



Threat Level

 **Amber**

HiveForce Labs

# THREAT ADVISORY

 **ATTACK REPORT**

## Unveiling Operation Jacana: Targeting the Guyana Government with DinodasRAT

Date of Publication

October 6, 2023

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2023400

# Summary

**First appeared:** February 2023

**Malware:** DinodasRAT


**Attack Region:** Guyana

**Targeted Industry:** Government

**Affected Platform:** Windows

**Attack:** A cyber espionage campaign named Operation Jacana was identified in February 2023, targeting a government entity in Guyana. This campaign began with a spear-phishing attack and resulted in the deployment of a C++-based implant called DinodasRAT.

## Attack Regions



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# Attack Details

## #1

A new malware threat known as "DinodasRAT" has emerged, following its use in a targeted cyber-espionage operation named Operation Jacana against a governmental organization in Guyana.

## #2

The Operation Jacana campaign initiated with highly targeted spear-phishing emails that alluded to recent developments in Guyanese public and political matters. Following the initial compromise achieved through these spear-phishing emails, the attackers then proceeded to conduct lateral movement within the victim's internal network.

## #3

To extract sensitive data, the threat actors leveraged a previously unreported backdoor known as DinodasRAT. In these spear-phishing emails, recipients were directed to click on a link, which, when accessed, triggered the download of a ZIP file from a compromised Vietnamese government website. This ZIP file contained malware samples. When the victim opened the ZIP file, their system became infected with the DinodasRAT malware.

## #4

DinodasRAT employs the Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) to encrypt the data it transmits to the command-and-control (C2) server. Additionally, DinodasRAT possesses a range of functionalities, including the ability to exfiltrate system metadata, files, manipulate Windows registry keys, and execute commands.

## #5

In addition to DinodasRAT, the attackers employed other tools during the intrusion, including Korplug and the SoftEther VPN client. These additional tools have raised suspicions that the operation may be connected to China-aligned threat operators.

# Recommendations



**Email Security:** Implement robust email filtering to counteract spam, phishing, and malicious attachments, and exercise caution with unverified links and email attachments by validating their authenticity before opening.



**Endpoint Security:** Implement robust endpoint security solutions that encompass antivirus and anti-malware software. Keep these security tools up-to-date to ensure comprehensive defense against emerging threats.



**Network Segmentation:** Implement proper network segmentation to limit the lateral movement of malware within the network. By dividing the network into smaller, isolated segments, organizations can prevent it from accessing critical systems and sensitive data.

## Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

|  |   |   |  |
|--|---|---|--|
| <u><b>TA0042</b></u><br>Resource Development     | <u><b>TA0001</b></u><br>Initial Access    | <u><b>TA0002</b></u><br>Execution             | <u><b>TA0005</b></u><br>Defense Evasion                  |
| <u><b>TA0003</b></u><br>Persistence              | <u><b>TA0006</b></u><br>Credential Access | <u><b>TA0007</b></u><br>Discovery             | <u><b>TA0009</b></u><br>Collection                       |
| <u><b>TA0011</b></u><br>Command and Control      | <u><b>TA0010</b></u><br>Exfiltration      | <u><b>T1583</b></u><br>Acquire Infrastructure | <u><b>T1583.003</b></u><br>Virtual Private Server        |
| <u><b>T1587</b></u><br>Develop Capabilities      | <u><b>T1587.001</b></u><br>Malware        | <u><b>T1608</b></u><br>Stage Capabilities     | <u><b>T1608.001</b></u><br>Upload Malware                |
| <u><b>T1584</b></u><br>Compromise Infrastructure | <u><b>T1584.004</b></u><br>Server         | <u><b>T1588</b></u><br>Obtain Capabilities    | <u><b>T1588.001</b></u><br>Malware                       |
| <u><b>T1588.002</b></u><br>Tool                  | <u><b>T1566</b></u><br>Phishing           | <u><b>T1566.002</b></u><br>Spearphishing Link | <u><b>T1059</b></u><br>Command and Scripting Interpreter |

