



Threat Level



Amber

HiveForce Labs

THREAT ADVISORY



ATTACK REPORT

The Rise of NetSupport RAT Recent Infections and Sector Impact

Date of Publication

November 21, 2023

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2023469

Summary

First appeared: 2017

Attack Region: Worldwide

Threat Actor: TA569

Malware: NetSupport RAT

Targeted Industries: Education, Government, and Business Services

Attack: Threat actors exploit NetSupport Manager into a Remote Access Trojan (RAT), leading to a recent surge in infections across multiple sectors. The evolving attack chain involves deceptive website downloads, JavaScript payloads, and PowerShell commands, emphasizing the need for vigilant detection and response measures.

Attack Regions



TA569



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Attack Details

#1

In recent years, threat actors have repurposed the legitimate NetSupport Manager software, originally designed for remote systems management, into a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) to infiltrate systems and serve as a launchpad for subsequent attacks. Researchers have observed a notable increase, with over 15 new infections related to NetSupport RAT identified in recent weeks, predominantly affecting the Education, Government, and Business Services sectors.

#2

NetSupport Manager, initially developed for remote technical support, has been exploited due to its widespread availability and legitimate nature. Various malicious entities, including TA569, have incorporated this tool into their arsenals, making it susceptible to use by a spectrum of threat actors.

#3

The history of NetSupport Manager reveals its transformation from a legitimate tool to a RAT, notably used in the 2020 COVID-19 phishing campaign. The delivery mechanisms for NetSupport RAT include fraudulent updates, drive-by downloads, malware loaders like GhostPulse, and diverse phishing campaigns. Unlike older variants, recent NetSupport RAT iterations deviate from using older methods like .BAT and .VBS files.

#4

The attack chain involves victims being deceived into downloading a fake browser update from compromised websites. A JavaScript payload, such as Update_browser_10.6336.js, connects to external servers, invokes PowerShell for executing obfuscated commands, and establishes persistence on victim devices. Once installed, NetSupport RAT enables threat actors to monitor behavior, transfer files, manipulate settings, and move laterally within networks.

Recommendations



Regular Software Audits: Conduct regular audits of installed software to identify and remove any unauthorized or unnecessary applications. This includes scrutinizing remote management tools like NetSupport Manager to ensure they are used legitimately.



Enhanced Cybersecurity Measures: Implement robust cybersecurity measures, including up-to-date antivirus software, firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and secure network configurations. Regular security updates and patches for all software and operating systems should be applied promptly to mitigate vulnerabilities.



Endpoint Security: Deploy robust endpoint security solutions that include advanced threat detection capabilities. Ensure these solutions are regularly updated to recognize and mitigate emerging threats, such as new variants of NetSupport RAT.



Monitoring and Threat Detection: Employ advanced threat detection tools and continuously monitor networks for unusual or suspicious activities. This includes monitoring network traffic for any communication with domains resembling legitimate sites and identifying potentially malicious payloads.

Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<u>TA0010</u> Exfiltration	<u>TA0001</u> Initial Access	<u>TA0004</u> Privilege Escalation	<u>TA0005</u> Defense Evasion
<u>TA0007</u> Discovery	<u>TA0009</u> Collection	<u>TA0002</u> Execution	<u>TA0003</u> Persistence
<u>T1566</u> Phishing	<u>T1204</u> User Execution	<u>T1204.002</u> Malicious File	<u>T1059</u> Command and Scripting Interpreter
<u>T1059.001</u> PowerShell	<u>T1059.007</u> JavaScript	<u>T1055</u> Process Injection	<u>T1027</u> Obfuscated Files or Information

<u>T1041</u> Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	<u>T1074.001</u> Local Data Staging	<u>T1074</u> Data Staged	<u>T1547.001</u> Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
<u>T1547</u> Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	<u>T1057</u> Process Discovery	<u>T1566.002</u> Spearphishing Link	

