

HiveForce Labs

THREAT ADVISORY

 **ATTACK REPORT**

LummaC Stealer Enlists Amadey Bot to Unleash SectopRAT

Date of Publication

August 16, 2023

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2023332


Summary

Malware: LummaC Stealer (aka LummaC2 Stealer), Amadey Bot, and SectopRAT (aka 1xxbot, ArechClient)

Attack Region: Worldwide

Attack: A fresh approach to spreading SectopRAT has surfaced. This method involves distributing the SectopRAT payload by utilizing the Amadey bot, which is sourced from the LummaC stealer.

Attack Regions



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Attack Details

#1

A novel methodology for disseminating SectopRAT has emerged. This strategy involves distributing the SectopRAT payload by harnessing the Amadey bot sourced from the LummaC stealer (aka LummaC2). The propagation of the LummaC Stealer has occurred through tactics such as phishing websites, enclosed ZIP archives masquerading as legitimate software sources, and targeted spear-phishing emails.

#2

There are two different folders within a ZIP archive: "Common Files" and "HMService." These directories hold various legitimate DLL files, and the archive contains an executable named "Setup.exe." Notably, this "Setup.exe" acts as the central payload for the LummaC Stealer executable. After being successfully installed on a chosen target system, the LummaC Stealer carries out hidden operations to gather essential system details. Following this collection, the obtained data is encrypted and sent to the designated C&C server.


#3

Furthermore, the LummaC Stealer facilitates the retrieval of the Amadey bot, a 32-bit GUI-based .NET Reactor executable malware. The Amadey bot generates an LNK file strategically placed within the startup folder to ensure enduring persistence. As it operates, the Amadey bot establishes communication with its specified C&C server, periodically sending thorough system data while requesting instructions.

#4

The Amadey bot's defining feature is its ability to deliver auxiliary payloads, such as the SectopRAT, to compromised computer systems. SectopRAT (aka Arechclient,1xxbot) operates as a meticulously crafted Remote Access Trojan (RAT) developed using the .NET compiler, fortified with Anti-VM and Anti-Emulator mechanisms. When activated, the SectopRAT initiates its process of scanning directories, extracting vital information from various cryptocurrency wallets such as Atomic, Exodus, Electrum, and Daedalus Mainnet.

Recommendations



It is advisable to utilize robust email filtering solutions, as these tools have the capability to detect and prevent spam, phishing attempts, and harmful emails. Additionally, it is recommended to exercise caution when engaging with links and attachments from sources that are unfamiliar or untrusted.



Configure network infrastructure devices such as firewalls and routers with strict security specifications. Use application whitelisting or control mechanisms to only allow authorized applications to run on systems.

Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<u>TA0001</u> Initial Access	<u>TA0002</u> Execution	<u>TA0003</u> Persistence	<u>TA0004</u> Privilege Escalation
<u>TA0005</u> Defense Evasion	<u>TA0006</u> Credential Access	<u>TA0007</u> Discovery	<u>TA0009</u> Collection
<u>TA0011</u> Command and Control	<u>T1204</u> User Execution	<u>T1047</u> Windows Management Instrumentation	<u>T1547</u> Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
<u>T1547.001</u> Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	<u>T1055</u> Process Injection	<u>T1497</u> Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	<u>T1027</u> Obfuscated Files or Information
<u>T1562</u> Impair Defenses	<u>T1027.002</u> Software Packing	<u>T1140</u> Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	<u>T1620</u> Reflective Code Loading
<u>T1003</u> OS Credential Dumping	<u>T1056</u> Input Capture	<u>T1057</u> Process Discovery	<u>T1012</u> Query Registry
<u>T1082</u> System Information Discovery	<u>T1083</u> File and Directory Discovery	<u>T1518.001</u> Security Software Discovery	<u>T1005</u> Data from Local System
<u>T1071</u> Application Layer Protocol	<u>T1573</u> Encrypted Channel	<u>T1105</u> Ingress Tool Transfer	<u>T1566.001</u> Spearphishing Attachment

✂ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
MD5	507bddfabd74a3d024b2ad5f67d666ea, 952d825a264745bb52b6977ba5983568, f290ed868caae994bbfae1b63aca1d28
SHA1	78eac92e0040e033406e6786b58b8a367fe171fa, 627a0a841c2fe194dd54f9ec6b0c1231d7da135f, 5ac7b60e56281dc0c72f7c1125b165867df56ed9
SHA256	f85d8adf012c96a63fcb989b8b0e71894b12b769ce78f6a62064a40029 54b144, d35d55bb74a7cf4349e2fa4a92839e2a88f17a1fee9725801d0d97b2bf0 d311c, 501444c9d25c15ca62baf062b6bb8a3b3f69f0ca13aff057e3b8b1a059 5f3a4, ca21c5b129c001c2b51359d5f74c0a99667028810623b779190b13f0de 86369e, 929f7b467d96d8d9c73bfa9b8adf758c1b3993c9438f23368c69e1201b eea622, 515ab212127cc722326043d77dda60943145798bfe8b17178937a2549 89367f1, 0d8dee5e24500219f037e673324479f22cc5649c2aafdfe47b35375b6b 76e60b, e0ac5909e219d4527691ea695185313376a0ccb075907b1deecd4e2ae ae42cba, 9252e999b76b9628ad0942df2649e1203ca078d1b45dab6a8f1ede3e2 2b99625, 51cb8641ed75c5037fa657ed2aa33c71350e01f5f949054f17582ca41c2 60280, f819a1d2234c2755a8dc844f89e765de56c1c927f3964a1453961cec4fd 38bae, 0539d46a6e61dd3ce32a4b41c0554f925f4b26054c49451acce7ccad0 409846, 2c256a4a1ac022bcd3784d19e66934056015e20b49d58238ce4f3dfb37 bfd98d, a3ceda3ef0a7b72145124def334dd3fa337614a1170960826016996151 188fc5, 033cafb9fcd3d50d858164c117ee2a1c9e7fe95b4d027315bc9d1186e6 55d583, 81f4e0d6a70f14c3e07241196bd7f5318e302c28c64ca4bb876f4e25fbc 3e5d2, ffd45c2b562d30113cb9a4823025a9a162503017e9d81fd96ddb5b98e5 bb89bd, fb553e12381d42a612c713968078424201794a35fd13c681ae7faa77bf 18e553,

TYPE	VALUE
SHA256	641710df66c792439f85b79879a268caa17b78ea0bf6924369fa6131fda01cd5
URLs	hxxp[:]//exitlife[.]xyz/c2sock, hxxp[:]//africatechs[.]com/Amdaygo[.]exe, hxxp[:]//45[.]9[.]74[.]182/b7djSDcPcZ/index[.]php, hxxp[:]//patriciabono[.]com/BRR[.]exe, hxxp://enfantfoundation[.]com/amday[.]exe, hxxp://fuji-iasi[.]ro/BRR[.]exe, hxxps://earthqik[.]co[.]za/BR[.]exe, hxxp://silversoft[.]jin/BR[.]exe, hxxp://tbmcoats[.]com/BRRR[.]exe, hxxp://aviangas[.]co[.]ke/BRRRRAS[.]exe
IP:PORT	95.143.190[.]57:15648

References

<https://cyble.com/blog/lummac-stealer-leveraging-amadey-bot-to-deploy-sectoprat/>

<https://www.hivepro.com/information-stealer-lummac2-targets-browsers-and-crypto-wallets/>

What Next?

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