

HiveForce Labs

THREAT ADVISORY

**ATTACK REPORT**

Mirai Botnet's Offspring InfectedSlurs Exploits Dual Zero-Days

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November 24, 2023

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Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2023476

Summary

Attack Began: October 2023


Malware: InfectedSlurs, JenX Mirai

Attack Region: Worldwide

Affected Products: QNAP VioStor NVR, FXC AE1021, AE1021PE

Attack: A new Mirai-based malware botnet, InfectedSlurs, is actively conducting a sophisticated campaign by exploiting two zero-day remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities in routers and video recorder (NVR) devices. These vulnerabilities, currently being exploited in the wild, facilitate the creation of a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) botnet.

🗡️ Attack Regions



⚙️ CVEs

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CVE	NAME	AFFECTED PRODUCT	ZERO -DAY	CISA KEV	PATCH
CVE-2023-49897	FXC OS command injection vulnerability	FXC AE1021 & AE1021PE version 2.0.9 and earlier	✓	✓	✓
CVE-2023-47565	QNAP VioStor OS command injection vulnerability	QVR Firmware 4.x	✓	✓	✓

Attack Details

#1

A recently discovered malware botnet named 'InfectedSlurs' is actively conducting a sophisticated campaign, leveraging two zero-day remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities to compromise routers and video recorder (NVR) devices. These vulnerabilities, currently being exploited in the wild, serve as channels for establishing a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) botnet.

#2

The malware seizes control of infected devices, incorporating them into its DDoS swarm, presumably for lucrative rental purposes. InfectedSlurs first emerged in late October 2023, with details of the vulnerabilities deliberately withheld to provide implicated vendors an opportunity to release patches and preempt potential exploitation by other malicious entities.

#3

The campaign began with initial low-frequency probes utilizing authentication via POST requests, followed by a subsequent command injection attempt. The threat actor exploits RCE flaws in QNAP VioStor and FXC firmware to gain authenticated access by modifying the device's NTP settings.

#4

The botnet's command-and-control (C2) servers and hard-coded strings align with a JenX [Mirai](#) malware variant revealed in January 2018. The C2 infrastructure demonstrates concentration and appears to support hailBot operations. Significantly, the attack mechanisms closely resemble those of the original Mirai botnet. Like Mirai, InfectedSlurs lacks a persistence mechanism. A temporary disruption of the botnet can be achieved by rebooting NVR and router devices.

Recommendations



Apply Official Fixes Immediately: For optimal security, it is strongly advised to promptly implement the following official fixes: update the FXC firmware to version 2.0.10, perform a factory reset, and modify the default password. Additionally, QNAP recommends that users download and apply the latest QVR Firmware, as both QVR Firmware 5.x and 4.x have reached end-of-life status according to QNAP's official statement.



Temporary Disruption Measures: Consider implementing temporary disruption measures for the affected devices. Rebooting NVR and router devices, as suggested, can serve as a short-term preventive measure until a patch is applied.



Continuous Monitoring of C2 Infrastructure: Given the concentration of InfectedSlurs' command-and-control (C2) servers, organizations should continuously monitor and block connections to these servers. This proactive approach can disrupt the botnet's communication channels and limit its effectiveness.



Anomaly Detection: Implement anomaly detection algorithms to identify deviations from normal network behavior. This includes monitoring network traffic, system logs, and user activities for any unusual patterns.



Vulnerability Management: This involves regularly assessing and updating software to address known vulnerabilities. Maintain an inventory of software versions and security patches, and evaluate the security practices of third-party vendors, especially for critical applications and services.

Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<u>TA0042</u> Resource Development	<u>TA0001</u> Initial Access	<u>TA0002</u> Execution	<u>TA0003</u> Persistence
<u>TA0004</u> Privilege Escalation	<u>TA0005</u> Defense Evasion	<u>TA0007</u> Discovery	<u>TA0011</u> Command and Control
<u>TA0040</u> Impact	<u>T1059</u> Command and Scripting Interpreter	<u>T1203</u> Exploitation for Client Execution	<u>T1659</u> Content Injection
<u>T1583.005</u> Botnet	<u>T1588.006</u> Vulnerabilities	<u>T1543</u> Create or Modify System Process	<u>T1574</u> Hijack Execution Flow
<u>T1046</u> Network Service Discovery	<u>T1105</u> Ingress Tool Transfer	<u>T1499</u> Endpoint Denial of Service	