✂ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
MD5	104b30fef04433a2d2fd1d5f99f179fe, 1b41e64c60ca9dfadeb063cd822ab089, 252dce576f9fbb9aaa7114dd7150f320, 34dfb87e4200d852d1fb45dc48f93cfc, 6fca49b85aa38ee016e39e14b9f9d6d9, a2b46c59f6e7e395d479b09464ecdba0, c94005d2dcd2a54e40510344e0bb9435, d3d39180e85700f72aaae25e40c125ff, eab603d12705752e3d268d86dff74ed4, f70b67c2b3204b7ddd8b755799cccf0, f838fdafd0881cf1e6040a07d78e840d
SHA1	01873977c871d3346d795cf7e3888685de9f0b16, 2a35456b2f67bd12905378beb6eaf373f6a0d0d1, 35b4e73fb7c8d4c3fefb90b7e7dc19f3e653c641, 55b4a1620c5d0113811242c20bd9870a1e31d542, 92c132307dd21189b6d7912ddd934b50e50d1ec1, a42e55e328d62d11e687c167bb7049d46f0f9b26, abfcd51bb120a7eae5bbd9a99624e4abe0c9139d, b0d689c70e91d5600ccc2a4e533ff89bf4ca388b, c07f0a02c284b697dff119839f455836be39d10e, ecb08e224a2f2772d1e53675bedc4b2c50485a41, f3404ef6322f5c6e7862b507d05b8f4b7f1c7d15
IPv4	5.252.177[.]111, 91.19.150[.]63, 91.219.150[.]64

TYPE	VALUE
SHA256	213af995d4142854b81af3cf73dee7ffe9d8ad6e84fda6386029101dbf3df897, 28208baa507b260c2df6637427de82ad0423c20e2bceceb92ba5d76074dcd347, 2d6c6200508c0797e6542b195c999f3485c4ef76551aa3c65016587788ba1703, 2e4bd5557aedd1743da5fab1b6995fbc447d6e9491d9ec59fa93ab889d8bccd1, 38684adb2183bf320eb308a96cdbde8d1d56740166c3e2596161f42a40fa32d5, 3c072532bf7674d0c5154d4d22a9d9c0173530c0d00f69911cdbc2552175d899, 46bb795f28ef33412b83542c88ef17d2a2a207ad3a927ecb4678b4ac9c5a05a5, 4bfa4c00414660ba44bddde5216a7f28aeccaa9e2d42df4bbff66db57c60522b, 54b920f5b87019fcf313bec4d9f4639a932b8268e5183b29804e91e29ed6f726, 60fe386112ad51f40a1ee9e1b15eca802ced174d7055341c491dee06780b3f92, 6795d760ce7a955df6c2f5a062e296128efdb8c908908eda4d666926980447ea, 89f0c8f170fe9ea28b1056517160e92e2d7d4e8aa81f4ed696932230413a6ce1, 8c9cd7a1ac6d4cbc641b31a3c55fde5e0e5a48c9bdaf71a59a2c4c9fd98ff9e7, 956b9fa960f913cce3137089c601f3c64cc24c54614b02bba62abb9610a985dd, b6b51f4273420c24ea7dc13ef4cc7615262ccbdf6f5e5a49dae604ec153055ad, c5c974b3315602ffaab9066aeaac3a55510db469b483cb85f6c591e948d16cfe, d96856cd944a9f1587907cacef974c0248b7f4210f1689c1e6bcac5fed289368, e3665d8c5030be81a6955965c2928564fe922b9a21f9e712580d04825fa0adf1, f4e2f28169e0c88b2551b6f1d63f8ba513feb15beacc43a82f626b93d673f56d, fc6f9dbdf4b9f8dd1f5f3a74cb6e55119d3fe2c9db52436e10ba07842e6c3d7c, fedd609a16c717db9bea3072bed41e79b564c4bc97f959208bfa52fb3c9fa814

TYPE	VALUE
URLs	hxxps://gamefllix[.]com/111, hxxps://gamefllix[.]com/111[.]php, hxxps://gamefllix[.]com/111[.]php?9279, hxxps://sdjfnvnbz[.]pw:443, hxxps://gamefllix[.]com/111[.]php[?]9279, hxxps://magydostravel[.]com/cdn/zwmrqgqanaww[.]php
Domains	arauas[.]com, gamefllix[.]com, gamefllix[.]com, implacavelvideos[.]com, kgscrew[.]com, magydostravel[.]com, sdjfnvnbz[.]pw

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
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What Next?

At Hive Pro, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

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November 21, 2023 • 4:30 AM

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