|   |   |   |  |
|---|---|---|--|
| <b><u>T1059.001</u></b><br>PowerShell                 | <b><u>T1059.003</u></b><br>Windows Command Shell        | <b><u>T1059.005</u></b><br>Visual Basic             | <b><u>T1106</u></b><br>Native API                              |
| <b><u>T1204</u></b><br>User Execution                 | <b><u>T1204.001</u></b><br>Malicious Link               | <b><u>T1204.002</u></b><br>Malicious File           | <b><u>T1140</u></b><br>Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information |
| <b><u>T1036</u></b><br>Masquerading                   | <b><u>T1036.007</u></b><br>Double File Extension        | <b><u>T1070</u></b><br>Indicator Removal            | <b><u>T1070.004</u></b><br>File Deletion                       |
| <b><u>T1564</u></b><br>Hide Artifacts                 | <b><u>T1564.001</u></b><br>Hidden Files and Directories | <b><u>T1078</u></b><br>Valid Accounts               | <b><u>T1078.002</u></b><br>Domain Accounts                     |
| <b><u>T1053</u></b><br>Scheduled Task/Job             | <b><u>T1003</u></b><br>OS Credential Dumping            | <b><u>T1003.003</u></b><br>NTDS                     | <b><u>T1083</u></b><br>File and Directory Discovery            |
| <b><u>T1012</u></b><br>Query Registry                 | <b><u>T1057</u></b><br>Process Discovery                | <b><u>T1007</u></b><br>System Service Discovery     | <b><u>T1082</u></b><br>System Information Discovery            |
| <b><u>T1115</u></b><br>Clipboard Data                 | <b><u>T1113</u></b><br>Screen Capture                   | <b><u>T1573</u></b><br>Encrypted Channel            | <b><u>T1573.001</u></b><br>Symmetric Cryptography              |
| <b><u>T1095</u></b><br>Non-Application Layer Protocol | <b><u>T1132</u></b><br>Data Encoding                    | <b><u>T1041</u></b><br>Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |  |

## ✂ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

| TYPE        | VALUE   |
|-------------|---|
| <b>SHA1</b> | 599EA9B26581EBC7B4BDFC02E6C792B6588B751E,<br>8BDC8FA3E398733F50F8572D04172CD4B9765BBC,<br>9C660AC9E32AD853CAAA995F5FC112E281D8520A,<br>6022383243927CAFC74D8DC937423DBED2A170B8,<br>B2B86DDA48A109EDD932B460649F60F505D5D71C,<br>EFD1387BB272FFE75EC9BF5C1DD614356B6D40B5,<br>9343E9716933382DA172124803F5463A8454E347, |

| TYPE             | VALUE  |
|------------------|--|
| <b>SHA1</b>      | C92DAC928D70EDED7D52CB1347850AA422CEA817,<br>FFBA119D86688AFC098109E08811F67A6E5DECDA,<br>9A6E803A28D27462D2DF47B52E34120FB2CF814B,<br>33065850B30A7C797A9F1E5B219388C6991674DB,<br>6129E37412AFEAFFEE47ECEB4C52094EE185E6768,<br>010451191D8556DCF65C7187BE9579E99323F74D   |
| <b>IPv4</b>      | 23.106.122[.]5,<br>23.106.122[.]46,<br>23.106.123[.]166,<br>42.119.111[.]97,<br>115.126.98[.]204,<br>118.99.6[.]202,<br>199.231.211[.]19   |
| <b>Filenames</b> | President Mohamed Irfaan Ali's Official Visit to Nassau, The Bahamas.doc.exe,<br>client.exe,<br>tools.exe,<br>Client.exe,<br>windowsupdate.exe,<br>people.zip,<br>lass.exe,<br>2.dll,<br>1.dll,<br>President Mohamed Irfaan Ali's Official Visit to Nassau, The Bahamas.exe,<br>114.exe,<br>hh.hsnx,<br>COTED_Att. I to Sav. 230 (Draft Agenda).docx.exe |
| <b>Domains</b>   | `fta.moit.gov[.]vn,<br>update.microsoft-settings[.]com   |

## References


<https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/operation-jacana-spying-guyana-entity/>

[https://github.com/eset/malware-ioc/tree/master/operation\\_jacana](https://github.com/eset/malware-ioc/tree/master/operation_jacana)

# What Next?

At **Hive Pro**, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

Book a free demo with **HivePro Uni5**: Threat Exposure Management Platform.



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