

HiveForce Labs

THREAT ADVISORY

**ATTACK REPORT**

North Korean APT's Covert Supply-Chain Ambush

Date of Publication

November 27, 2023

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2023478

Summary

Attack Began: March 2023


Threat Actor: Lazarus Group (aka Labyrinth Chollima, Guardians Of Peace, Zinc, Nickel Academy, Group 77, Hastati Group, Whois Hacking Team, Newromanic Cyber Army Team, Hidden Cobra, Appleworm, APT-C-26, Atk 3, Sectora01, ITG03, TA404, DEV-0139, Gods Apostles, Gods Disciples, UNC577, UNC2970, UNC4034, UNC4736, UNC4899, Diamond Sleet, Jade Sleet, TraderTraitor)

Attack Region: Worldwide

Targeted Industries: Government Organizations, Financial Institutions and Defense

Attack: There has been a significant increase in software supply chain attacks orchestrated by North Korean hackers. Notably, the MagicLine4NX and 3CX compromises gained attention, with the Lazarus hacking group employing a sophisticated approach. They leverage a zero-day vulnerability in the MagicLine4NX software to execute supply-chain attacks.

Attack Regions



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Attack Details

#1

In recent years, there has been a significant surge in software supply chain attacks orchestrated by North Korean hackers. Notably, the compromises involving MagicLine4NX and **3CX** gained traction in March 2023. The **Lazarus** hacking group from North Korea employs a sophisticated approach, leveraging a zero-day vulnerability within the MagicLine4NX software to execute supply-chain attacks.

#2

Lazarus's modus operandi involves exploiting vulnerabilities in security authentication and network-linked systems sequentially to illicitly access a target organization's intranet. The initial breach entails exploiting a software vulnerability in the MagicLine4NX security authentication program to infiltrate a target's internet-connected computer.

#3

Subsequently, a zero-day vulnerability in the network-linked system is exploited to traverse laterally, thereby gaining unauthorized access to sensitive information. The offensive maneuver initiates with the compromise of a media outlet's website, where malicious scripts are embedded into an article, creating an avenue for a 'watering hole' attack. This attack, codenamed 'Dream Magic,' specifically impacts versions preceding 1.0.0.26.

#4

A cyber assault on **CyberLink** orchestrated by the Lazarus hacking group involved the exploitation of a supply chain vulnerability. This tactic facilitated the dissemination of trojanized CyberLink installers, which bore digital signatures, ultimately resulting in the compromise of at least one hundred computers with the 'LambLoad' malware.

#5

Consistently, state-backed North Korean hacking operations employ supply chain attacks and capitalize on zero-day vulnerabilities as integral components of their cyber warfare strategies. These tactics are strategically employed to target specific companies, whether for cyber espionage, financial fraud, or cryptocurrency theft.

Recommendations



Vet Third-Party Software: Given the exploitation of legitimate software in their attacks, organizations must diligently vet and monitor third-party software components, especially those used in critical systems. This process involves assessing the reputation and security practices of software providers, as well as evaluating the authenticity of their digital signatures.



Anomaly Detection: Implement anomaly detection algorithms to identify deviations from normal network behavior. This includes monitoring network traffic, system logs, and user activities for any unusual patterns.



Zero-Trust Architecture: Consider adopting a zero-trust architecture, where no device or user is inherently trusted, and verification is required from everyone trying to access resources. This approach can limit the lateral movement within a compromised network.



Enhance Endpoint Security: Deploy advanced endpoint security solutions, such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, to identify and respond to malicious activities promptly. Keep security software, including antivirus and endpoint protection, up to date to defend against known threats.

Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<u>TA0001</u> Initial Access	<u>TA0002</u> Execution	<u>TA0003</u> Persistence	<u>TA0004</u> Privilege Escalation
<u>TA0005</u> Defense Evasion	<u>TA0007</u> Discovery	<u>TA0008</u> Lateral Movement	<u>TA0011</u> Command and Control
<u>TA0010</u> Exfiltration	<u>T1190</u> Exploit Public-Facing Application	<u>T1129</u> Shared Modules	<u>T1027</u> Obfuscated Files or Information
<u>T1036</u> Masquerading	<u>T1563</u> Remote Service Session Hijacking	<u>T1112</u> Modify Registry	<u>T1056</u> Input Capture
<u>T1012</u> Query Registry	<u>T1018</u> Remote System Discovery	<u>T1082</u> System Information Discovery	<u>T1518.001</u> Security Software Discovery
<u>T1071</u> Application Layer Protocol	<u>T1095</u> Non-Application Layer Protocol	<u>T1105</u> Ingress Tool Transfer	<u>T1588.006</u> Vulnerabilities
<u>T1573</u> Encrypted Channel	<u>T1041</u> Exfiltration Over C2 Channel		

✂ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
MD5	316c088874a5dfb8b8c1c4b259329257, 33ca34605e8077047e30e764f5182df0, d5101c3b86d973a848ab7ed79cd11e5a, 660ea9b8205fbd2da59fef26ae5115c, 5faf36ca90f6406a78124f538a03387a
URLs	hxxps[:]//msstorageazure[.]com/analysis, hxxps[:]//officestoragebox[.]com/api/biosync, hxxps[:]//visualstudiofactory[.]com/groupcore, hxxps[:]//azuredeploystore[.]com/cloud/images, hxxps[:]//msstorageboxes[.]com/xbox, hxxps[:]//officeaddons[.]com/quality, hxxps[:]//sourcelabs[.]com/status, hxxps[:]//zacharryblogs[.]com/xmlquery, hxxps[:]//pbxcloudeservices[.]com/network, hxxps[:]//pbxphonenetwork[.]com/phone, hxxps[:]//akamaitechcloudservices[.]com/v2/fileapi, hxxps[:]//azureonlinestorage[.]com/google/storage, hxxps[:]//msedgepackageinfo[.]com/ms-webview, hxxps[:]//glcloudservice[.]com/v1/status, hxxps[:]//pbxsources[.]com/queue, hxxps[:]//sbmsa[.]wiki/blog/_insert,
Domains	msstorageazure[.]com, officestoragebox[.]com, visualstudiofactory[.]com, azuredeploystore[.]com, msstorageboxes[.]com, officeaddons[.]com, sourcelabs[.]com, zacharryblogs[.]com, pbxcloudeservices[.]com, pbxphonenetwork[.]com, akamaitechcloudservices[.]com, azureonlinestorage[.]com, msedgepackageinfo[.]com, glcloudservice[.]com, pbxsources[.]com, sbmsa[.]wiki
SHA1	3dc840d32ce86cebf657b17cef62814646ba8e98, 769383fc65d1386dd141c960c9970114547da0c2, 9e9a5f8d86356796162cee881c843cde9eaedfb3

TYPE	VALUE
SHA256	e6bbc33815b9f20b0cf832d7401dd893fbc467c800728b5891336706da0dbcec, a64fa9f1c76457ecc58402142a8728ce34ccba378c17318b3340083eeb7acc67, 6c121f2b2efa6592c2c22b29218157ec9e63f385e7a1d7425857d603ddef8c59s

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
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