✂ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
Domains	infectedchink[.]cat, opewu[.]homes, wu[.]qwewu[.]site, dfvzfvd[.]help, husd8uasd9[.]online, homehitter[.]tk, shetoldmeshewas12[.]oss, shetoldmeshewas12[.]geek, shetoldmeshewas12[.]pirate, shetoldmeshewas12[.]dyn, shetoldmeshewas12[.]libre, shetoldmeshewas12[.]gopher, shetoldmeshewas12[.]parody, shetoldmeshewas13[.]oss, shetoldmeshewas13[.]geek, shetoldmeshewas13[.]pirate, shetoldmeshewas13[.]dyn, shetoldmeshewas13[.]libre, shetoldmeshewas13[.]gopher, shetoldmeshewas13[.]parody, hujunxa[.]cc, skid[.]uno, dogeating[.]monster, chinkona[.]buzz, dogeatingchink[.]uno, infectedchink[.]cat, infectedchink[.]online, sdfsd[.]xyz, gottalovethe[.]indy, pqahzam[.]ink, cooldockmantoo[.]men, chinks-eat-dogs[.]africa, cnc[.]kintaro[.]cc, fuckmy[.]site, fuckmy[.]store, hbakun[.]geek, ksarpo[.]parody, rwziag[.]pirate, metbez[.]gopher, rmdtqq[.]libre,

TYPE	VALUE
Domains	pektbo[.]libre, mqcgb[.]gopher, cbdgy[.]pirate, czbrwa[.]geek, edrnhe[.]oss, hfoddy[.]dyn, fawzpp[.]indy, hxqytk[.]geek, iaxtpa[.]parody, mfszki[.]gopher, qhedy[.]oss, wnisyi[.]libre, asdjjasdhioasdia[.]online, jiggaboojones[.]tech
SHA256	dabdd4b5a3a70c64c031126fad36a4c45feb69a45e1028d79da6b443 291adb8, 3f3c2e779f8e3d7f2cc81536ef72d96dd1c7b7691b6e613f5f76c3d029 09edd8, 75ef686859010d6164bcd6a4d6cf8a590754ccc3ea45c47ace420b026 49ec380, f8abf9fb17f59cbd7381aa9f5f2e1952628897cee368defd6baa6885d7 4f3ecc, 8777f9af3564b109b43cbcf1fd1a24180f5cf424965050594ce73d754a 4e1099, ac43c52b42b123e2530538273dfb12e3b70178aa1dee6d4fd5198c08 bfeb4dc1, a4975366f0c5b5b52fb371ff2cb034006955b3e3ae064e5700cc5365f 27a1d26, cd93264637cd3bf19b706afc19944dfb88cd27969aaf0077559e56842 d9a0f87, 8e64de3ac6818b4271d3de5d8e4a5d166d13d12804da01ce1cdb751 0d8922cc6, 35fcc2058ae3a0af68c5ed7452e57ff286abe6ded68bf59078abd9e7b 11ea90a, 7cc62a1bb2db82e76183eb06e4ca84e07a78cfb71241f21212afd1e01 cb308b2, 29f11b5d4dbd6d06d4906b9035f5787e16f9e23134a2cc43dfc11651 27c89bff, cfbcbb876064c2cf671bdae61544649fa13debbbe58b72cf8c630b5bfc 0649f9, a3b78818bbef4fd55f704c96c203765b5ab37723bc87aac6aa7ebfcc7 6dfa06d, ac43c52b42b123e2530538273dfb12e3b70178aa1dee6d4fd5198c08 bfeb4dc1
IPv4	45.142.182[.]96

Patch Details

Update the FXC firmware to 2.0.10, perform a factory reset, and change the default password.

Link:

<https://www.fxc.jp/form/certify/>

Update the QVR Firmware to 5.x and later

Link:

<https://www.qnap.com/en/download>

References

<https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/new-rce-botnet-spreads-mirai-via-zero-days>

<https://www.fxc.jp/news/20231206>

<https://www.qnap.com/en/security-advisory/qa-23-48>

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
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