

Threat Level

# HiveForce Labs THREAT ADVISORY



Hackers Employ Updated Ducktail to Target Indian Marketers

**Date of Publication** 

Admiralty Code

TA Number TA2023459

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# Summary

First appeared: March and early October 2023 Attack Region: India Targeted Industry: Marketing Malware: Ducktail Attack: The threat actors linked to the Ducktail stealer malware have been implicated in a new campaign that focused on marketing professionals in India. The primary goal

in a new campaign that focused on marketing professionals in India. The primary goal of this campaign was to compromise and gain control of Facebook business accounts. Notably, this campaign diverged from previous ones by utilizing Delphi as the programming language instead of .NET applications.



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THREAT ADVISORY • ATTACK REPORT (Amber)

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### **Attack Details**

The threat actors associated with the Ducktail stealer malware have been identified in a new campaign that took place from March to early October 2023. This campaign specifically targeted marketing professionals in India, with the objective of compromising and taking control of Facebook business accounts.

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In the Ducktail attacks, the infostealer propagated by masquerading as documents related to projects and products of well-known companies and brands. A distinctive feature of this campaign was the use of Delphi as the programming language, deviating from the previous approach that relied on .NET applications.

In the Ducktail attacks, the attackers primarily utilized sponsored ads on Facebook to disseminate malicious ads and deploy malware. The malware is capable of extracting victims' login cookies, ultimately enabling the attackers to take control of their accounts. In this campaign, individuals seeking a career change are targeted, receiving archive files containing a malicious executable. The binary is disguised with a PDF icon to deceive users into launching it.

Upon launching the malicious file, it saves a PowerShell script named param.ps1 and a decoy PDF document locally in the "C:\Users\Public" folder on Windows. The script then utilizes the default PDF viewer on the device to open the decoy, introduces a five-minute pause, and subsequently terminates the Chrome browser process. Additionally, the parent executable downloads and executes a rogue library named libEGL.dll.

#5

In the next stage, the browser's LNK shortcut file is modified by appending a command line switch to initiate a rogue extension. This extension disguises itself as the authentic Google Docs Offline add-on to avoid detection. Its purpose is to transmit information about all open tabs to a server controlled by the threat actor and subsequently hijack the targeted Facebook business accounts.

### Recommendations



**Remain vigilant:** It is essential to remain cautious. Be wary of clicking on suspicious links or visiting untrusted websites, as they may contain malicious content. Exercise caution when opening emails or messages from unknown sources, as they could be part of phishing attempts.



**Robust Endpoint Security:** Deploy advanced endpoint security solutions that include real-time malware detection and behavioral analysis. Regularly update antivirus and anti-malware software to ensure the latest threat definitions are in place. A multi-layered approach to endpoint security can prevent malwares from infiltrating the network through vulnerable endpoints and can detect and block malicious activities effectively.

#### Potential <u>MITRE ATT&CK</u> TTPs

TA0043 Reconnaissance	TA0042 Resource Development	TA0001 Initial Access	TA0002 Execution
TA0003 Persistence	TA0005 Defense Evasion	TA0006 Credential Access	TA0011 Command and Control
TA0010 Exfiltration	<u><b>T1589</b></u> Gather Victim Identity Information	T1598 Phishing for Information	T1598.002 Spearphishing Attachment
T1583 Acquire Infrastructure	<u><b>T1583.001</b></u> Domains	<u><b>T1566</b></u> Phishing	T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
T1176 Browser Extensions	T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter	<u><b>T1059.001</b></u> PowerShell	T1129 Shared Modules
T1204 User Execution	T1204.002 Malicious File	<b>T1539</b> Steal Web Session Cookie	<b>T1027</b> Obfuscated Files or Information
<b>T1071</b> Application Layer Protocol	T1071.001 Web Protocols	<u><b>T1132</b></u> Data Encoding	T1132.001 Standard Encoding
<b>T1041</b> Exfiltration Over C2 Channel			

#### **X** Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

ТҮРЕ	VALUE
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	69257876e2ec5bdbe7114d6ce209f13afbfddb2af0006a6d17e6e915789 66870,
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	bdf8dea28f91adcba7780a26951abc9c32a4a8c205f3207fd4f349f6db29 0da7,
	d4f10bd162ee77f4778ecc156921f5949cd2d64aab45b31d6050f446e59 aed5a,
	bdf8dea28f91adcba7780a26951abc9c32a4a8c205f3207fd4f349f6db29 0da7

ТҮРЕ	VALUE
Domains	dauhetdau[.]com, motdanvoi20232023[.]com, voiconprivatesv2083[.]com, cavoisatthu2023asd[.]com

#### **Seferences**

https://securelist.com/ducktail-fashion-week/111017/

https://www.hivepro.com/threat-advisory/ducktail-targets-the-digital-marketers-withmalicious-operations/

## What Next?

At **<u>Hive Pro</u>**, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

Book a free demo with <u>HivePro Uni5</u>: Threat Exposure Management Platform.

#### Contextualize

Uni5 Threat Exposure Management

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Resolve

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