive malware designed to operate entirely in memory, making it exceptionally difficult to detect. This heavily obfuscated threat specifically targets Windows systems, intending to deploy information stealers and loaders.

## 🗡️ Attack Regions



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# Attack Details

## #1

The PEAKLIGHT Downloader is advanced, stealthy malware engineered to operate exclusively in memory. This PowerShell-based downloader is heavily obfuscated and programmed to search for specific hard-coded filenames on the targeted system, with the ultimate objective of deploying information stealers and loaders on Windows systems.

## #2

Notable malware strains distributed through this method include Lumma Stealer, SHADOWLADDER (also known as DOI Loader, IDAT Loader, or Hijack Loader), and CryptBot, all offered under the malware-as-a-service model. The infection chain typically begins when victims download pirated movies, where LNK files disguised as ZIP archives are embedded.

## #3

When the user opens the downloaded archive, expecting to access the movie, they inadvertently execute the LNK file, which connects to a content delivery network (CDN) hosting an obfuscated memory-only JavaScript dropper. This dropper then executes the PEAKLIGHT PowerShell downloader script.

## #4

Some variations of the LNK files use asterisks as wildcards to invoke the legitimate mshta.exe binary, covertly running malicious code retrieved from a remote server. The droppers are known to embed both hex-encoded and Base64-encoded PowerShell payloads.

## #5

Once active, the PEAKLIGHT Downloader connects to a remote Command and Control (C2) server, the attacker's command hub for issuing instructions and retrieving data. By storing the malware on a CDN and executing it directly in memory, the attack chain avoids leaving significant traces on the system's hard drive, thereby enhancing its ability to evade detection.

## Recommendations



**Enhance File Download Security:** Educate users about the risks of downloading pirated content and the potential for embedded malware. Implement web filtering solutions to block access to known malicious sites and file-sharing platforms.



**Strengthen Network Security Measures:** Implement network segmentation to limit the spread of malware within the network. Use firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDS) to monitor and block malicious traffic.



**Configure Application Whitelisting:** Apply application whitelisting policies to only allow approved applications and executables to run on systems. This can prevent unauthorized scripts or executables from being executed. Regularly review and update the whitelist to accommodate legitimate applications while blocking potentially harmful ones.



**Implement Machine Learning-Based Anomaly Detection:** Deploy machine learning models that analyze normal system behavior and identify deviations indicative of potential threats. These models can detect unusual patterns in network traffic, file access, and system processes. Continuously train and update the models with new data to improve their accuracy and reduce false positives.

## Potential **MITRE ATT&CK** TTPs

<b>TA0001</b> Initial Access	<b>TA0002</b> Execution	<b>TA0005</b> Defense Evasion	<b>TA0007</b> Discovery
<b>TA0011</b> Command and Control	<b>TA0010</b> Exfiltration	<b>T1057</b> Process Discovery	<b>T1083</b> File and Directory Discovery
<b>T1189</b> Drive-by Compromise	<b>T1059.001</b> PowerShell	<b>T1059</b> Command and Scripting Interpreter	<b>T1203</b> Exploitation for Client Execution
<b>T1041</b> Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	<b>T1071.001</b> Web Protocols	<b>T1105</b> Ingress Tool Transfer	<b>T1027</b> Obfuscated Files or Information
<b>T1574.007</b> Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable	<b>T1218</b> System Binary Proxy Execution	<b>T1218.005</b> Mshta	<b>T1518</b> Software Discovery

## Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
<b>URLs</b>	hxxps[:]//fatodex[.]b-cdn[.]net/fatodex, hxxps[:]//matodown[.]b-cdn[.]net/matodown, hxxps[:]//potexo[.]b-cdn[.]net/potexo, hxxp[:]//gceight8vt[.]top/upload[.]php, hxxps[:]//brewdogebar[.]com/code[.]vue, hxxp[:]//62[.]133[.]61[.]56/Downloads/Full%20Video%20HD%20(1080p)[.]lnk,

TYPE	VALUE
URLs	<p>           hxxps[:]//fatodex[.]b-cdn[.]net/K1[.]zip,            hxxps[:]//fatodex[.]b-cdn[.]net/K2[.]zip,            hxxps[:]//forikabrof[.]click/flkhfaiouwrqkxfasdrhfsa[.]png,            hxxps[:]//matodown[.]b-cdn[.]net/K1[.]zip,            hxxps[:]//matodown[.]b-cdn[.]net/K2[.]zip,            hxxps[:]//nextomax[.]b-cdn[.]net/L1[.]zip,            hxxps[:]//nextomax[.]b-cdn[.]net/L2[.]zip,            hxxps[:]//potexo[.]b-cdn[.]net/K1[.]zip,            hxxps[:]//potexo[.]b-cdn[.]net/K2[.]zip         </p>
Domains	<p>           relaxtionflouwerwi[.]shop,            deprivedrinkyfaiir[.]shop,            detailbaconroollyws[.]shop,            messtimetabledkolvk[.]shop,            considerrycurrentyws[.]shop,            understanndtytonyguw[.]shop,            patternapplauderw[.]shop,            horsedwollfedrwos[.]shop,            tropicalironexpressiw[.]shop         </p>
MD5	<p>           d6ea5dcdb2f88a65399f87809f43f83c,            307f40ebc6d8a207455c96d34759f1f3,            d8e21ac76b228ec144217d1e85df2693,            43939986a671821203bf9b6ba52a51b4,            58c4ba9385139785e9700898cb097538,            95361f5f264e58d6ca4538e7b436ab67,            b716a1d24c05c6adee11ca7388b728d3,            b15bac961f62448c872e1dc6d3931016,            e7c43dc3ec4360374043b872f934ec9e,            f98e0d9599d40ed032ff16de242987ca,            b6b8164feca728db02e6b636162a2960,            bb9641e3035ae8c0ab6117ecc82b65a1,            236c709bbcb92aa30b7e67705ef7f55a,            d7aff07e7cd20a5419f2411f6330f530,            a6c4d2072961e9a8c98712c46be588f8,            059d94e8944eca4056e92d60f7044f14,            dfdc331e575dae6660d6ed3c03d214bd,            47eee41b822d953c47434377006e01fe         </p>


## References

<https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/peaklight-decoding-stealthy-memory-only-malware/>

# What Next?

At Hive Pro, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

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