



Threat Level



HiveForce Labs

# THREAT ADVISORY



## ATTACK REPORT

### CoralRaider's Malware Campaign Distributing Stealers Via CDN Cache

Date of Publication

April 24, 2024

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2024161

# Summary

**Attack Began:** February 2024

**Attack Region:** U.S., Nigeria, Pakistan, Ecuador, Germany, Egypt, the U.K., Poland, the Philippines, Norway, Japan, Syria and Turkey

**Affected Industries:** Computer service call center organizations and civil defense service organizations

**Malware:** Cryptbot, LummaC2 and Rhadamanthys


**Actor:** CoralRaider

**Attack:** A persistent malware campaign has been distributing three distinct stealers—CryptBot, LummaC2, and Rhadamanthys. This campaign utilizes Content Delivery Network (CDN) cache sites to host its malicious payload. CoralRaider, a financially motivated threat actor known for targeting social network accounts and credentials, is believed to be behind this campaign.

## ☒ Attack Regions



CoralRaider



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# Attack Details

#1

An ongoing campaign involves a threat actor storing information-stealing malware in a content delivery network cache. This behavior has been attributed to a threat actor known as **CoralRaider** with a moderate degree of confidence. The hackers distribute information stealers such as LummaC2, Rhadamanthys, and Cryptbot.

#2

The infection chain begins when a victim opens a malicious shortcut file from a ZIP file, likely delivered via phishing emails. This Windows shortcut file contains an embedded PowerShell command that runs a malicious HTA file hosted on attacker-controlled CDN domains. The HTA file then executes an embedded JavaScript, which decodes and executes a PowerShell decrypter script. The PowerShell Loader script employs various techniques to evade detections and bypass UAC, ultimately downloading and executing payloads such as Cryptbot, LummaC2, or Rhadamanthys information stealer.

#3

The PowerShell loader script is a versatile tool that carries out multiple activities on a victim's machine. It drops a batch script into the victim's temporary folder, containing a PowerShell command to add the "ProgramData" folder to the Windows Defender exclusion list. This script is executed using a Living off the Land Binary (LoLBin) and a Programmatic Identifiers registry key, enabling it to bypass the victim's UAC.

#4

After downloading the payload onto the victim's machine, the PowerShell loader executes a function. It then updates the previously dropped batch file with new instructions. These instructions are designed to run the downloaded payload information stealer using the Windows "start" command. This ensures that the information stealer is executed and begins its malicious activities on the victim's system.

## Recommendations



**Remain Vigilant:** It is essential to remain cautious. Be wary of clicking on suspicious links or visiting untrusted websites, as they may contain malicious content. Exercise caution when opening emails or messages from unknown sources, as they could be part of phishing attempts.



**Network Segmentation:** Implement network segmentation to isolate critical infrastructure components from other systems. This can limit lateral movement for attackers and contain potential breaches.



**Robust Endpoint Security:** Deploy advanced endpoint security solutions that include real-time malware detection and behavioral analysis. Regularly update antivirus and anti-malware software to ensure the latest threat definitions are in place. A multi-layered approach to endpoint security can prevent malwares from infiltrating the network through vulnerable endpoints and can detect and block malicious activities effectively.



**Implement Behavioral Analysis:** Deploy advanced security solutions that employ behavioral analysis and anomaly detection to identify unusual patterns of activity indicative of malware presence. This proactive approach can help catch sophisticated threats before they fully compromise your systems.

## ✿ Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<b>TA0042</b> Resource Development	<b>TA0001</b> Initial Access	<b>TA0002</b> Execution	<b>TA0005</b> Defense Evasion
<b>TA0006</b> Credential Access	<b>TA0007</b> Discovery	<b>TA0010</b> Exfiltration	<b>TA0011</b> Command and Control
<b>T1218</b> System Binary Proxy Execution	<b>T1218.005</b> Mshta	<b>T1059</b> Command and Scripting Interpreter	<b>T1059.001</b> PowerShell
<b>T1059.006</b> Python	<b>T1059.007</b> JavaScript	<b>T1204</b> User Execution	<b>T1204.002</b> Malicious File
<b>T1104</b> Multi-Stage Channels	<b>T1566</b> Phishing	<b>T1566.001</b> Spearphishing Attachment	<b>T1566.002</b> Spearphishing Link
<b>T1112</b> Modify Registry	<b>T1083</b> File and Directory Discovery	<b>T1140</b> Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	<b>T1041</b> Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
<b>T1055</b> Process Injection	<b>T1036</b> Masquerading	<b>T1027</b> Obfuscated Files or Information	<b>T1608</b> Stage Capabilities
<b>T1608.001</b> Upload Malware	<b>T1548</b> Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	<b>T1548.002</b> Bypass User Account Control	<b>T1555</b> Credentials from Password Stores
<b>T1217</b> Browser Information Discovery	<b>T1105</b> Ingress Tool Transfer		

# ☒ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
SHA256	150dd450f343c7b1e3b2715eae3ed470c1c1fadf91f2048516315f150 0a58ffa, 74ea6e91c00baad0b77575740eb7f0fb5ad1d05dde8227dc1aa477e 179e62df, 3ae459746637e6f5536f3ba4158c822031578335505a512df3c31728 cac8f627, 88528be553f2a6f72e2ae0243ea907d5dcacd7c8777831b4c3ab2a67 128bc9b9, fd53383d85b39e68d817e39030aa2184764ab4de2d478b7e33afc39d d9661e96, e68c9aedfd080fe8e54b005482fcedb16f97caa6f7dcfb932c83b29597 c6d957, 8c732ec41550851cc933e635708820ec9202fddc69232ca4ed625d42 0aec3d86, 1942c417f2b71068fb4c1abb31bc77426bbe3513334cdaceaff360395 5830e21, 5ad73cf7e08b8c7bab0d96ba92607b8c9b22b61354052cf59df93b78 2b6e039b, a1f16ab97b9516e85c202ff00bd77b0b5e0e4ed29bfad28797fbbd0f2 5a8e0ae, 963ffc17565079705c924b8ab86d1c7018f5edc50ce8e810df3eebead 4e14e7f, 3b54d05ec98321980c1d71b89c42ff77a42f121e37f6ea54a6368a58c e1b1ad3, 934dc78ab89dd466b1a140954c6528b6a8591ca09a023616405cf71f af69f010, 305bf697e89e6eef59b0beef2b273a1daad174ebec238a67a6e80c5df 5ffffaf8, 31b4fd83c16bf7266c82a623998b0d7b54bb084b24a5cb71a2b5e9b1 7bb633dc, 5dc77655bddf8881b533e4db732dcf7ac5ebf3adad4be77ff226909a4 9bfc89b, 2ad94e492bc18e11f513a29968054e1a37df504ac577fd645e781e65 4f2730c9, 02e03904d09ccece4f71e34a4a6d0f1181471c4d17208ee6cfe940e11 e185018, eef156d681c4921cbcd720e6de257a69ad6a187e814037257977958 eb0c7604e, 6089c53ef2b0100fd91554c2a56aafaeea86b08c5ad0459fd66bd05a6 602a3ee, 7db78346dde71258ae1307b542d162a030c71031eebd0ed80816112 d82c008f0,

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## References


<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/suspected-coralraider-continues-to-expand-victimology-using-three-information-stealers/>

<https://www.hivepro.com/threat-advisory/coralraider-targeting-social-media-accounts-across-asia-for-financial-gain/>

# What Next?

At **Hive Pro**, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

Book a free demo with **HivePro Uni5**: Threat Exposure Management Platform.



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