

Threat Level

## HiveForce Labs THREAT ADVISORY



**RedEyes Exploiting Ably Platform Using FadeStealer and Wiretapping Capabilities** 

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Admiralty Code

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A1

# Summary

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Actor Name: Red Eyes (APT 37, Reaper, Ricochet Chollima, ScarCruft, Thallium, Group 123, Geumseong121, Venus 121, Hermit, InkySquid, ATK 4, ITG10) Target: Individuals of North Korean defectors, human rights activists, journalists, and policymakers, university professors for surveillance purposes. Malware: FadeStealer, CHM malware, AblyGo backdoor Affected Platform: Ably

**Attack:** RedEyes, a state-sponsored APT group, is targeting individuals through spear phishing emails and employing an Infostealer with wiretapping capabilities, utilizing the Ably platform for command and control.

### **X** Attack Regions

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### **Attack Details**



RedEyes, a state-sponsored APT group, has recently been conducting targeted attacks against individuals such as North Korean defectors, human rights activists, and university professors. Their attacks involve sophisticated techniques and tools.

#2

RedEyes was observed using an Infostealer named FadeStealer with wiretapping capabilities and a backdoor developed using GoLang, which exploited the Ably platform for command and control. FadeStealer exhibits advanced capabilities such as organizing exfiltrated data into separate folders and employing RAR compression with split volumes to restrict the size of compressed files.



The initial breach occurred through spear phishing emails containing a disguised CHM file that appeared as a password-protected document. When executed, the CHM file executed a malicious script, establishing persistence on the compromised system and acting as a backdoor.

#4

RedEyes utilized the Ably platform and GoLang backdoor to send commands and control the compromised systems. The API key required for communication was stored in a GitHub repository, allowing anyone with the key to access the threat actor's channel and receive commands.

#5

After gaining control, the threat actor employed privilege escalation techniques and executed additional malware. They utilized the "AblyGo backdoor" and PowerShell to conduct exfiltration activities, including wiretapping, keylogging, and the theft of data from removable media devices and smartphones.

### Recommendations

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**Robust Email Filtering and Anti-Phishing Measures:** Implement advanced email filtering solutions and anti-phishing technologies to detect and block malicious emails containing suspicious attachments or links. This will significantly reduce the risk of employees interacting with RedEyes phishing attempts.



**Endpoint Protection and Regular Updates:** Maintain up-to-date endpoint protection solutions, including anti-malware and anti-virus software, on all devices. Regularly update operating systems, software applications, and security solutions to patch known vulnerabilities that could be exploited by RedEyes attackers. By keeping systems protected and current, organizations can significantly mitigate the risk of successful RedEyes attacks.



**File Extension Awareness:** Enable the display of file extensions on operating systems to help users identify potentially malicious file types, such as CHM or LNK files. Instruct users to exercise caution when opening files with uncommon or suspicious extensions.

#### Potential <u>MITRE ATT&CK</u> TTPs

<u>TA0003</u>	<u>TA0011</u>	<u>TA0005</u>	<u>TA0002</u>
Persistence	Command and Control	Defense Evasion	Execution
<u>TA0007</u>	<u>TA0001</u>	<u>TA0009</u>	<u>TA0008</u>
Discovery	Initial Access	Collection	Lateral Movement
<u>T1068</u>	<u>TA0004</u>	<u>T1204</u>	<u>T1140</u>
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Privilege Escalation	User Execution	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
<u>T1059</u>	<u>T1056</u>	<u>T1560</u>	<u>T1176</u>
Command and Scripting Interpreter	Input Capture	Archive Collected Data	Browser Extensions
<u>T1059.001</u>	<u>T1218</u>	<u>T1547</u>	<u>T1106</u>
PowerShell	System Binary Proxy Execution	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	Native API

<u>T1566.001</u>	<u>T1566</u>	<u>T1036</u>	<u>T1218.005</u>
Spearphishing Attachment	Phishing	Masquerading	Mshta
<u>T1547.001</u>	<u>T1546.015</u>	<u>T1546</u>	<u>T1574.002</u>
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	Component Object Model Hijacking	Event Triggered Execution	DLL Side-Loading
<u>T1574</u>	<u>T1056.001</u>	<u>T1025</u>	<u>T1027</u>
Hijack Execution Flow	Keylogging	Data from Removable Media	Obfuscated Files or Information

#### **X** Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

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ТҮРЕ	VALUE
IPV4	172[.]93[.]181[.]249
URLs	http://172[.]93[.]181[.]249/file/ http://172[.]93[.]181[.]249/control/html/1[.]xnhtml-y96a http://172[.]93[.]181[.]249/control/html/1[.]html http://172[.]93[.]181[.]249/control/data/
MD5	f44bf949abead4af0966436168610bcc 59804449f5670b4b9b3b13efdb296abb 3c475d80f5f6272234da821cc418a6f7 3277e0232ed6715f2bae526686232e06 1c1136c12d0535f4b90e32aa36070682 1352abf9de97a0faf8645547211c3be7

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#### Contextualize

Uni5 Threat Exposure Management

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