

HiveForce Labs

# THREAT ADVISORY

**ATTACK REPORT**

## Chinese Espionage Hackers Exploit ESXi Zero-Day

Date of Publication

June 14, 2023

Admiralty Code

A2

TA Number

TA2023263

# Summary

**First appeared:** September 2022

**Actor Name:** UNC3886

**Malware:** VirtualPita and VirtualPie backdoors


**Attack Region:** The US and APJ regions.

**Targeted Sectors:** Defense, Technology, and Telecommunication.

**Targeted Platforms:** Windows, Linux, and PhotonOS (vCenter) guest VMs

**Attack:** The Chinese-sponsored hacking group, UNC3886, has been actively exploiting the CVE-2023-20867 vulnerability and using advanced backdoors such as VirtualPita and VirtualPie to carry out malicious activities across organizations in the US and APJ regions.




## Attack Regions



UNC3886

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## CVEs

CVE	NAME	AFFECTED PRODUCT	ZERO-DAY	CISA KEV	PATCH
CVE-2023-20867	VMware Tools authentication bypass	VMware Tools: 10.0.0 - 12.2.0			

# Attack Details

## #1

The Chinese-sponsored hacking group UNC3886 utilized a zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2023-20867) in VMware ESXi to exploit an authentication bypass flaw within VMware Tools. This enabled them to stealthily deploy VirtualPita and VirtualPie backdoors on both Windows and Linux systems, including guest VMs, originating from compromised ESXi hosts.

## #2

The primary objective of this nefarious activity was to illicitly acquire sensitive data. In the event of a fully compromised ESXi host, the manipulation of VMware Tools can fail to authenticate host-to-guest operations, thereby compromising the confidentiality and integrity of the guest virtual machine. UNC3886 has predominantly targeted defense, technology, and telecommunication organizations located in the United States and APJ (Asia Pacific and Japan) regions.

## #3

In the subsequent phase, UNC3886 deployed VirtualPita and VirtualPie backdoors into ESXi and vCenter machines, ensuring the concealment of their malicious operations. Notably, UNC3886 has demonstrated the deployment of multiple backdoors, such as VIRTUALGATE and VIRTUALPITA, using VMCI sockets to facilitate lateral movement and maintain a persistent presence within the compromised infrastructure.

## #4

When an ESXi host is initially connected to a vCenter server, a service account called 'vpxuser' is created. UNC3886 has been observed harvesting the credentials of this vpxuser account from vCenter servers, thereby acquiring administrative privileges over all associated ESXi hosts. By exploiting the CVE-2023-20867 vulnerability, the threat actor can execute privileged commands across guest virtual machines, leveraging the harvested credentials of the connected ESXi service accounts from the vCenter Server appliance.

## #5

UNC3886 persistently focuses on devices and platforms that typically lack EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response) solutions, effectively leveraging zero-day exploits on these specific platforms. During their mid-2022 campaign, the Chinese hacking group UNC3886 exploited a zero-day vulnerability ([CVE-2022-41328](#)) to compromise FortiGate firewall devices and successfully deploy previously undiscovered Castletap and Thincrust backdoors.

# Recommendations



**Ensuring Regular Patching and Vulnerability Management:** Organizations must prioritize timely patching and updates for their virtualization platforms, such as VMware ESXi and vCenter, to effectively address known vulnerabilities. By promptly applying patches and keeping systems up-to-date through the upgrade to VMware Tools version 12.2.5 or later, the risk of exploitation can be significantly reduced, effectively thwarting potential attacks from threat actors like UNC3886.



**Implement Least Privilege and Access Controls:** Organizations must adopt strong access controls, employing least privilege principles. This involves restricting administrative access to authorized personnel, implementing multifactor authentication, enforcing regular password updates, limiting the use of service accounts, and regularly reviewing access privileges. These measures mitigate the risk of unauthorized access and credential abuse highlighted by UNC3886's exploitation of administrative privileges and credential harvesting.

## Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

<b><u>TA0002</u></b> Execution	<b><u>TA0003</u></b> Persistence	<b><u>TA0004</u></b> Privilege Escalation	<b><u>TA0005</u></b> Defense Evasion
<b><u>TA0006</u></b> Credential Access	<b><u>TA0009</u></b> Collection	<b><u>TA0011</u></b> Command and Control	<b><u>T1560</u></b> Archive Collected Data
<b><u>T1059</u></b> Command and Scripting Interpreter	<b><u>T1203</u></b> Exploitation for Client Execution	<b><u>T1569</u></b> System Services	<b><u>T1098</u></b> Account Manipulation
<b><u>T1136</u></b> Create Account	<b><u>T1543</u></b> Create or Modify System Process	<b><u>T1548</u></b> Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	<b><u>T1068</u></b> Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
<b><u>T1055</u></b> Process Injection	<b><u>T1211</u></b> Exploitation for Defense Evasion	<b><u>T1212</u></b> Exploitation for Credential Access	<b><u>T1087</u></b> Account Discovery
<b><u>T1105</u></b> Ingress Tool Transfer			

# ✂ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
MD5	8e80b40b1298f022c7f3a96599806c43 2c28ec2d541f555b2838099ca849f965 744e2a4c1da48869776827d461c2b2ec 93d50025b81d3dbcb2e25d15cae03428 fe34b7c071d96dac498b72a4a07cb246 61ab3f6401d60ec36cd3ac980a8deb75
SHA1	e9cbac1f64587ce1dc5b92cde9637affb3b58577 e35733db8061b57b8fcdb83ab51a90d0a8ba618c a3cc666e0764e856e65275bd4f32a56d76e51420 abff003edf67e77667f56bbcf391e2175cb0f8a 0962e10dc34256c6b31509a5ced498f8f6a3d6b6 93d5c4ebec2aa45dcbd6ddbaad5d80614af82f84
SHA256	c2ef08af063f6d416233a4b2b2e991c177fc72d70a76c24bca9080521 d41040f,505eb3b90cd107cf7e2c20189889afdff813b2fbb98bbdeab 65cde520893b168,4a6f559426493abc0d056665f23457e2779abd34 82434623e1f61f4cd5b41843,13f11c81331bdce711139f985e6c5259 15a72dc5443fbbfe99c8ec1dd7ad2209,5731d988781c9a1d2941f73 33615f6292fb359f6d48498f32c29878b5bedf00f,4cf3e0b60e880e6a 6ba9f45187ac5454813ae8c2031966d8b264ae0d1e15e70d

## ✂ Patch Links

<https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2023-0013.html>

## ✂ References

<https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/vmware-esxi-zero-day-bypass>

<https://core.vmware.com/vsphere-esxi-mandiant-malware-persistence#introduction>


<https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/esxi-hypervisors-malware-persistence>

<https://www.hivepro.com/unc3886-targets-technologies-with-custom-malware-and-exploits-zero-day-vulnerabilities/>

# What Next?

At Hive Pro, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

Book a free demo with HivePro Uni5: Threat Exposure Management Platform.



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